

Theology on the Web.org.uk

Making Biblical Scholarship Accessible

This document was supplied for free educational purposes. Unless it is in the public domain, it may not be sold for profit or hosted on a webserver without the permission of the copyright holder.

If you find it of help to you and would like to support the ministry of Theology on the Web, please consider using the links below:



Buy me a coffee

<https://www.buymeacoffee.com/theology>



PATREON

<https://patreon.com/theologyontheweb>

[PayPal](#)

<https://paypal.me/robbradshaw>

A table of contents for *Bibliotheca Sacra* can be found here:

https://biblicalstudies.org.uk/articles_bib-sacra_01.php

Sandys and Quaresmins.¹ Eye-witnesses moreover differ in their testimony. In the year 1844, a friend, whose name has already been frequently mentioned, examined the tomb in reference to this very theory; and the impression left upon his mind was, that the whole chamber, niches and all, is built up with masonry within the wall; and that if any part is earlier than the times of the crusades, it is the receptacle sunk in the floor. The entire silence of the English author in respect to this reputed tomb, is likewise under the circumstances a strong testimony against any claims of high antiquity.

We may here close the discussion respecting the course of the ancient second wall. The foregoing historical considerations relieve the subject from the dust which has been cast upon it; and leave the explicit language of Josephus, and the other circumstances above adduced, to bear their testimony in its full strength, without danger of contradiction or need of modification.

In a second article, I propose to consider the evidence relating to the following points, viz. the southern part of the temple-area and the ancient bridge which led from it to Zion; the position and extent of the fortress Antonia; the situation of the fountain Gihon; the earlier gate of St. Stephen, and the tradition connected with it; as also some miscellaneous topics of minor importance.

ARTICLE II.

SCHOTT'S TREATISE ON THE SUBJECT-MATTER OF SERMONS.

By Edwards A. Park, Professor at Andover.

[A BRIEF notice of the writings of Henry Augustus Schott was given in the Bib. Sac. Vol. 2. pp. 12, 13. The notice was introductory to an abstract of the first volume of Schott's *Theorie der Beredsamkeit*. The second volume of that work is condensed into the following Article. The title of the second volume is, *The Theory of Rhetorical Invention*, with especial reference to

¹ Zuallart, Anvers 1626, p. 150. Sandys' Trav. p. 127. Quaresm. II. p. 568. All these writers speak of it only as the tomb of Joseph of Arimathea; so that Nicodemus has come in for a share only at a still later period.

Discourses from the Pulpit. Among the reasons for publishing an abstract of this treatise are the following: It exhibits in a good degree the spirit, the guiding principles of the German pulpit; and the preachers of every land are profited by an acquaintance with the homiletic literature of other nations. It is a celebrated volume, and we naturally feel some measure of interest in any work, whatever may be its intrinsic worth, which has exerted a perceptible influence upon a large and learned community. It is in itself a valuable treatise. It suggests many accurate distinctions of words and ideas which are frequently confounded. It affords proof that German scholars can write with sound judgment and without visionary hypotheses. It exhibits a pleasing degree of honest and sober piety, of purity of intention, of freedom from rhetorical artifice, and from the extravagances both of rationalism and fanaticism.]

1. *Use of the term, Invention, in Sacred Rhetoric.*

The ancient rhetoricians gave to the term Invention, *inventio*, *εὕρεσις*, a more limited meaning than is assigned to it in modern treatises on homiletics. It included the selection of arguments, of illustrations and of appeals, by which the address of the orator might be made effective, but it did not include the selection of the subject of the address. It was according to Cicero, (*De Inventione* L. i. c. 7.) *excogitatio rerum verarum aut verisimilium, quae causam probabilem reddant*. Comp. Auctor ad Herennium L. 1. c. 2. 3, and Cicero, *Partitiones Oratoriae*, c. 2. But in modern homiletics, the term Invention includes the choice of the subject, as well as of the proofs, modes of explanation and of appeal by which the subject is enforced. There is indeed, in some cases, a restriction of the preacher to one prescribed text for each sermon of the year, but this text may allow him to write on either of several themes; and in other cases, there is given him a free choice, not only of his theme, but also of the text which suggests it. In treating of Invention, therefore, with special reference to sacred oratory, it is important to consider, first, the general classes and the character of the subjects which are proper for the pulpit; and secondly the various kinds of explanation, argument, motive and appeal which are useful in the treatment of these subjects.

2. *The General Character of the Subjects of Sermons.*

The theme of a discourse should be such as will call forth the activity of the whole soul. It should appeal not to the intellect only, nor the imagination only, nor the affections only, but to all these faculties and susceptibilities combined, and also to the will, which is always the ultimate principle to which the orator addresses himself. Hence it is a rule, that the theme of a discourse should be practical in its character. The ancient rhetoricians prescribed this rule for the judicial, demonstrative and panegyric orations. When rhetoric had declined from its original dignity, the term *eloquence* was applied to those addresses which were designed for mere parade or for the play of wit. At the present day, also, we sometimes hear the term, *scholastic or academical orations*, appended to essays whose only object is to inform the intellect. But this is an improper use of the words, *eloquence*, and *orations*. The very nature of *eloquence* has been shown to involve an appeal to the will.¹ The nature of religion, also, emphatically demands that a religious address should have a practical character. The design of public worship and of the services in the sanctuary, requires that the preacher aim to affect the voluntary conduct of his audience. The history of the pulpit evinces that such was the design of the earlier preachers. The pulpit should aim to affect men as free moral agents; not merely as beings capable of choice, but also as beings capable of choosing the right, the good. The subject of a discourse should be such, therefore, as is fitted to make men labor for the perfect development of every human virtue. It should be such as will excite all the virtuous susceptibilities of the preacher. He must therefore be fully acquainted with it in its various relations. He must feel a deep interest in it. He must firmly believe and must have practically experienced the truth and importance of what he utters. This must not only be the fact, but also the known fact. If he pretend to have a warmer interest in his subject than he actually does possess, his hypocrisy will soon be detected; and if he be known or supposed to preach insincerely, his hearers will not sympathize with him, and therefore he will not persuade them, he will not be eloquent. Hence results the importance of the rule, that the preacher be penetrated with an earnest love to the truth and warm philanthropy. Thus we learn the full

¹ See Bib. Sac. Vol. II. Art. II. § 2. 3.

meaning of Quintilian's remark, (*Instit. Orat. L. 12. c. 1.*) *neque enim tantum id dico, eum qui sit orator virum esse oportere, sed ne futurum quidem oratorem, nisi virum bonum.* Thus also we see the importance of a minister's selecting for his discourses, only such themes as lie within the sphere of his own investigation and practical experience. He may sometimes awaken an interest in his theme by his manner of treating it, even when his audience have a prepossession against his ability or moral fitness to discuss it. But this interest would be much increased if the prepossessions of his hearers were in his favor, or were at least not unfriendly to him. A man who is advanced in life, may preach against the dread of novelties and innovations with great effect, but a young man would encounter a baneful prejudice in his attempts to recommend the new and disparage the old customs. Cicero in his Oration for Sextus Roscius, endeavors to remove the unfavorable impressions which his youth would naturally make upon his audience; and the ancients generally attached great importance to the connection between the private character of an orator and the themes of his public discourses. See Quintilian's *Inst. Lib. 12. c. 1. 6.*

But as the preacher is not merely a minister of religion, but also of the Christian religion, it follows that he should unfold in his sermons the positive and distinctive instructions of the New Testament; that the *central* truth of all his pulpit ministrations should be Jesus Christ, the person, the character, the teaching, the works of the Redeemer. The doctrines which were taught, and the duties which were inculcated, directly or indirectly, by the Saviour and his apostles, are such as will afford scope for the most extensive series of discourses. Never should the preacher be afraid of diminishing the variety of his pulpit addresses, by confining himself to what is taught or implied more or less emphatically in the New Testament. His great object should be to inspire his hearers with faith and love, with that faith which is described in the *Form. Concord.* as *quiddam vivum, efficax, potens, ita ut fieri non possit, quin semper bona operetur.* He should so present Christian doctrine as to evince its harmony and inseparable connection with Christian duty. The subjects of some of his discourses should be the truths of Christianity, yet not without reference to the practical virtues which grow out of them. The themes of other discourses should be the duties imposed by the Christian system, yet not without regard to the doctrines which form their basis. The subjects of the preacher's

discourses, then, should not be purely doctrinal, if by this is meant that they should have no tendency to affect the moral conduct of the hearers; neither should they be merely practical, if by this is meant that they should have no obvious connection with the great doctrines of Christianity.

3. *Doctrinal Subjects of Sermons.*

When the doctrines of our religion are discussed, they should be treated in the popular, and not in the scientific form. The essential truths of Christianity are, indeed, the same, in whatever way presented; but the interests of science demand that they be reduced to a strictly logical order, that they be considered in their relations to philosophical theories, and that they compose one compact system; whereas the edification of the people demands that these truths be presented in a freer, simpler style, and that those nice distinctions which are needed for the schools be excluded from the pulpit. There are also some objections to the introduction of controversy into sermons. The polemical preacher is apt to be suspected of an undue zeal for all that is new, or all that is old; of animosity toward his opposers, or of a desire to attract attention to himself. This loss of reputation injures him as an orator. Still, there are some subjects on which fatal errors are prevalent in the community, and against these errors the preacher must assume a polemical attitude. He should not fear the unfavorable judgments of men with regard to himself, when he is called to oppose the false opinions of his hearers on subjects of essential importance. That love of peace which would exclude from the pulpit all controversy on the cardinal truths of religion, is more properly called an indifference to the spirit of the Christian scheme. Great objections have been made against the practice of discoursing on the distinctive tenets of the particular church [or sect] to which the preacher belongs. Whenever these distinctive tenets are mere philosophical explanations or subtle analyses, or recondite inferences from admitted principles; whenever they have no immediate connection with the essential genius and spirit of the New Testament, they are not proper subjects for the pulpit. But so far as the dogmas of the creed, to which we subscribe, form the characteristic features of the Christian system, we are bound to preach upon them. When a clergyman professes his belief in a creed, he is not to be considered as obligating himself to defend every word or sen-

tance in it, or as precluding himself from all further advance in theological knowledge; but he is under obligation to maintain the fundamental articles of that creed, and to avoid all appearance of despising what he professes to adopt as his system of faith.

It is a mistake to suppose that doctrinal sermons must be chiefly argumentative. Some of them may be chiefly such; others may be chiefly devoted to the unfolding of the nature of the truth discussed, and others to the exhibition of its appropriate influence on the feelings and conduct. Sometimes, these three characteristics may be united in one and the same discourse. In either case the contemplation on the doctrine may be salutary to the moral feelings.

4. *Practical Subjects of Sermons.*

As doctrinal sermons may be properly called *doctrino-practical*, so practical sermons may be termed *practico-doctrinal*. They are devoted, not to exhibitions of mere philosophical ethics, but to the inculcation of such duties as are distinctively Christian. They demand that species of virtue which consists in conformity with the example of Christ, in a likeness to God, in such love to the Creator and to our fellow creatures as flows from faith in the divine word. Such sermons, being devoted to the ethics of Christianity, must also direct our attention to the great truths which make Christianity what it is.

The subjects in the department of Christian morality may be divided into general and special. The former class comprises all those themes which present evangelical duty as a whole. It is useful to exhibit the virtues of the Christian as forming a complete system; as intimately combined one with another, so that no one may feel himself justified in selecting a portion of these duties for practice and neglecting the remainder. There are various points of view from which one may take a comprehensive survey of the whole circle of Christian virtues, and may show the incompatibility of any, even the smallest sin with the spirit of the gospel. The second class of practical subjects, the special, comprises the specific virtues or vices, or the particular moral relations of individuals. It is desirable that the preacher exhibit the nature of evangelical virtue in its single modifications, as well as in its generic and systematic character. He should be careful not to select for the main subjects of his discourses, those

virtues or vices in which the majority of his audience feel no personal interest. He may preach on the duties of children to their parents, because many of his hearers are interested and profited in considering the appropriate methods of treating those who are advanced in life. He may preach on the mutual obligations of rulers and private citizens, but an ordinary audience would not be edified by an entire discourse on the duties of a civil ruler, nor on the peculiar obligations of a school teacher. Such themes are *too* special for a promiscuous auditory. The preacher should likewise avoid all minute casuistical discussions in relation to exigencies which his hearers will probably never experience; see 2 Tim. 2: 23. Titus 3: 9. He should also avoid such graphic descriptions of vice as will excite disgust in the virtuous, or inflame the bad passions of the vicious. Such descriptions often awaken in the minds of the inexperienced, a new desire to mingle in the scenes which are so vividly pictured forth. A glowing description of the delights connected with sin, is fitted to entice many hearers into the sin from which the description was intended to dissuade him.

There is a second classification of practical or ethical discourses. They may be divided into such as warn and reprove, and such as cheer and invigorate. The preacher may so portray the vices to which his hearers are exposed, and the virtues which they ought to cherish, as to deter them from the former and persuade them to the latter. He may either descend in his description from the general to the particular, or he may rise from the particular to the general. In the latter case, he may begin with some incident recorded in the Bible, and from it may infer some general principle of ethics, which may be the subject of his discourse. The life of Christ affords a rich abundance of historical data, from which the most important rules of morality may be derived. Ecclesiastical history also furnishes many facts on which ethical instruction may be grafted. Care should be taken, however, that facts selected from history should be such as will be, in their moral relations, readily comprehended by the people. It is much better to illustrate our ethical teachings by the actual occurrences of history, than by the fictitious narratives which are sometimes composed for this purpose. Why resort to fiction, when the sacred narrative is exuberant in its moral instruction? Besides, the use of this narrative gives a biblical aspect to the sermon, and thus imparts an authority to it. The habit of indulging in fictitious description is apt to lead the preacher into a meretricious style of ornament, and also to ob-

score his own and his hearers' view of the substantial truth to be illustrated. In addition to this mode of delineating the virtue or the vice, which is the subject of the discourse, and illustrating it by veritable history, the preacher may exhibit the reasons for practising or avoiding the conduct described, the encouragements to a right demeanor, the temptations to wrong, and the consequences which result from the one and the other. In his public reproofs, he should guard against too great particularity; he should not administer reprimand very often, lest the effect of it be lost by its commonness; he should never betray a petulant or angry temper, and should adapt his rebuke to the character of the persons censured. He has no right to omit the duty altogether, of preaching against the specific sins which are committed by his people; for in 2 Tim. 4: 2. 2 Thess. 3: 15. Titus 2: 15, he is commanded to reprove men, as decisively as in other passages he is commanded to comfort them. In his condemnatory discourses he should not discourage the guilty from attempting to amend their life, nor in his consolatory discourses should he impart a greater degree of hope than the character of the afflicted will justify.

It has been already stated, that the subjects of sermons may be either, Christian doctrine, so exhibited as to encourage the performance of duty, or Christian ethics, so exhibited as to illustrate its dependence on doctrinal truth. But there may be other subjects of discourses, derived either from history, which is a progressive revelation of the divine will, or from natural philosophy, which is a reflection of the divine character, or from psychology, which is related in various ways to religious doctrine and practice.

5. Historical Subjects of Sermons.

Allusion was made in the preceding Section to the use of historical incidents in sermons; but the present Section is devoted to the selection of an historical narrative, as the chief theme of a discourse. Some event or series of events recorded in the Bible, some account of the early establishment of Christianity and of the triumph of the church over Judaism and Heathenism, may be a proper subject for a Christian discourse. The preacher may also devote a sermon occasionally to an exhibition of the state of God's people during the middle ages, to their conflict with spiritual despotism, to their struggles at the Reformation, to the progress and the influence of the Reformation, to the success of Missionary and Bible Societies; to the abuses and corruptions which have

sometimes prevailed in the church, the conduct of fanatical sects, the influence of heterodox parties, etc. Nor is the preacher limited to biblical and ecclesiastical history for the themes of his discourses. He may sometimes, though less frequently, select as the theme of his sermon, a narrative from the general history of religions; an account, for example, of Mohammedanism, a comparison of the ecclesiastical policy of the early Christians with that of Mohammed, a contrast of the spirit of the New Testament with the spirit of the Koran. So too the history of the various forms of religious worship among heathen nations, and of the gradual development of Pagan theological systems, may impart much spiritual knowledge to a Christian audience. The minister may also devote a sermon, occasionally, to some fragment of general history; for as the history of religions, so the history of nations and of individuals who have distinguished themselves in secular life, has often an intimate connection with the truths of Christianity. In particular, the clergyman may discourse, at certain periods, upon some historical narratives relating to his own country, or to some of its more eminent benefactors. He may sometimes, although seldom, discourse upon political movements. Some of these movements may essentially affect the freedom or the spirituality of the church, and therefore demand the attention of the clergy. Sometimes the welfare of the nation requires an immediate and great sacrifice of individual good; and the preacher is then bound to stimulate the patriotism and the philanthropy of his hearers. Such sermons are often useful in a time of foreign or of civil war.

The general rules for the selection of historical subjects are these. The subjects should have an obvious connection with Christian doctrine or duty. They should be spiritual, and not secular in their final impression on the mind. They should be in some degree familiar to the audience, or at least such as may be easily made familiar to them. The preacher should not allow the historical element to obscure the moral instruction, or diminish the moral impression of the discourse. He should, therefore, be careful not to fill up too large a part of his sermon with narrative, nor to be too minute in his historical or geographical delineations. He should never aim at a display of his own historical researches. He should never distort the truth of history, nor allow his imagination or his feelings to supply what the authentic narrative has not fairly implied. He should be modest in his interpretations of Divine Providence, and not pronounce dogmatically on the purposes of God in allowing those events to take place which are

left unexplained by the Bible and by philosophy.¹ He should not ascribe a *legislative* authority to the example of the men whose biography he rehearses; for the conduct of no man except our Saviour, can be held up as a faultless model to be imitated; and besides, the demeanor of an individual, however excellent, in one relation, is no inviolable rule for us who may be in a very different relation, and may therefore be obligated to conduct ourselves in a different manner. The law of God, and not the example of man is our rule of duty.

The utility of historical discourses is obvious. They give vivid ideas of divine truth. By their particular details they interest the whole man, the imagination and sympathy as well as the intellect. The concrete form of instruction is more distinct than the abstract. When the sermons are founded on scriptural narratives, they explain the sacred word, illustrate its truths and develop its practical bearings. There are some principles which require the historical method for their full elucidation. The Bible is an historical book, and the Christian system has a positive and historical character. The doctrine of God's superintending providence, his righteous moral government can be more clearly taught by a delineation of the Jewish history, than by any abstract statements. The dignity to which man may be exalted, the debasement into which he may sink; the beauty and the profitableness of virtue, the adverseness and the misery of vice may be delineated with peculiar impressiveness by the recital of memorable instances of holy or sinful conduct.

Our Saviour often adopted the historical method of illustrating religious truth. The early Christian fathers imitated his example. In the Roman Catholic church particular days are set apart for commemorating the virtues of departed saints, and many sermons of great value have been preached on the character of the personages to whom these days were consecrated. See, for example, the sermons of Flechier and Bourdaloue. Great evils have arisen from an abuse of the historical element in sermons; and the proper employment of it requires a lively sympathy with Christian doctrine, and a sound, well practised judgment.

6. *Philosophical Subjects of Sermons.*

It is not allowable for the preacher to give an exclusively phil-

¹ Schott would condemn, for example, all such *decisive* explanations of providential events, as are given by Dwight, in Vol. V. p. 41 of his *System of Theology*.

osophical character to his discourses; still he may occasionally select his themes from the two great departments of science, the natural and the mental. In his treatment of subjects derived from natural philosophy, he should avoid the style of a scientific treatise and also of a poetical description, and should present the Christian and the religiously practical views of the phenomena of nature. He is justified in discoursing on these phenomena, by such passages of the inspired word as are found in Ps. 19. 65. 92. 95. 104. 105. 106. 107. 111. 148. Matt. 6: 26—29. 10: 29. Acts. 14: 17. 17: 27. Rom. 1: 19, 20. What a variety of religious instruction do the sacred writers derive from one small object in nature, a grain of seed-corn! In John 12: 24, this single seed is an image of the great truth, that death is a precursor of a new life. In 1 Cor. 15: 36 sq. it affords a symbol of the relation between our present bodies, and the spiritual bodies which we shall receive at the resurrection. In Matthew 18: 18 sq. it suggests the diversified influences of the divine word upon human character. In Gal. 6: 7 sq. and in 2 Cor. 9: 6, 7, it portrays to us the consequences, the rewards and punishments of our good or evil actions. Thus do the phenomena of nature serve as pictures of religious truth, and as means of increasing the vividness of our theological conceptions. They afford, moreover, notwithstanding the attempts of the critical philosophy to invalidate their force in this regard, a strictly logical argument in favor of certain doctrines relating to God, and in this way they authorize us to infer certain truths relating to man, particularly to his existence in a future state. The contemplation on these phenomena presented in connection with moral truth, exerts a subduing and calming influence on the mind, inspires us with noble feelings in regard to our relative place in the scale of creation, and gives us a pleasing familiarity with certain laws and principles which regulate the material world and are analogous to the rules for our religious life. There is a correspondence between the material kingdom and the spiritual, which it is useful for Christians to notice. The order and obedience to law which prevail throughout the physical universe, the conduciveness of all events to a good end, the richness and variety, the beauty and grandeur of nature, all have a favorable influence upon our tastes, and lead to a harmony of our moral emotions with the principles of the divine government.

If discourses on the material works of God be thus conducive to spiritual improvement, much more useful must be the preacher's exhibition of truths relating to the intellect, affections and

will. The consideration of our mental structure may increase the Christian's faith in the divinity and the excellence of the Gospel, by showing him the nice adjustment of evangelical doctrine to the susceptibilities of man, its fitness to elevate his character and to satisfy all his wants. Psychological discourses, penetrated as they should be with the devotional spirit, may suggest the meaning of numerous biblical phrases, excite the mind to a just appreciation of its powers, of its duties to itself, of its facilities for perpetual advancement in knowledge and virtue, of its dangers also, and the means of averting them. The Old and New Testaments contain an exhaustless variety of narratives, parables and apothegms which may furnish texts for such discourses, and which form a system of biblical psychology, highly useful to the pastor, and not less so to the preacher. Rheinhard has given several good specimens of psychological discourses; as for instance, his sermon on the tendency of sorrowful virtue to produce a deeper impression on men than is produced by cheerful virtue, on the connection between the necessity of providing for our physical wants, and the promotion of our spiritual good; on the influence which piety gives a man over the mind and heart of his fellows. Dräseke and Ammon, [Bishop Butler and Dr. Chalmers,] have also furnished agreeable specimens of this species of discourse.

7. *The Advantages of preaching from Texts.*

In the judicial, deliberative and demonstrative orations of the ancients, there was no necessity for a formal announcement of the theme. The occasions on which the orators spoke, were of themselves sufficient to indicate the subjects to be discussed. But the sacred orator cannot ordinarily apprise his hearers of the theme which he has selected, except by announcing it at the commencement of his sermon. It was the custom of the earliest preachers to discourse from passages of the inspired word. They thus announced the subjects of their discourses. In the times of Gregory the Great and of Charles the Great, collections of texts were published and the clergy were required to preach from the passages inserted in these selections. This use of prescribed texts is still continued in many churches. It was not the uniform practice of the Fathers, to deliver their sermons from passages of Scripture prefixed to them. They sometimes adopted a freer mode of address. We must not think that the use of the text is

essential to the Christian character of the sermon. It is possible for a man to preach in the spirit and according to the standard of the Gospel, and to explain many biblical passages in the progress of his discourse, without mentioning any text as the origin and foundation of his remarks. Still, it would not be right, as some contend that it would be,¹ for a preacher, at the present day, to deviate from the now universal custom of prefacing the address from the pulpit with a passage from sacred writ. The advantages of conforming to this ancient usage are numerous. The use of the text constantly reminds the preacher of his duty to make the Bible the source of his instructions and appeals, to avoid all those themes of discourse which are not suggested by the spirit of the New Testament, to preserve throughout his sermon the tone of evangelical doctrine, and to introduce into his pulpit ministrations the variety and copiousness of biblical truth. The use of prescribed texts, or of the *pericope*, suggests to the preacher the richest and most diversified topics of discourse, and thus saves him from falling into a monotony of preaching, into a habit of confining himself to a narrow circle of favorite subjects, and from painful suspense with regard to the character of the themes which he ought to discuss in the pulpit, and with regard to the specific mode of discussing them. It also affords him a plausible reason for selecting such themes as will be disagreeable to those of his hearers who need to be reprov'd by them. When he preaches on texts which convey a reprimand to these individuals, it is evident that he has not gone out of his way to procure these condemnatory texts, and he cannot be accused of personality for following the order which is marked out in the pericope. Nor is the use of the text less important for the hearers than for the preacher. It constantly reminds an audience of the paramount authority of the Bible, and of the binding force of sermons founded upon that sacred volume. It is far more impressive to introduce the text at first, as the foundation of the discourse, than afterwards as a mere proof or confirmation of the doctrine previously advanced. The practice of preaching from texts leads to a frequent exposition of the Bible, and affords to the hearers suggestive and easily remembered passages with which they may indissolubly associate the contents of the sermon, and which, being often perused in private, will as often for a long time recall to memory the otherwise evanescent thoughts of the discourse, and thus re-

¹ See the treatises of Niemeyer and Haker in Schuderoff's Jahrb. for 1820, and 1821.

new its good moral impression. Accordingly, that passage is the most felicitous as a text, which expresses most strikingly the general theme of the discourse, and also suggests the specific propositions into which the sermon is divided.

8. *Classification of Discourses according to the Mode of treating their Texts.*

One class of discourses is denominated *synthetic*. In these sermons a proposition is laid down and logically discussed. The proposition is suggested, but may not be all that is suggested by the text. It is considered in its philosophical or practical relations, and not necessarily in the specific relations which the text discloses. The preacher advances from the proofs to the thing proved, and on this account is his sermon called synthetic. His text, when treated in this manner, is kept subordinate to the logical train of his thoughts, and therefore is not, or need not be chosen until after the subject is selected. This class of sermons has its advantages. It encourages a habit of connected and consecutive thought; it enables the preacher to discuss particular subjects thoroughly and comprehensively; to secure unity and thereby depth of impression. A second class of discourses is the *analytic*. In these sermons the phrases of the text are explained and applied, the thoughts which it suggests are elucidated in the order which the text itself presents, and no effort is made to combine these thoughts into one general proposition. The preacher, therefore, announces no specific theme of his discourse, but proceeds backwards from the biblical truth to the various considerations which sustain it, analyzing the text into its component parts, and on this account his sermon is called analytic. His whole train of thought is kept subordinate to the order of the words and phrases of which he treats, and therefore the text must be selected previously to the subject. This second, as well as the first class of sermons, has its peculiar advantages. It is adapted to the easy comprehension of the people; it allows a pleasing and enlivening degree of variety in a single discourse; it pursues the unconstrained order of thought laid down in the Scriptures; and this is the order most congenial with the spontaneous feelings, especially with the religious feelings of a popular audience. The continual allusion to the words of the text, impresses men with the belief that their preacher has received his doctrine from the inspired volume. Many important parts of the Bi-

ble are explained, applied and enforced in this method of preaching, and the truths of the discourse become so intimately associated with the passage from which they are derived, that whenever that passage is afterwards read, it will serve as a memento of those truths and of their personal application. This simple method of treating a text was commonly adopted by the earliest of the Church Fathers, when they did not choose to dispense with a specific text altogether. Our systematic structure of a sermon is the invention of more modern times. It evinces more artifice and labor than the analytic method, and on that account is less agreeable to the minds of uneducated and unpretending Christians.

The third class of discourses is the *analytico-synthetic*. In these sermons the entire text is made use of, but its parts are combined into one whole, its various ideas reduced to a general proposition; and this proposition embracing the truths taught or implied in the text, is discussed in a logical as well as a biblical manner. The train of the preacher's thought is, in this class of sermons, coördinate with the train of the ideas involved in the text; and therefore it is seldom advisable to select the proposition to be discussed, before the choice of the text with which that proposition is to be collateral. This class of sermons embraces the advantages of the first two classes and excludes their evils. It allows unity of impression, and also the obvious dependence of the whole discourse upon the inspired word. It avoids the excessive looseness and incoherence into which the analytic method often tempts the preacher, and likewise the severe tension of mind which is sometimes required by the synthetic method. It therefore preserves the hearers' interest longer than do the scattering remarks of the textual, or the syllogistic reasonings of the topical preacher. Not every text, however, is fitted for the analytic, or the analytico-synthetic discourse, nor can every subject be properly discussed in the logical style first named. It is, therefore, expedient to interchange the three classes of sermons. This interchange secures variety in the ministrations of the sanctuary, and the practice in each method of writing facilitates the execution of the other two methods.

It may be proper to remark, that the second of these classes of sermons is the *homily* in the proper and narrow sense of that word, and is sometimes distinguished by the phrase, *free homily*. The third of them is also called *the homily*, but in a wider and less technical signification. The term, *homily*, is sometimes though improperly applied to any discourse which allows a free

and unrestrained flow of thought. The second and third of these classes are also designated by the epithet *ascetic*, because they are with peculiar frequency applied to the mere inculcation of practical duties.

9. *Variety in the Themes for the Pulpit.*

Secular orators, having their themes determined by the very nature of the occasions on which they speak, are not tempted like clergymen to fall into a monotony of address. They may indeed often employ the same illustrations, but they are obliged to speak on very different subjects. Preachers, being allowed to choose their own topics, are apt to confine themselves within a very narrow circle. Whatever their text may be, it may lead them to the discussion of some favorite theme on which they have already preached themselves out. They are drawn into this *curriculum* sometimes by their love of ease, and sometimes by their hope of deepening the impression of their favorite ideas by a frequent repetition of them. But the reiteration of the same truths in the same style, does not enforce them upon the mind. We must approach these truths from different starting-points and in different directions, in order to present them effectively to our hearers. Sermons on various topics must be made to converge to one moral result. Every theme has numerous relations, and each of these relations should be exhibited so as to diversify the services of the pulpit. The preacher must have no uniform plans for his discourses, but must accommodate his methods of discussion to the nature of the subjects discussed. He must not always preach on doctrines, nor always on duties; not uniformly on historical, nor uniformly on philosophical themes. He must avoid all one-sidedness in his own intellectual and moral training, for it is the partial education of clergymen which indisposes them to take an extensive sweep of subjects for their discourses. He must also feel a desire for the comprehensive and symmetrical development of the character of his people; and if he aims to cultivate all the Christian graces in all his hearers, he will see the necessity of leading them through an extended range of subjects. His sermons should be appropriate to his audience, and to the times, but every audience has a character somewhat peculiar, and requires a style of preaching somewhat different from that required by other audiences. Every Sabbath may also present its own exigency, and demand a variation from the style of discourse appropriate to the

preceding Sabbaths. The doctrines advanced by the preacher need not be new, but his illustrations, his appeals, his modes of adopting and enforcing old truths, may be altogether original; suggested by his individual experience, his communion with his own heart, with the minds of his fellow men and with God. By such a variety in the selection and the treatment of his themes, he will preserve the freshness of his own spirit, and will be able to command the interested attention of his audience. He must, however, guard himself against an affectation of novelty, a search for what is new in distinction from what is good, a prurient desire to avoid all such themes as have been discussed by others. In shunning what is hackneyed, he should not be led to tolerate mannerisms and conceits. Among the moderns, good specimens of originality and variety are found in the discourses of Reinhard, Ammon, Schleiermacher and Dräseke; among the ancients, in the sermons of Ephraëm Syrus, who flourished in the fourth century.

10. *Elucidation of the Subject of a Discourse.*

Next to the choice of the subject, comes the elucidation of it. The feelings and the will are not excited by a theme, unless it be distinctly exhibited in its nature and relations. The first class of subjects to be discussed, comprises those particular events or acts which are within the sphere of individual experience or observation. These are elucidated by a more or less graphic description of them. A description may be *prosaic*, designed merely to give a clear idea of the described events or acts to the intellect; or it may be *poetical*, designed to bring these events or acts into our ideal presence and to excite the imagination and feelings; or it may be *oratorical*, designed to influence the whole soul, and especially the will. The oratorical description is, of course, the appropriate one for the pulpit. It combines and modifies both the prosaic and the poetical. It should never allow such a minute and vivid delineation of circumstantial matters, as will obscure the hearer's view of the main subject of the discourse, and allow him to lose himself among pictures when he ought to be occupied with the great reality. The description of an act is distinguished from that of an event, by the term narration. It is apt to be less poetical than the description of an event, and is better adapted to the character of sermons. The narration constituted a distinct part of the ancient judicial orations. It sometimes appears as a distinct part of sermons, but is often,

like the description of events, intermingled with the other parts of the discourse. It appears most prominent in sermons on the parables, or on historical passages of the Bible. Dräseke introduces one of his sermons with a graphic narration of the circumstances in which Paul and Martin Luther were converted to spiritual Christianity.¹

The second class of themes comprises not individual objects of experience and observation, but general and abstract notions. The phrase, abstract notions, is applied in its most extensive import, to such as are not perceptions or conceptions of individual objects of sense; and in its most limited import, to such as are not immediately derived from these perceptions or conceptions. Thus our notion of body is abstract in the widest sense, and our notion of power is abstract in the narrowest sense; for our notion of body is immediately derived from our perceiving an individual of the genus *body*, but our notion of power is derived, not immediately but mediately, from our perceiving a movement which suggests that notion. Ideas of the reason, as well as notions of the understanding, are termed abstract, and are included in this second class of themes. The phrase, concrete notion,

¹ This sermon was preached at the celebration of the anniversary of the union between the Lutheran and Calvinistic churches in Prussia. The text is Acts 9: 8, and the preacher passes in the following manner, from his text to his theme: "Paul is on his way to Damascus, with a commission from the High Priest, to carry bound unto Jerusalem any men or women whom he might find adhering to the new doctrine. And lo! near the end of his journey, there shines round about him suddenly a light from heaven. This may have been a flash of lightning. But for Paul it was something more. It penetrated into his soul with a power never before experienced, with a power increased by the voice from heaven; and it changed the whole current of his life. In what manner and to what degree he was transformed, is familiar to all. Luther, after the close of his academic education, became the teacher of the High School at Erfurt, and the science of law was his chief study. There, on a certain day, he took a walk for the purpose of freely expressing his dissatisfaction with this study to his bosom friend Alexius, and of consulting with that true hearted companion in regard to some more agreeable mode of life. And lo! the heavens are darkened by a storm, and suddenly he sees his friend struck by the lightning, killed, and sinking to the earth by his side. Then was an impression made upon his mind, such as was never made before. And from without there came an influence transforming his inner life, and from within came forth a power changing his outward character. This is the idea which I wish to delineate by a few characteristic touches, and I will endeavor to show how Luther's faith penetrated the interior of his life, and how his inward life penetrated and pervaded his faith." Dräseke's *Predigten zur dritten Jubelfeier der Evangelischen Kirche*. No. 10.

is also used with a narrow import, to express a perception or conception of an individual object of sense, and with a wider import, to express a general notion which is proximate to, and which immediately suggests the individual object of perception or conception. Now an abstract notion is elucidated by one less abstract, or by one which is concrete in the narrow sense. It may be made palpable by mentioning some individual of the genus which it denotes. An idea of the reason may be also rendered palpable by mentioning some individual objects resembling it, especially objects within the scope of the hearers' own observation. A general proposition may be made clear by examples, as is finely illustrated in the 7th ch. of Romans, and in Catech. 6. c. 4. of Cyril of Jerusalem. A great degree of liveliness and power over the feelings, is imparted to our style by thus presenting our generalizations in sensible forms. Definite and precise statements are also important for the elucidating of general propositions. These statements are made sometimes by means of the *definition*, which specifies the essential characteristics of the object defined, as in Heb. 11: 1; sometimes by the *exposition*, which brings to light the essential, but more obscure and less prominent characteristics of the object, as in 1 Cor. 13: 4 seq.; sometimes by the *distinction*, which points out the differences between the object explained and other objects which are similar to it in some respects, and are often confounded with it; sometimes by the *partition*, which is an analysis of the object into its essential component parts; sometimes by the *minute division*, which technically denotes the analysis of the object into such of its subordinate parts as are important in some of its relations. There are many cases in which we may elucidate a general or abstract notion, both by one less general and abstract, and at the same time by a sensible representation. We may also explain a simple idea by stating the ideas opposed to it. This method of contrast excites attention, affixes precise limits to the ideas considered, and by clearly defining the negative, casts additional light over the positive.

In elucidating the theme of his discourse, the orator should adopt a style different from that of the philosopher. He should avoid scholastic technical phrases, and all such trains of thought as prove the decided preponderance of the intellect above the imagination, the feelings and the will. He should be easy and free in his explanatory remarks, and should select such definitions as are fitted for the special relations of his subject to the design

of his discourse, rather than such as are adapted to the general and logical relations of his subject. He should elucidate his theme in those special relations, with great copiousness, vividness and variety, yet should avoid excessive length. He should remember that he and his hearers are conducting a dialogue on a specific theme, and he should not interrupt their responses, draw their attention away from the main object of their interest, and thus retard the progress of the colloquy by thrusting cold, formal and abstruse distinctions between himself and them. Therefore, his whole soul, his imagination, feelings and will should be absorbed in his subject.

He should, in general, prefer the synthetic to the analytic method of explaining his theme. The former method descends from particulars to generals; the latter descends from generals to particulars. The former method is therefore more free, more agreeable to the natural habits of the learner's mind than the latter. The synthetic method leads the hearer from one step to another, until he forms his own idea of the whole subject; the analytic method begins with a dry definition, and thus suggests at the outset the essential truth to be developed, allays curiosity, and compels the mind to sink down from the more to the less important considerations. The former method encourages the mind to exercise its own powers, to advance from the known to the unknown; and thus both excites and prolongs the hearers' interest. It prevents confusion of thought by leading the mind from the simple to the more complex, from the contiguous to the more remote. Rising from the less to the more important, it comes nearer and nearer to the essential truth to be discussed, imparts to the hearer a feeling of rapid progress, gratifies him with continued change and novelty, and is thus peculiarly appropriate to the character of an oration, considered as a regularly advancing dialogue between the speaker and his silent yet ever active audience. Still the synthetic method, being more interesting and peculiar, is also more diffuse than the analytic, and therefore the latter is to be preferred, whenever conciseness is required. Some writers, also, are better qualified by nature and practice for the analytic method than for the synthetic, and they should not be compelled to resist the native tendencies of their minds.

It is far more necessary for the sermon than the essay, that it be written in the vividly descriptive style, that one truth be compared and contrasted with another, that the spiritual be eluci-

dated by the sensible, the inward by the outward. It is also true that external phenomena may be often advantageously illustrated by internal, events in the material world by those in the mental. There is one law pervading matter and mind, and each furnishes many symbols of the other. The will is moved by vivid ideas of the good to be attained, and therefore, especially in addressing the common people, the minister should give such visible and tangible representations of moral good, as the nature of his theme demands. In order to increase the liveliness of the description it is sometimes useful to adopt the form of a dialogue, and especially of a soliloquy. Cramer and Harms have introduced this element into their description, and thereby brought many distant scenes near to the eyes and ears of their audience. The use of the parable is also important for bringing an object into the ideal presence of hearers. Some of the allegorical illustrations in the sermons of Ephraëm Syrus (see his *Paraenes.* II. 21.) are very lucid, as also some in the discourses of Tzschirner and Stiller. Instead of originating a parable, it is sometimes useful to make a new application of some literal or allegorical narrative already found in the Scriptures. See eloquent applications of this kind in Gregory of Nazianzen, *Opp. T.* 1. p. 620. Ed. Col., Schleiermacher's *Predigten*, Vol. 3. S. 51 sq.

11. *Various Kinds and Sources of Arguments and Motives employed in a Discourse.*

The conditions of success in the pulpit are, first, that the preacher select a subject which is fitted to excite the susceptibilities of his hearers; secondly, that he unfold his subject with distinctness and precision; thirdly, that he prove the truth of his statements, and convince his hearers of the intimate connection between the duty which he enjoins and their own highest happiness; and fourthly, that he convince them of their ability to do what he requires of them. Hence it is requisite that the preacher resort to argument as well as explanation, that he demonstrate the propriety and the feasibility of the work to which he would incite the will of his hearers.¹

¹ Nothing can be more unphilosophical than the attempt to persuade a man to do what he believes to be impossible. Hence, the preacher should endeavor to evince the practicability of every work to which he exhorts his hearers. He may effect this object, first, by dilating on the natural capabilities of the soul created in God's image, and on the aids of the Divine Spirit which are

He must adopt some mode of convincing his audience, that the proposition of his discourse is true. The conviction of this truth may be of two kinds. It is distinct from mere opinion and conjecture, and must be either *knowledge* or *faith*. Our knowledge may be either direct or indirect. The former is the knowledge of that which we perceive by our external senses, or of which we are conscious, or which is necessarily involved in, or inseparable from our sensation or consciousness, or which we are compelled to admit immediately by the demands of our spiritual nature. Indirect knowledge is that which we acquire not immediately in sensation or consciousness, but through the intervention of some truth which is known to us intuitively, and from which we infer the truth thus indirectly learned. Faith differs from knowledge, in its relating to an object which we do not or cannot perceive by our senses or consciousness, and which is not essentially involved in the truths which we do perceive in sensation, or of which we are conscious. Faith is that belief in truths which is derived from testimony, or from the harmony of those truths with our higher nature. Thus the existence of God is a doctrine of which we have no *knowledge*, for it is without the sphere of our sensation and consciousness, but we have a *faith* in it, and have sufficient reasons for our firm unwavering confidence. Faith is called *historical*, when it is founded on testimony, and religious when founded on the harmony between the truth believed and

vouchsafed to the good; secondly, by describing the special means and facilities which may be in the hearers' power for the specific work to which they are exhorted; by detailing the particular method in which the work may be effected; thirdly, by referring to examples which demonstrate the possibility of performing the required operation. In the celebrated Πανηγυρικός of Isocrates, the orator attempts, first to show how dishonorable it is for the Greeks to allow the Persians to subjugate them; secondly, to prove that it is possible for the Greeks to conquer the Persians; thirdly, to arouse a feeling of indignation against the Persians; fourthly, to prove that the present circumstances of the Greeks are favorable to a combined undertaking against their aggressors; fifthly, to show that without such an undertaking, it is impossible to ameliorate the present deplorable situation of the Greeks; sixthly, to quicken the feeling of shame in the bosoms of his countrymen, that they continue to live under a treaty so unfavorable to their interests as that which by their ambassador Antalcidas they formed with the Persians; seventhly, to excite the hope that if Athens and Sparta will commence a coalition against Persia, all the other Grecian States will unite themselves in the same. Thus we see that the second, fourth and seventh, divisions of this Panegyric are occupied in setting forth the capabilities and facilities of the Greeks for making a successful resistance to the Persians. See also the first of Demosthenes' Philippics, for a similar illustration.

the laws of our moral nature. Faith presupposes, therefore, the cultivation of all our powers and susceptibilities, moral as well as intellectual; knowledge implies the activity of the intellect alone. Our free will has far more influence on our faith than on our knowledge.

The arguments by which we are convinced of any truth are either subjective, or objective. Of the former kind are the arguments for the divine existence, which are derived from the harmony of that truth with our moral feelings. To the latter class belong the arguments for the same truth, which are derived from the contrivances of nature. Arguments may be also divided into the mathematical, which relate to the laws of number and quantity; the philosophical, which are the foundation of our direct knowledge; empirical, which are the foundation of our indirect knowledge and of our faith; the historical, which are properly a branch of the empirical, and include those arguments which are derived from testimony. The empirical reasonings comprise all the processes of induction. They also, in their widest extent, embrace those weaker arguments from analogy which often make an opinion more probable than its opposite, although they fail to give us any real knowledge of its truth.

Arguments are again divided into theoretical and practical. The former are addressed exclusively to the intellect, and are designed to produce a mere conviction in favor of the truth; the latter are addressed to the heart as well as the judgment, and are designed to secure some particular course of action. The latter are more properly termed motives, or persuasive, as distinct from convincing arguments; and as every discourse is intended for practical effect, its characteristic aim should be to present inducements to the will, more than reasons to the intellect. The great end of preaching the gospel is, to bring man into a state of harmony with himself and with the universe. Therefore should the sacred orator, if he would be successful, persuade his hearers to labor for their own highest physical, intellectual and moral good, and to discharge all their religious duties; for these secure the welfare of the body, mind and heart, and thus promote the harmonious operation of the powers which are combined in the human system. He should also persuade his hearers to labor for the corporeal, mental and religious good of their fellow-men, and to secure the symmetrical development of all their faculties and susceptibilities; and thus will every hearer be brought into a state of harmony not only with himself but with his race, and

above all with that great Being who is constantly promoting the welfare of his creatures. He should exert this persuasive influence, first by presenting the truths which impose on a man the obligation of striving to attain this perfect harmony with his own nature and with the universe; and secondly, by exciting the emotions, affections and desires which prompt the man to exert himself in the discharge of this duty; in reducing all his evil desires into a state of subordination to the authority of conscience, and in furnishing his fellow-men with the same advantages for outward and inward culture, which he himself enjoys. It is true, that in *practice* the communication of appropriate ideas cannot be separated from the attempt to awaken appropriate emotions; for all the powers and susceptibilities of man are so intimate in their union, that the operation upon one of them often involves an influence upon more than that one. But in *theory*, we may and must distinguish between an address to the percipient, and an address to the sensitive part of our natures. Although every motive is in one sense an argument, yet every argument is not a motive; and the immediate design, the first characteristic of a process of ratiocination is obviously different from that of an appeal to the feelings. The union of the convincing with the persuasive argument constitutes the truest eloquence, and the preacher should therefore aim at that comprehensive style of argumentation, which calls forth all the energies of the intellect, heart and will.

In attempting to convince his hearers of the truth, the preacher should pursue the shortest and most simple course which the nature of his subject will allow. His object is to go as directly as possible to the hearts of his audience; therefore he will not stop longer with the intellect than the wants of the heart require. The philosopher seeks to prove the truth by all the arguments which can establish it; the orator, by such arguments as will be effectual in gaining the assent of the hearers. The former seeks especially for the fundamental proofs; the latter for such as, being valid, will produce the readiest and most indelible impression on the public mind. While the philosopher regards all arguments according to their intrinsic value, the orator regards them according to their relative worth. Therefore in producing a conviction in favor of some truths, the preacher will simply delineate the nature of the truths themselves, the lucid statement of them being a sufficient argument in their favor. Sometimes he will refer to the proof as already known, and will not

minutely analyze it; sometimes he will contrast the proposition to be established with its opposite, and will make the truth appear obvious by setting it over against the related error. Cicero places his arguments for the guilt of Clodius in ingenious contrast with those for the innocence of Milo, and the former reflect additional light upon the latter. Many sermons are written on a plan similar to this oration of Cicero *pro Milone*. Remembering that he is engaged in a practical colloquy with his audience, for the purpose of securing their consent to perform some specific duty, the preacher should endeavor to bring them up, as soon as possible, to the agreement which he desires them to make, and therefore should never detain them with needless argumentation, however curious, and should never like Dr. Barrow, manifest more desire for exhausting the subject, than for inciting to the specific act of the will. Especially, should he avoid all artificial, and apparently cunning processes of reasoning. He may forfeit the confidence of his hearers in his probity and fairmindedness, by allowing himself to pursue a circuitous course of argument, where he could take a straight one, or by resorting to any kind of dialectical trick. If he be really interested in the truth and in the welfare of his audience, the course of reasoning most suitable for convincing their minds will suggest itself to him spontaneously. Aeschines was less honestly and heartily engaged than Demosthenes in the case of Ctesiphon; therefore the reasoning of the former was far less natural, direct and cogent than the reasoning of the latter.

The preacher should aim to select those arguments which his people, in their daily life, virtually allow to be valid, and the denial of which would involve them in self-contradiction; those arguments also which excite the imagination and the feelings as well as inform the intellect, and the definite, graphic statement of which will commend them at once to the belief. The sermons of Cyril of Jerusalem, and of Asterius, bishop of Amasea, abound with these forms of popular argumentation. The judicial orators of antiquity derived signal advantages for this species of reasoning, from the historical character of their speeches. The testimonies which they adduced were concrete and vivid exhibitions of principles which, being thus exemplified, did not require to be treated abstractly. Quintilian and other ancient rhetoricians recommend the *testimonia aliorum* as the class of arguments most readily comprehended, and imparting the most lively conceptions of the facts to be proved. The preacher as well as the political

erator, is at liberty to quote the opinions and appeal to the authority of men, as a means of commending the truth to his hearers, for they will be naturally influenced by the example of their fellow-beings, especially of the great and good. Reinhard, in his published discourses, gives many striking examples of this reference to human testimony.¹ As many religious doctrines have their foundation in human experience, they can be properly illustrated and confirmed by human examples. The authority, however, to which the minister should most frequently appeal is that of the inspired authors. There is a natural tendency in the human mind not only to adopt a system of religious belief, but also to derive this system from positive instructions. Hence all religionists profess to have obtained their creed from some express testimony of superior beings. The Bible satisfies the Christian's demand for an outward corroboration of his faith. It gives a new influence to the teachings of the pulpit. It is, therefore, of more value than the testimony of witnesses to which the orators of Greece and Rome appealed. It affords more vivid, more quickening exemplifications of truth than can be obtained from merely scientific treatises. By no means, however, does it pre-

¹ See especially his sermon (Pred. 1795) on the expectation which a man feels that, after his decease, there will be an improvement in the state of society and of the times. After alluding to the fact that ancient prophets and kings died in the confident hope of a favorable change in the future destinies of the world, he says: "Permit me now to revive your recollections of that noble minded man, who more than a hundred years ago lived in this city, and adorned the offices which are at present committed to me, and died in the joyful hope that a better state of things would ensue after his demise. Philip James Spener is the venerable man whom I mean. All his life long, had he toiled, contended, suffered for the cause of Christian truth and godliness, and he had often received for his labors the ingratitude of his contemporaries. But the hope of a future improvement in the condition of society, the belief that God would surely cause virtue to triumph, was so active, so efficacious in the soul of the dying old man, that it was his last request to have not a thread of black put upon his corpse, for this is the color denoting sorrow. Clothed in white, he chose that his dead body should attest the cheerful hope with which he died, that a brighter day would soon dawn upon the world. Thou hast not hoped without reason, venerable witness for God! Much better has it gone, since thy times, and by means of thy labors and example! He on whom thou hast relied will perfect that which he has commenced in the name of his Son. Joy be with thee, and with all those who sleep as thou sleepest! May God permit us to labor, contend, hope and conquer as thou hast done." Such examples as these stimulate the hearer to resort to the same sources of right feeling and belief, which had proved so beneficial to the individuals quoted as authorities. They are *suggestive* and *confirmatory* arguments in favor of the truth, as well as *persuasive* arguments to the duty resulting from that truth.

clude, it rather sanctions, both by precept and example, the unre-mitted exercise of our own faculties in the various processes of induction and of deduction, in the search for religious truth through the departments of external nature, of human consciousness, of history and general science. The preacher should never hesitate to employ such philosophical arguments, as are needful for the nourishment of the minds of his audience and for the enforcement of evangelical doctrine. He should remember that the Bible communicates its instructions in the form of general principles, and therefore requires the free action of our own powers in applying these principles to the specific details of life. It was written in a style immediately adapted to its first readers or hearers, and consequently demands the application of a sound judgment in distinguishing the spirit of its assertions from the form of them. It is not, therefore, by simply quoting a multitude of biblical passages, that a minister produces a conviction in favor of sound doctrine. He must make the truth commend itself to every man's reason and conscience, by showing that it accords with the spirit of the Bible, and with the laws of the divine government. In what proportion he should quote specific texts of the inspired word, depends on the character of his audience and the nature of his theme. His invariable rule should be, to make no statement which is at variance with the moral aims of inspiration, and to exhibit truth in such a manner as to show that the Bible is his highest standard of appeal, and that he is penetrated with reverence for all its instructions. He should resort, first of all, to the records of the New Testament; for these present the most instructive realization, the most affecting embodiment of goodness in the person of our Redeemer, and are most immediately authoritative as witnesses for the Christian system. Still, he must not omit references to the Old Testament; for this teaches many doctrines which are presupposed in the gospels and epistles, furnishes the most important verbal illustrations of both the language and the spirit of those records, and is essential to the harmonious, diversified and comprehensive exhibition of evangelical truth. By showing the convergence of the Old and New Testaments to the particular doctrine which is under discussion, the preacher will make the biblical element predominant in his discourses, and will give them that persuasive power which comes from truth well fortified, even directly sanctioned by the Omniscent Father of us all.

It is sometimes necessary that the minister prove, not only the

truth of his doctrine by passages of Scripture, but also the correctness of the explanation which he gives of those passages. Often he has not sufficient authority over his people to make them receive his interpretation, without assigning a reason for it. In such cases, he is tempted to introduce a series of hermeneutical remarks which are too recondite for the facile comprehension of his auditors, and which give to the intellectual, a decided preponderance over the practical character of his discourse. It is better for him to select such arguments in favor of his exposition as are founded on general principles, than such as are founded on verbal *minutiae*. He may exhibit the *internal* evidence which is afforded by the passage explained; the evidence derived from the design of uttering the text, the connection in which the words are found, the nature of the subject to which they refer. He may also exhibit the *external* evidence suggested by the passage; the evidence derived from comparing it with other passages of the Bible, from considering the character and circumstances of the person who uttered it, or the persons to whom it was addressed, the customs, and especially the modes of speaking prevalent in times when it was written. Herm. Niemeyer and Schuler have published excellent treatises on the rules for interpreting Scripture in the pulpit. See also Mosheim's *Anweisung erbaulich zu predigen*, 387 sq.

12. *Different Methods in which the same kind of Arguments and Motives may be presented in a Discourse.*

The same argument may be exhibited in a great variety of styles; the parts of it being differently arranged, and the forms of statement being diversified, according to the various objects designed to be secured.

It is sometimes advisable to begin a discussion with some very plain statement, from which a second may be easily derived, and from this second, a third; and thus, after a series of inferences, the main proposition of the discourse will present itself as virtually admitted in the preceding statements. This arrangement is called the Progressive or Synthetic, because it leads the mind forward from what is established to something new, and combines the conceded premises, one after another, into propositions which involve more or less distinctly the very idea which is the subject of the discourse. The sermon, being a dialogue between the preacher and his hearers, calls forth from their

minds the most active responses, when it is arranged in this synthetic order; when it begins with a remark commending itself at once to the belief, and leading to a consequent observation which immediately suggests a third, and thus progressively excites the hearers to think for themselves, and work their own way, step by step, with all the interest arising from conscious progress and incessant novelty, into a heartfelt acquiescence with the preacher. When this truth is unwelcome to the hearers, and would awaken, if announced at the outset, a strong prejudice against its reception, it may be kept back until they have admitted several preliminaries, which impose an absolute necessity of admitting the obnoxious doctrine. And when these preliminaries, one after another, have been proved and conceded to be true, it may be shown that they involve the proposition which is thus insinuated into the faith of the hearers, but which, if stated suddenly and abruptly, would have met with a decidedly unfavorable bias. This progressive order of arguments makes the discussion popular and interesting, for it often begins with individual concrete statements, and advances gradually, as the audience are able and disposed to proceed, to the more general and abstract propositions. It is an arrangement, however, which requires much time for its full exhibition, and therefore is not appropriate for some subjects and for some discourses.

Where the theme is very extensive, or the discourse must be very brief, the Regressive or Analytic arrangement is preferable. This reverses the order just named. It begins with the main proposition, places this forward, in a conspicuous and prominent situation, then goes back to the constituent elements of this truth, to the premises from which it is a result, and thus constantly associates the doctrine which is advanced openly and unreservedly, with the arguments by which it is sustained. The use of the first or the second of these methods depends not merely upon the nature of the theme, and of the occasion on which it is discussed, but also upon the character and habits of the preacher, upon the specific design which he has in view, upon his text which may or may not require a formal proposition and distinct divisions, upon the facility with which his audience can or will follow a train of consecutive argument, from premises which are unobjectionable to an obnoxious inference.

Logicians have also divided arguments into the *ostensive* and the *apogical*, the *probatio ex consequentibus* and the *probatio ex pugnantis*; the former establishing a true proposition directly,

without reference to its antagonist errors; the latter proving it indirectly, in the way of refuting the opinions opposed to it. The first of these methods is ordinarily preferable; but the second has some advantages over it. Often, when our hearers are prejudiced in favor of an erroneous proposition, the easiest method of making their mistake apparent is to set forth its consequences, and to show them that they cannot adhere to it without adopting, at the same time, some absurd or demoralizing conclusions. This indirect method conducts the mind with peculiar vivacity to the truth, by preventing it from pursuing any of the devious paths of error. Whenever the indirect can be conjoined with the direct method, the force of the argument is complete; as the refutation of a false opinion tends to prepare an audience for the reception of a true one.

Another distinction in the form of arguments, is that into the *logical* or formal, and the *rhetorical* or popular. The logical style is no more convincing than the rhetorical, but is less free and easy. The former employs certain scholastic terms; the latter dispenses with them. The syllogism is the favorite instrument of the former; the enthymeme, which the ancient rhetoricians called the rhetorical syllogism, is the favorite instrument of the latter. Sometimes indeed, for the sake of attracting attention by a novelty in his discourse, and for the purpose of making the *ærvus probandi* more obvious to his congregation, the preacher will employ the regular syllogistic form of statement, but ordinarily he prefers a livelier and more flowing style, one better fitted to awaken the whole mind, and harmonizing more exactly with the excited feeling of his audience.

The orator often resorts to amplification; the mere logician, not. *Amplificatio, αύξησις*, was generally used by the ancients to signify the vivid, animated description of the magnitude, the importance, or the diminitiveness of an object; but it was sometimes used to denote what the moderns commonly express by the equivalent word, viz. a description not only of those qualities which are requisite to the full comprehension of the object, but also of other qualities and relations which contribute to the clearness of our ideas, the depth of our convictions, or the liveliness of our feelings with regard to the object. It is of use, as it induces the hearers to linger upon some one truth, to view it in its various forms, and by obtaining more striking conceptions of it, to feel more keenly its moral influence.

In the treatment of his theme the orator often adopts, what

the logician avoids, the *digression*, *digressio*, *egressio*, *παρέμβαιος*. It is a mistake to suppose, that when a skilful preacher departs for a brief interval from the straight line of his argument, he diminishes at all the ultimate influence of his reasonings. He rather increases it; for the thoughts which he introduces during his digression are necessary to the full development of his theme in all its bearings, and by refreshing the mind with a transient change of view, they prepare it for the renewed force of the moral appeal. Still his digressions must be short, and, in consequence of the brevity of his discourses, far less frequent than those which were allowed to the secular orators of antiquity.

The oratorical discussion is still further distinguished from the logical, by the *recapitulation*, *recapitulatio*, *collectio*, *ἀνακεφαλαίωσις*. This is found not merely at the close of the whole discourse, but also at the end of particular parts of it. It is of peculiar service to an orator, because his hearers cannot, like readers, refer at pleasure to the sentences which they failed to understand, or wish to reconsider, and they consequently need to have the essential portions of the argument restated, to have their memories refreshed with the thoughts which would otherwise be evanescent, and to have the moral impression of the truth deepened by repetition. There is a special necessity that the preacher should recapitulate before unlearned audiences, because they are the least capable of retaining either the substance or the connection of the arguments which they have heard. Whenever he sums up what he has already advanced, he should employ a terse, compressed phraseology; and should guard against repeating the identical words which he used at first. The rhetorical style demands, in general, freshness and variety, and in the recapitulation it especially proscribes all monotonous and wearisome forms of statement. By condensed and gracefully varying phrases, the recapitulation presents the whole subject to the hearer in one view, and collects, so to speak, all the scattered rays of the sermon into one focal point.

The rhetorical method of argument is further distinguished from the logical, in its expression of firm confidence in the truths which are declared. The orator, glowing with interest in his theme, strives to awaken a like interest among his audience; he utters freely and boldly the sentiments of his heart, so that his hearers sympathize with him and are carried along to all his conclusions. It is this expression of honest confidence in his statements, this undisguised eagerness and expectation to establish

their correctness, which constitutes the much talked of *δαιμόνιος* of the Athenian orator.

The ancient rhetoricians often spoke of the apparently extemporaneous remark, the unpremeditated parenthesis, *το ἀπροσέδοον*, as imparting to the discourse an air of ingenuousness and naturalness. Cicero frequently introduced such parenthetical observations, without any seeming forethought, and as they had the appearance of having accidentally occurred to him, they gave to his speeches the aspect of free and unconstrained effusions. It is, indeed, important for the preacher to attain such a command over himself, that he shall be able to weave into his discourse such thoughts as may suddenly suggest themselves to him while he is in the pulpit. This unconfined mode of delivery relieves him from that appearance of stiffness and constraint which is so inappropriate to the character of an orator. But he should guard against the least semblance of artifice in uttering a sentiment as if it had all at once arisen in his mind, when in fact he had premeditated its utterance in that way long before. Let him be honest with himself, if he would be a true orator, and speak forth the real suggestions of the moment, if they will increase the apparent freedom and ease of his utterance; but let him not practise any theatrical devices, nor seem to be what he is not. The consciousness of practising a deceit upon his hearers, is uncongenial with the spirit of an orator.

The rhetorical differs again from the logical and philosophical mode of reasoning, in the rapidity with which the arguments of an address sometimes follow one another. Thought succeeds thought with a rush and force that carry the hearers, as it were, by assault. Eloquence often delights in condensation of language, in short sentences and quick transitions, which take the mind by surprise and nullify its power of resistance. This celerity of speech is a natural result of the enthusiasm with which the whole soul of the orator is enkindled in his theme, and in his practical design.

13. *The Manner of treating such Opinions and Feelings of his Hearers, as are at variance with the Preacher's Discourse.*

When the political orators of antiquity foresaw an objection which might possibly be made to their statements, they would sometimes endeavor to preoccupy the mind of their hearers with such a train of thought or feeling, as would prevent them from

thinking of that objection. But the sacred orator is not allowed to excite the passions of his audience so far, as to preclude their attention to any adverse argument which would occur to them in their calmer moments. Besides, he does not, like the secular orator, speak merely for the present occasion, but for the whole future life, and he will therefore gain nothing by diverting his hearers' minds, for a short time, from a difficulty which will afterwards embarrass and injure them. Still, he need not attempt to answer every objection which can be brought by any one against his doctrine; but should confine himself to such difficulties as have been or will be felt by the audience which he addresses. Nor should he give a public reply to all the adverse arguments that may have occurred to every individual who hears him; for some of these arguments may be so peculiar, that true wisdom will require him to rebut them in a merely private interview. There are, for example, objections against the physico-theological proof of the divine existence, which would occur to a student of Kant's philosophy, but not to the great mass of a Christian audience. The attempt to refute these objections in the pulpit, would suggest to many minds such difficulties as would never otherwise have been known to them. It might lead them to an entire distrust of that proof on which they had previously rested the whole system of religion; and if the preacher should endeavor to establish their faith on a new basis, he would find that, as they were incompetent to detect of themselves the deficiencies in the old argument, so they are unable to discern, even with the aids and explanations of the pulpit, the conclusiveness of the proofs which are substituted for the old. We cannot expect that the populace will be convinced of the truth by philosophical reasonings, and when we have succeeded in undermining the only arguments which can be made intelligible to them, we shall find it impossible to prevent the skepticism which results from an ability to see objections and an inability to see positive proofs.

The difficulties with which an orator has to contend are sometimes negative, such as consist in the hearers' want of the convictions and feelings requisite for the success of the speech that is made to them; and sometimes positive, such as consist in the hearers' entertaining certain convictions and feelings decidedly adverse to the influence of the address. Of the difficulties last-named, some result from convictions which are true, and from feelings which are right, and the opposition of these convictions and feelings to the design of the orator is merely apparent;

others result from convictions which are false and feelings which are wrong, and the opposition of both to the design of the orator is real. In the former case, the orator should show that the convictions and feelings which are correct, do not in the least militate with his design, but they rather favor it. Some of the most eloquent passages of Cicero and Demosthenes, are those in which the objections of the adversary are converted into arguments for the speaker's own assertions. In the latter case where the convictions or feelings are wrong, the orator must devote himself to the proof, either that they are reprehensible, and ought not to be retained; or else that they do not in reality oppose his design, and ought not to be considered as objections to his address. The ancient secular orators would often show, that the theoretical or practical errors of their audience were not really adverse to the object recommended in the oration, and at the same time would not characterize these errors as such, and might even seem to justify them. But the sacred orator, looking beyond the merely temporary influence of his address, is called upon to express his disapprobation of all opinions or inclinations which are adverse to the spirit of the Gospel. He may indeed hesitate to assail long established errors which are not inconsistent with the temper of Christianity, and which are supposed to be intimately combined with evangelical faith, but he has no right to spare such faults as conflict with essential truth. He must always express his condemnation of them, although he need not always stop the current of his discourse for the sake of proving his condemnation to be just. After his naked disavowal of all sympathy with them, he may be justified in confining himself to the proof that their opposition to the immediate design of his sermon is not real, but only apparent. When, however, the preacher finds that the speculative errors or the wrong inclinations of his audience are actually operating against the specific purpose of his address, he must not content himself with a simple disavowal of those incorrect opinions or emotions; he must make a special effort to eradicate them from the mind of every hearer whom they influence. Sometimes he may resist them indirectly, by demonstrating the truth of his own doctrines, or by exciting the right moral feelings; for a true faith and right affections expel their opposites from the soul. At other times, he may directly assail the false notions or evil desires which oppose him. He may show the consequences which result from them, and the sources from which they arise, and may thus diminish

the overweening confidence of his hearers in principles which lead to such disastrous results, or originate from such ignoble causes. By showing men the origin of their mistake, he often makes the way easy for them to renounce it. He proves it to be reprehensible, by giving the history of its inception and subsequent retention. He should ever aim not merely to convince his hearers of their previous error, but to enlist them in favor of the truth; not merely to secure their confidence but to engage their warm interest in the correct principles of faith and practice. He may often induce them to work their own way out of their mistake, by proposing to them a logical *dilemma*, such as our Saviour employed in Matt. 12: 25—28.

Ancient rhetoricians have recommended the practice of an orator's concealing when necessity requires it, his real design in a speech, or part of a speech, and appearing to be engaged in a very different project from that which he is actually attempting. This artifice is called the *σχῆμα*, and orations composed in this style are termed *λόγοι ἰσχηματισμένοι*, *orationes figuratae*. In the first centuries of the Christian era, the rhetoricians labored in the classification, and also in the multiplication of the various forms of this artifice, with great perspicacity and inventiveness of genius. See especially the *Τέχνη Ῥητορικὴ* ascribed to Dionysius Halicarnassus, c. 8. 9. Demetrius Phalerius de Elocutione § 305 sq. Hermogenes de Inventione l. 4. Quintilian Inst. Orat. l. 9. c. 2. et al. The orators, particularly Isocrates and Cicero, frequently employed this artifice; see Isocrates, Panathenaicus, c. 95. 96, and Cic. pro Milone. c. 1. 24. It consisted either in announcing one theme and actually speaking on another; or in discussing the proposed subject with an entirely different design from that which was at first apparent, or in aiming at a distinct class of individuals from that which the speaker seemed to address. The circumstances of the ancient orators, haranguing assemblies who were so liable to be overawed by the civil power, or to be swayed by popular faction, tempted them frequently to adopt these circuitous methods of reaching the hearts of their auditors. A more direct appeal might have exposed them to the indignation of a ruler, or to the wrath of a mob. But the sacred orator, who addresses a calmer assembly and in a more tranquil style; who dwells in the light and discountenances works of darkness, is seldom necessitated to use the *λόγοι ἰσχηματισμένοι*. He may, however, be driven to an imitation of some of them, at certain conjunctures, in particular parts of a discourse; for it is sometimes need-

ful for him to utter truths with a design of affecting some individuals whom he would not appear to aim at, and of suggesting some inferences which it would not be prudent for him openly to announce.

14. *Cautions to be observed in exciting the Feelings of an Audience.*

Man, being of a compound nature, and being impelled to action by a great variety of principles, should be addressed with an appropriate and corresponding variety of style. The diversified themes which are presented to his consideration in the pulpit, appeal to his different susceptibilities in such a manner, as to secure their full and harmonious development. We need not fear to address the lower, innocent desires of an auditor, if their influence be always kept subordinate to that of his more dignified principles of action. We may stimulate his constitutional love of self, if we can hasten thereby his progress in virtue. Our Creator intended that all our appetites and passions should be made to facilitate our religious advancement; and while we never disturb the fit proportions between the desires of a man for his own good, and his interest in the general welfare, we may excite those desires to such a degree as to secure their prompting and encouraging activity in favor of holiness. The more degraded the people whom we address, so much the more must we strive to call out their lower propensities into the service of the higher; and to set over against each other, in the proper balance, the previously disordered parts of their constitution. The more refined our audience, so much the more successful may we be in a direct appeal to their more elevated principles of action. The majority of the ancient orators devoted their highest energies to the excitement of the feelings of their hearers, and often awakened such an interest in merely personal relations, as was predominant over the zeal for the public good. But the character of sacred eloquence does not allow such passionate appeals, as were made by the political orators of antiquity. The preacher should attempt to excite no emotion which will disturb the symmetry of the soul; no merely animal feeling, which he does not intend to make subsidiary to spiritual improvement; no sensuous desire which, harmless in itself, may lead, without suitable direction, to a moral evil; no emotion which may be called *pathological*, and is distinguished from the *contemplative* by its originating blindly, impulsively, without a definite idea of truth previously in the

mind, without any rational cause in the preceding meditations. An excitement which has no spiritual ground, will result in no religious good; and true eloquence, especially that of the pulpit, is the eloquence of the soul, the entire soul, and not only emanates from clear views of truth but also conduces to some beneficent end. Hence the preacher should never inflame any feelings of his audience so far, as to repress the activity of the moral judgment. Conscience must always be allowed the supreme dominion over the soul, and no passion, however innocent in itself, should usurp the place of the governing faculty. The rule is, then, that a preacher should instruct his audience, before he aim to arouse them. Ideas must call forth their emotions, and stringent proof must justify feeling. He should endeavor to secure a complete harmony between the intellectual and the moral nature, between the appetites, emotions and affections of his audience. This harmony, however, by no means forbids, but rather requires the excitement of the hearers' zeal in the discharge of duty, their joy in the contemplation of virtue, their desire to emulate the deeds of good men, their indignation against moral evil, their enthusiasm in the religious life. It is no objection to the awakening of these feelings that they diminish, for the time being, somewhat of the vigor with which the intellect applies itself to abstract truth. The intellect is not the whole of the spirit. Abstract investigation should not engross the soul. The affections are not diseased operations of the mind. They are noble parts of our nature, and lead to the most exalted achievements. Without their appropriate cultivation, the reason does not act healthily. They should, therefore, be excited by the orator, but never to that degree which may be called an irregularity in the spiritual system.

15. The Department of Topics (Topica).

The whole subject of Invention is treated by the ancient rhetoricians with great copiousness and discrimination. See Aristotle, *Τέχνη ῥητορικὴ* L. 1; Auctor ad Herennium, L. 1, 2, 3; Cicero, *De Inventione*, L. 1, 2; *De Oratore*, L. 2; *Orator*, c. 14, 15; *Topica*, and *Partitiones Oratoriae*, c. 1, 2, 3, 9-15. Quintilian, *Institutiones Oratoriae*, L. 5. Hermogenes, *Περὶ εὐρέσεων*. All the means of persuasion were reduced by the ancients to three; *docere, conciliare, permovere*. They were also arranged into two great divisions; first, the *argumenta ἀνεργα, inartificialia, quae foris veniunt*, such as are

presented by witnesses, laws, decrees, and other external authorities ; second, the *argumenta inventiva, artificialia, ex ipsa re atque arte oratoria sumpta*. This second class of the means of persuasion, as they derived their origin from the speaker himself, constituted, of course, the main object of rhetorical invention. They were subdivided into three orders : first, those which were designed to prove the truth of a proposition, *argumenta ἀποδεικτικά, πίστει* in the narrow sense of that word ; secondly, those which were designed to conciliate the favor of the hearers toward the person of the orator and the subject of which he treated, and which were termed *ἥθη, mores* ; and thirdly, those which made known the feelings of the speaker and excited the same affections in the hearers, and which were called *πάθη, affectus*. The *argumenta ἀποδεικτικά* were separated into the *ἐπαγωγή, inductio, exemplum oratorium*, and the *ἐθνύμμη, ratiocinatio oratoria*. The last was again distinguished into the argument *ex verisimilibus (εἰσοσι)*, and the argument, *e signis (σημείους)* ; and the last-named proof from sign was subdivided into the *επιμήκειον*, which proved the certainty of a proposition, and the *σημείον*, in the narrower sense of that term, which proved the bare probability of the thing asserted.

After these arguments and motives had been classified with great preciseness, in the treatises on Invention, the sources from which the means of persuasion were derived, began to receive attention and to be arranged in a scientific order. The name Topics, was given to the methodical collection of the general ideas which might be of use in suggesting the particular arguments and motives to be employed by an orator. Topics were subdivided into, first, the *loci argumentorum*, the *τόποι ἴδιοι*, which are defined by Cicero to be *quasi regiones aut sedes, ex quibus argumenta promuntur, fontes argumentorum* ; and, secondly, the *loci communes*, the *τόποι κοῖνοι*, which were collections of such subjects of remark as were applicable to entire genera, and were derived from the *loci argumentorum*, the latter being immediately applicable not to the genus, but rather to particular individuals included under it. In modern writings, the word Topics has a signification still more extensive. It denotes either a connected statement of the various points of view under which every theme or class of themes may be discussed ; or else a scientific statement of the general relations in which the theme stands, and of the rules pertaining to those relations and facilitating the full development of them. It is true that the preacher may be led in the

use of a book of Topics, to a pedantic, discursive and general style of remark, ill suited to the peculiar wants of his hearers; but he may also, if he be well educated and if he be judicious in the consultation of the book, derive from it a feeling of security that his mental processes have been correct, an enlargement and completeness of his views, and a general improvement of his mental character. Such a book will not supply natural deficiencies of talent, but may correct many faults arising from partial, one-sided conceptions of a particular subject, and an habitual contractedness and monotony of thought. Among modern treatises in this department, some of the most ingenious are found in C. F. Bahrdt's *Versuch über die Beredsamkeit*, and in Witting's *Schrift über die Meditation eines Predigers*; but the best is C. A. L. Kästner's *Topik, oder Erfindungswissenschaft aufs neue erläutert*.

ARTICLE III.

THE TRINITY.

[Translated by Rev. H. B. Smith, West Amesbury, Mass., from the Theological Lectures of Dr. A. D. C. Twisten, Professor of Theology in the University of Berlin.]

INTRODUCTORY NOTE.

[The following Article has been translated, not only on account of its intrinsic excellence, but also because it presents a discussion of the doctrine of the Trinity upon somewhat different grounds from those ordinarily found in English and American systems of theology. Even if we do not agree with all the positions advanced nor think them conclusive, yet they may aid the mind to some new aspects of a doctrine which lies at the basis of the whole Christian scheme. This doctrine has always been discussed and illustrated differently by different minds, in different ages of the church; and that, too, without detriment to the general orthodoxy. Those who hold, and faithfully hold, to the same formula of doctrine will expound it differently, according to the influences under which their minds have been trained, to the objections made against their creed, and to the philosophical views prevailing around them. And such a discussion of this doctrine as is here presented, may lead us to a more thorough