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finite reality as well as the infinite reality? This, too, exists in the mind clearly and distinctly, and it is not to be supposed, argues Descartes, forgetting utterly his inductive or psychological method, that God would deceive us in such a matter, he concludes that the external world has a real and not merely apparent or phenomenal existence.¹ Our mental faculties prove the existence of God, and the existence of God proves the validity of our mental faculties, is the vicious circle which throws inextricable confusion into the Cartesian philosophy.²

[To be continued.]

ARTICLE IX.

REMARKS ON THE BIBLICAL REPERTORY AND PRINCETON REVIEW. VOL. XXII. NO. IV. ART. VII.

By Edwards A. Park, Abbot Professor in Andover Theol. Seminary.

IN the *Biblical Repertory* for October, 1850, has been published a *Review* of the last Convention Sermon delivered before the Congregational Ministers of Massachusetts. Some admirers of this *Review* have published the remark, that no one can mistake "the hand" that is in it, and have fitly characterized its author as "one of the most accomplished Reviewers in the country." As it is said to have emanated from a well-known theological instructor; as it suggests some grave questions of rhetoric; and as it illustrates various evils incident to anonymous criticism, it seems entitled to a dispassionate regard. There is no need, however, of canvassing all the principles, right and wrong, which are advanced in the *Review*, nor of commenting on *all* the wrong impressions which it makes, with regard to the sermon. We shall content ourselves with noticing a few, as specimens of the many mis-statements into which the critic has inadvertently lapsed.

It is a familiar fact, and one of great practical importance, that there are two generic modes of representing the same system of religious truth; the one mode suited to the scientific treatise, the other to the popular discourse, hymn book, liturgy. They differ not in language *alone*, but in several, and especially the following particulars: first, in the images and illustrations with which the same truth

¹ Meditation Quatrieme, p. 93.

² Meditation Cinquieme — particularly the close, pp. 107, 108.

is connected; Reinhard's Dogmatic System, for instance, not admitting the fervid imagery which glows in his eloquent discourses; secondly, in the proportions which the same truths bear to each other: Van Mastricht's scientific treatise, for example, giving less prominence to some, and more to other doctrines, than would be given to them in the earnest sermons of Krummacher; thirdly, in the arrangement of the same truths; Turretin's arrangement not being adapted to the ever varying wants of men, women, and children; fourthly, in the mode of commending the same truth to popular favor; a treatise of Ralph Cudworth, depending on nice distinctions and scholastic proofs, but a practical sermon of John Bunyan, depending on a bold outline and the selection of a few prominent features which win the heart at once; fifthly, in the words, and collocations of words used for expressing the same class of ideas; the truths in Ridgely's *Body of Divinity* not being clothed in the language proper for an impassioned exhortation, or for popular psalmody. The design of the sermon under review is, to develop some practical lessons suggested by this plain distinction between these two modes of exhibiting one and the same doctrine.

One of these lessons is, the necessity of the preacher's enlivening a single abstract doctrine by concrete exhibitions of it; as, for example, the doctrine of eternal punishment, or of the general judgment, or of the resurrection, by images of the fire, darkness, worm, gnashing teeth, throne, open books, palm branch, white robe, etc. etc.¹ Another of these lessons is, the importance of inferring certain great doctrines from their congeniality with constitutional or pious feeling, and of ennobling the manifestation of this feeling by the clear statement of those doctrines.² The expressions of feeling are premises from which the intellect must deduce important corollaries; while it must not force upon these expressions the meaning which might be derived from a rigid analysis of them, but, making allowance for their unguarded terms, must penetrate into their substantial import. So far from its being a design of the sermon to deny that "truth is in order to holiness," as a reader of the *Review* would infer, a design of the sermon is rather to show that "every doctrine which [the intellect discovers in the Bible or in nature] is in reality practical, calling forth some emotion, and this emotion animating the sensitive nature which is not diseased, deepening its love of knowledge,

¹ *Bib. Sac.* pp. 540-542. Throughout this article reference is made to the edition of the sermon in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* for July, 1850.

² *Bib. Sac.* pp. 542-546.

elevating and widening the religious system which is to satisfy it. Every new article of the good man's belief elicits love or hatred, and this love or hatred so modifies the train and phasis of his meditations as to augment and improve the volume of his heart's theology."¹

Instead of its being a tendency of the sermon to discountenance logical studies, one object of it is to show that "we lose our civilization so far forth as we depreciate a philosophy truly so called;" and "our faith becomes a wild or weak sentimentalism, if we despise logic," p. 543. Instead of the sermon's being adapted, as the Review implies, p. 660, to represent 'diversities of doctrinal propositions as matters of small moment, and make light of all differences which do not affect the fundamentals of the Gospel,' it reiterates the idea in various forms, that the "metaphysical refinements of creeds are useful," that "our spiritual oneness, completeness, progress, require" us to "define, distinguish, infer, arrange our inferences in a system," and that although "there is an identity in the *essence* of many systems which are run in scientific or aesthetic *moulds* unlike each other," yet even some of these unessential differences are more important, others less so, than they seem. Hence is inferred the duty "to argue more for the broad central *principles*, and to wrangle less for the side, the party *aspects* of truth," and to guard against what Dr. Hodge calls "a denunciatory or censorious spirit," which "blinds the mind to moral distinctions, and prevents the discernment between matters unessential and those vitally important."²

Many pious men are distressed by the apparent contradictions in our best religious literature, and for their sake another practical lesson developed in the discourse is, the importance of exhibiting the mutual consistency between all the expressions of right feeling. The discrepancies so often lamented are not fundamental but superficial, and are easily harmonized by exposing the one self-consistent principle which lies at their basis.³ The assertions, for example, that God repents of having made our race and that he never repents, although contradictory in themselves, are not so in their fit connections; for they refer not to the same specific truth, but to different truths, both of which, however, may be reduced to the same ultimate principle,

¹ Bib. Sac. p. 543.

² See Hodge on Rom. 14: 1 - 23, also Bib. Sac. pp. 543, 559 - 561. It may be stated here, once for all, that whenever quotations are made in this article from the Review, or from the sermon, the writer has introduced his own italics, for the purpose of making this article the more definite.

³ Bib. Sac. pp. 546-550.

that the changeless God is disposed to punish sin. So the assertions God is a rock and God is a Spirit, are contradictory if interpreted as divines often interpret language, by its letter, but they are not contradictory if interpreted as divines ought to interpret language, by its intent; for they relate not to the same specific idea, but to different ideas, both of which, however, may be reduced to the same ultimate principle, that the immaterial Divinity is a strong and sure support of his people.

Numerous and serious errors arise from understanding figurative expressions as if they were literal, and from transferring prosaic, vapid formulas, into sacred songs, fervent prayers, pathetic appeals. For this cause another practical lesson developed in the sermon is, the importance of keeping in their appropriate sphere the two modes of expressing truth, and the importance of appreciating the evil which results from unduly intermingling them.¹ Much of this evil finds its way into the religious character of men. Every controversial essay exposes it. Every day we see that the careless intermixture of the two forms of truth "confuses the soul," raises feuds in the "church," encourages "*logomachy*," "makes men uneasy with themselves and therefore acrimonious against each other," causes them to "sink their controversy into a contention and their dispute into a quarrel," etc. Often "the massive speculations of the metaphysician sink down into his expressions of feeling and make him appear cold hearted, while the enthusiasm of the impulsive divine ascends and effervesces into his reasonings, and causes him both to *appear* and to *be*, what our Saxon idiom so reprovingly styles him, hot-headed." Sermon, p. 553. We have no right to press our dogmas so far as to check the natural tendency of men to use language which, if interpreted according to the letter, is not correct. We must allow them to say that the sun rises and the fire is hot. An eminent and excellent divine once commenced an epistle to a friend with the exhortation not to pray for power to do right, because all men have this power but are merely disinclined to use it; and he closed the letter with an affectionate petition that his friend might be *enabled* to discharge his duty in this respect. The feelings *will* express themselves in words which the intellect left to itself would never have devised. We must do justice to these feelings. Let them have free play. This, however, is no excuse for inferring from the language of emotion, that the idea denoted by the literal interpretation of that language is the truth. **If**

¹ Bib. Sac. pp. 550—558.

so, the Romanists have gained their controversy and Galileo was rightly proscribed. We must not build a fortress of polemic theology on a mere flower of rhetoric; if so, we do not consolidate the fortress, and we crush the juices out of the flower. How much of theological mysticism has resulted from regarding the stanza of Cowley, that with God

"Nothing is there to come, and nothing past,
But an eternal *now* does always last,"——

as if it were a scientific formula, not less exact than poetical? How much of ethical error has arisen from interpreting the fervid exhortation, that impenitent sinners should pray for grace to put forth their first holy choice, as if this exhortation were designed to imply that they may pray without holiness for aid in performing their first right act. Rigidly explained, the phrase must have this meaning, but was it intended for a logical or a popular phrase? And is it not often understood, in the sense which is not indeed, but which nevertheless *ought* always to be designed, as a stimulus to immediate repentance, a stimulus applied so vehemently that the solecism of the words is overlooked.

Other practical lessons suggested in the discourse are, the importance of making our sermons less dull and stiff, by making them less abstract; the importance of rendering our theological treatises less ambiguous by writing them in a style less in need of qualification; the importance of a larger charity toward good men, and of a deeper reverence for the one system of inspired truth which unites in its maintenance so many classes of devotees.

But the Reviewer seems not to have noticed the true practical aims of the sermon. He was led, perhaps, into his misapprehensions of it by its title. This title is distinctly affirmed to have been chosen "for want of a better,"¹ not because it is all that could be wished. Let us then state some of the reasons which may justify it.

First, it is less cumbrous than any other which would be equally expressive of the author's meaning. The title might have been, The form of theology suggested by and best suited to the calm processes of the intellect, and the form of theology suggested by and best fitted to awaken and then to gratify the right feelings. Or it might have been, Theology in the form prompted by the reasoning powers and best adapted to speculation, and theology in the form prompted by the sensibilities and suited to excite and then satisfy emotion.

¹ Bib. Sac. p. 534.

But the title actually selected is, The Theology of the Intellect and that of the Feelings. This need not be misunderstood, for it is expressly defined as not denoting two *kinds* of truth essentially unlike, but as denoting two dissimilar *modes* of representing one and the same truth. A brief Proposition, when definitely explained, is allowed as a convenience to all preachers.

Secondly, the title was selected as a deferential and a charitable one. It was designed to mitigate prejudices, by conceding somewhat to them. The representations which are classified under the theology of feeling are often sanctioned as "the true theology," by the men who delight most in employing them. What the sermon would characterize as images, illustrations and intense expressions, these men call *doctrines*. It is a *doctrine*, for instance, that the bread is Christ's body; that men are regenerated in baptism; that the sins of a man are forgiven by God if a minister forgive them; that moral inability is not a mere desperate unwillingness, but a literal powerlessness; that guilt is as literally imputed to the innocent as innocence is imputed to them, and that innocence is as literally imputed to the sinful as sin is imputed to them. In like manner the conceptions most obviously denoted by such terms as eternal generation and procession, are often said by the men who are most fond of using these terms, to be necessary parts of "the correct theology." In deference to this frequent usage, these conceptions may be named "the theology of the heart." We call one system of theology "rational" or "liberal," simply because it is called so by its advocates; much more then may we designate by the phrase "emotive theology," those representations which are so tenaciously defended by multitudes as the truth fitted both for the feeling and the judgment. It appears less invidious to designate them by some such phrase, than to stigmatize them as merely figurative or poetical modes of statement. The sermon repeatedly declares, that there is a depth of significancy in some of these representations, which cannot be adequately expressed by the words figurative, imaginative and poetical, for these words have often an import too superficial; that the language of the emotions, even when *dis-sonant* from the accurate statements of truth, has yet a meaning which is perfectly correct, but is "more profound than can be pressed home upon the heart by any exact definitions." It affirms, that even when Dr. Jonathan Edwards, and Andrew Fuller, and Dr. Day call our "moral inability" a figurative term, they use the word figurative in a sense which needs to be explained, or it will be misunderstood.¹

¹ Bib. Sac. pp. 537, 538, 549, 567. See also note B. to the second pamphlet edition of the sermon.

Therefore, one design of the discourse is to show the dignity and importance of those subjective conceptions which, although not conformed to the literal verity, are yet, like all vivid conceptions, attended with a momentary belief in their conformity to it, and which enliven our more accurate ideas of it, and which, being supposed by many to be logically correct, may be honored with a more respectful name than *mere* fancies or metaphorical representations.¹

A third reason for the title is, that it is conformed to the analogy of language. As a substance, though distinguishable, is yet inseparable from its form, the name of the substance is often applied to the form. We speak of a syllogistic and of a popular argument, when we mean merely two different ways of expressing the very same argument. We speak of the language of eloquence and of logic, of the imagination and the passions, when we refer to the same identical language in different arrangements. We allude to the Jehovah of the Old Testament and the Jehovah of the New, without implying that there are two different Gods, but implying only that there are two different manifestations of God. The Sabellians, in order to avoid Tritheism, speak of God the Father, *and* God the Son, *and* God the Spirit, as one God in three modes of development; but, according to the Reviewer's way of interpreting the title of this sermon, the Sabellians may be fairly charged with being Tritheists, and believing in three different Supreme Beings. Diverse names are often applied to dissimilar forms or states of the same essence; as to one material substance when it is exhibited in dissimilar shapes; to the soul itself in different modes of its activity. The same ideas and even words, as they are presented in differing combinations, are denominated eloquence, poetry, or prose. Men distinguish between a doctrinal and a practical sermon, a didactic and a controversial theology, between the theology of one master and that of another,² between the theology of Paul and that of John, when they fully admit and intend only to declare by these phrases, that exactly the same truths are presented in diverse styles for different ends. Why then may we not distinguish between an intellectual and an emotive theology, when we expressly affirm that each differs from the other in form rather than in

¹ Bib. Sac. pp. 540, 549.

² Prof. Tholuck has said that the theology of Pres. Edwards *and* the theology of Hegel, on the subject of the will, *are* the same; of course he could not mean the same in form. Dr. Channing has said that the theology of Dr. Hopkins *and* the theology of Fenelon, on the subject of disinterested benevolence, *are* the same; of course he could not mean the same in style and *contour*.

essence? If we may speak of a belief or conviction of the head as distinct from a belief or conviction of, i. e. prompted by the heart, when we mean essentially one and the same mental belief or conviction, why may we not speak of a theology of the head as distinct from a theology of, i. e. prompted by the heart, when we mean the same theology in essence? This appellation is by no means unusual, even in familiar converse. And for the Biblical Repertory to distort the title of the sermon into an affirmation of "two theologies" (a phrase never used in the discourse) substantially opposite to each other, is as marked a violation of the rules of speech, as it would be to represent the eloquence of the outward manner, of the reasoning process, of the passionate address, of the direct exhortation, as four radically different "eloquences." But this remark anticipates one class of the misapprehensions developed in the Review.

1. The Repertory mis-states the very object of the discourse. It describes the sermon as advocating not two different forms but two essentially antagonistic "*kinds* of theology," two opposing sets of "*doctrine*," both equally correct. It recognizes no difference between an image or symbol, and a truth. As many of its reasonings are directed against the wrong subject, they spend themselves like arrows aimed at the wrong target. It is needless to refute them, after they have been shown to result from a misunderstanding of the theme.

The Review mis-states the object of the discourse, first, by omitting the formal *definition* of its title. In introducing the subject, after having stated that "when preachers aim to rouse the *sympathies* of a *populace*, they often give a brighter coloring or a bolder prominence to *some lineaments* of a doctrine than can be given to them in a *well compacted science*," the discourse proceeds, "There are two *forms* of theology of which the two passages in my text are selected as individual specimens, the one declaring that God never repents, the other that he does repent. *For want of a better name* these two *forms* may be termed the theology of the intellect and the theology of feeling. Sometimes, indeed, both the mind and the heart are suited by the *same modes of thought*, but often they require dissimilar *methods*."¹ And immediately afterwards, lest this should be misunderstood, the subject is thus reannounced: "What then are some of the differences between these two kinds of REPRESENTATION?" Now, against the canons of fair criticism, the entire paragraphs containing this formal definition are omitted by the Reviewer. The true intent of the discourse is thus in a degree hidden from his readers. This definition

¹ Bib. Sac. p. 534.

given in form at the outset, adds an emphasis to many subsequent phrases which our critic has either kept entirely out of view, or the *meaning* of which he has in some degree concealed by his one capital omission. No reader of the sermon needs to doubt, that the theology of feeling is "*the form of belief* which is suggested by and adapted to the wants of the well trained heart;"¹ contains the '*literal truth* presented in appropriate images;' allows '*discordant representations* of the one self-consistent *principle*;' sanctions "an interchange of *styles* all unfolding the same *idea*;" includes "*forms* of language which circumscribe a *substance* of doctrine, a *substance* which fashioned as it may be, the intellect grasps and holds fast; a *substance* which arrests the more attention and prolongs the deeper interest by the *figures* which bound it." With the preceding definition the whole tenor of the discourse shows its object to be, the delineation of "*our mode of shaping and coloring* the doctrines of theology," and these doctrines are "those *cardinal truths* which the Bible has lifted up and turned over in so many different lights as to make them [the truths] the more conspicuous by their very alternations of *figure and hue*."² Accordingly, the discourse delineates the *one doctrine* of Future Punishment and the "*symbols*" by which it is illustrated; the *one doctrine* of the Resurrection, and the "*pictures*" by which it is enlivened; the *one doctrine* of the General Judgment and the *poetical conceptions* which vivify it;³ the *one doctrine* of Regeneration "revealed in dissimilar *forms*;" the *one doctrine* of man's unwillingness to repent, expressed in "*phrases* which disagree with each other;"⁴ all these "*symbols*," "*pictures*," "*poetical conceptions*" and illustrative images not being distinct doctrines but only distinct modes of representing the same doctrine, not belonging to theology as used for speculation but belonging to theology as employed for impression.

Throughout the sermon the distinction is between the "*intellectual statements* of doctrine," and the more "*impressive representations* of it," i. e. of the same doctrine; and it is declared in apology for even the anthropopathical style, that "into more susceptible natures than ours the *literal verities* of God will penetrate far deeper than even when shaped in their most pungent *forms*, they [i. e. the literal verities] will penetrate into our obdurate hearts." But notwithstanding all these various and wearisome repetitions of the same idea, the Reviewer makes the impression that the sermon really advocates "two conflicting theologies," which are unlike in *substance* as well as in *style*; two

¹ Bib. Sac. p. 535.

² Ibid. pp. 540-542.

³ Ibid. pp. 555, 560.

⁴ Ibid. p. 547.

antagonistic "doctrines" pertaining to the sinful nature, the atonement, etc. He has made this impression, partly by omitting the author's essential definition of his theme. Is it not a rule of controversy, that a writer's formal definitions shall be formally quoted by his antagonist? Does not the sermon state that its title is selected "for want of a better," and does not this imply that the title may be perverted, unless it be defined? Why, then, does the critic fail to apprise his readers that the title has been defined, and why does he thus make it easy to misrepresent the entire scope of the sermon? We wish to be distinctly understood. The "accomplished Reviewer," of whom his admirers say that no one can mistake "*his hand*" in these criticisms, is by no means accused or suspected by us of *dexterity* in keeping important explanations out of sight; but is merely reminded of his inadvertence in not bringing them clearly and prominently into view; an inadvertence which is none the less hurtful because it is accidental. His fault, however, is not one of omission merely; for,

Secondly, he mis-states the very object of the sermon by explaining the theme in words and with illustrations which the discourse neither uses nor justifies, but clearly opposes.¹ He has not only *left out* the phrases which *interpret* the Proposition, but has also *put in* phrases which *misinterpret* it. The fact is a curious one, that whenever he seems to gainsay the main distinction between the two forms of religious truth, he departs from the phraseology of the discourse, and substitutes a phraseology of his own. His objections would seem inapposite, if he did not prepare the way for them by defining the object of the discourse in words which he himself has introduced, not with the design we presume, but with the result of caricaturing that object. Thus he repeatedly conveys the idea that the sermon directly authorizes such unqualified terms as "two theologies," "two kinds of theology," one of which is conformed to the "logical consciousness," the

¹ It is singular that not only the Reviewer's literal language does injustice to the literal language of the sermon, but his figures of speech do injustice to the figures of the sermon. Thus he says, p. 660: "The temple of God which temple is the church, is not to be built up by *rubbish*," but the sermon speaks of the "jealousies of those good men who build their faith upon Jesus Christ as the chief corner stone, and yet are induced by unequal measures of genius and culture to give different *shapes* to structures of the same *material*;" and again "the *subject matter* of these heterogeneous *configurations* may often be one and the same, having for its nucleus the same *cross*, with the formative influence of which all is *safe*." p. 559.

other to the "intuitional consciousness,"¹ the one "true to the feelings and false to the reason, the other "true to the reason and false to the feelings;" whereas none of these unmodified phrases have been employed, and some of them have been designedly rejected as inaccurate, by the author of the discourse.² But the Reviewer may say that the sermon must be considered as advocating two essentially different theologies, because it speaks of a theology of the intellect and a theology of the heart. In the same method of reasoning, it may be inferred, that because the author of the sermon believes in the divine Creator, and in the divine Preserver, and in the divine Governor, and in the divine Lawgiver, therefore he believes in four first persons of the Trinity; and because he believes in the divine Redeemer, and in the divine Mediator, and in the divine Judge, and in the divine Intercessor, therefore he believes in four second persons of the Trinity; and because he believes in the divine Renewer, and in the divine Sanctifier, and in the divine Comforter, and in the divine Inspirer of truth, therefore he believes in four third persons of the Trinity. The simple fact is, that our critic, without intending to abuse, has distorted language.

Having thus described the sermon as advocating two radically opposite kinds of theology, the Reviewer has (innocently, we presume) prepared his readers for a new dualistic invention, and he therefore represents the discourse (without specifying wherein) as proceeding on the supposition "that the feelings perceive in one way and the in-

¹ In unfolding (or rather obscuring) the design of the sermon, the Reviewer says (p. 646) of its author, "he proposes the distinction between the theology of feeling and that of the intellect. There are two modes of apprehending and presenting truth. The one by the logical consciousness (to use the convenient nomenclature of the day) that it may be understood; the other by the intuitional consciousness, that it may be felt. These modes do not necessarily agree; they may often conflict, so that what is true (!) in the one, may be false (?) in the other." These terms, "logical and intuitional consciousness," are the well known terms of Mr. Morell; and a reader of this Review, who had not read the sermon, would infer that the sermon advocated Morell's philosophy. For the honor of this Reviewer, we trust that he did not intend to excite a suspicion at once so ~~sharp and so~~ hurtful; but by using these suspicious terms, which he must have known were ~~not~~ in the sermon, he has prepared the way, as really as if he had designed it, for several of his subsequent charges.

² The sermon alludes once to "different kinds of theology which cannot be reconciled with each other," and alludes to them as *contradistinguished* from the different forms of theology which are the theme of the sermon. It characterizes them as two antagonistic systems of intellectual belief; and specifies, for an example, the theology which inserts and that which omits "the doctrine of justification by faith in the sacrifice of Jesus," p. 559.

tellect in another," that "the perceptions themselves vary, so that what appears true to the feelings, is apprehended as false to the intellect," that there are "different percipient agencies in the soul," two conflicting intelligences in man; the one seeing a thing to be true, and the other seeing it to be false, and yet both (each?) seeing correctly from its own position and for its own object."¹

Now, we presume that in the history of theological criticism, there have been more singular caricatures than this; and accordingly this may be endured with patience. Let us then calmly consider the foundation of this oft repeated charge, that the sermon represents the soul as not "a unit," but as having "a dualism" in it. The only foundation for it is, that the discourse contains a prolonged account of the feelings as distinct from, and often as opposed to the reason. But what shall we say of those metaphysical systems in which one volume is devoted to the intellect, and a separate volume to the sensibilities? What shall we say of the common language of men, in which we hear every day that the judgment governs the fancy, or the imagination controls the judgment, the passions mislead the conscience, and contend with each other; the "old man" and the "new man" struggle together in the same man, we have "a divided soul," "a divided heart," are "double minded," etc. etc.² Does any one pretend to find in this ordinary speech an implication that the soul is dichotomized and subdichotomized into ten or twenty "conflicting agents?" One might as well make this pretension, as profess to discover an implied "dualism" in the sermon which is thus bisected. What shall we say of this very Review, speaking, as it does so often, of an expression "*false to the taste and to the feelings.*"³ Does the taste perceive *falsehood*? Do the feelings *perceive* it? What shall we say of its peculiar remark, that the phrase "God the mighty Maker died," has to be *defended* by the *intellect* at the bar of the *feelings*?⁴ What shall we say of the "dualism" which is found between this Reviewer and Dr. Hodge; for Dr. Hodge says in his Commentary on Romans 7: 15-23, that "there is a conflict between the natural authoritative sense of right and wrong and [the] corrupt inclinations," that "*indwelling sin wars against the renewed principle, and brings the soul into captivity to itself,*" and he deliberately affirms that the

¹ Bib. Rep. pp. 663, 669, 666.

² When a man says, I have a soul and body, does he mean that the "I" is separate from the soul and body? What does he mean by *my* soul, *myself*?

³ Bib. Rep. p. 652.

⁴ Ibid p. 666.

word "I, in the language of the apostle, includes, as it were, *two persons*, the new and the old man."¹

Now, can a fair critic infer from this language, that the Reviewer and Dr. Hodge, (if we may continue so long in our dualism,) and all men are ready to reason on the principle that one person is two persons, and has two souls? Why, then, does the Reviewer draw such an inference from the sermon? *Every body knows* that such language is necessary in this imperfect state of being. Just in proportion to the clearness with which we aim to distinguish between the dissimilar processes of the soul, must we employ terms which, if pressed to the letter, would imply not a "dualism," but an indefinite multiplication. Two things which cannot be separated, may yet be distinguished throughout a prolonged description. We may reason for hours on the distinction between the substance and the attributes of matter, without implying that there is a separation between them. The Reviewer's charge of dualism rests on his own oversight of the difference between *distinct* and *separate*. We can no more easily converse without alluding to an apparent division in the soul, than without saying that the sun sets, or ice is cold. Usage justifies such representations. It requires them. We should be mere pedants without them. All philosophers admit them. But such expressions, as they are generally understood, are reconcilable with the truth that the soul is simple and indivisible. For this undivided agent has different states or modes of activity, and in relation to these different states or modes of activity, it assumes different names. The conscience is the soul viewed as capable of acting in one manner; the will is the same spirit viewed as capable of acting in a different manner; the intellect is the same soul viewed as capable of perceiving; and the heart is the same spirit viewed as capable of loving what is perceived. And here is suggested another reason why the modes of presenting truth which are adapted to the soul in one method of its action, may receive a different name from that applied to the modes

¹ One of the sweeping assertions made by the Reviewer is, that "the Bible never recognizes that broad distinction between the intellect and the feelings which is so often made by metaphysicians," Bib. Rep. p. 671. But does it not often represent a pure spirit as having a percipient eye and ear, and a feeling heart, bowels of mercies, etc.? Dr. Hodge says, (Com. on Rom. 14: 1-23) that "conscience or a sense of duty is not the *only* and perhaps not the most important principle to be appealed to in support of benevolent enterprises;" "but we find the sacred writers appealing *most frequently* to the pious and benevolent *feelings*;" and yet the Reviewer says that the Bible "*never* predicates depravity or holiness of the feelings as distinct from the intelligence."

of presenting the same truth which are adapted to the soul in another method of its action. And this illustrates the persistive error of the Review, which detects in these two modes of presenting truth, two radically antagonistic "kinds of theology," because the word theology is applied to each; and which also detects in the two different modes of the spiritual activity which the sermon describes, two intelligences, or "*such a dualism in the soul.*" Why did not the Review push its consistency still farther, and because the sermon describes two different modes of teaching astronomy and natural philosophy, charge it with advocating two radically opposite astronomies and philosophies? The sermon specifies two diverse methods of representing our personal identity; therefore, there are two opposite identities in each individual, as our critic might infer, if he should persevere in the course which he has begun. We will not borrow his own decorous language, and say of his reasoning on this subject, that it "indicates a most extraordinary confusion of mind;" we only say that it makes a confusion of mode with essence, the forms of a thing with the thing itself.

It is indeed possible, (for what is not possible?) that from some rhetorical phrases in the sermon, if they be interpreted as if they were found in a mathematical treatise, and if also they be severed from their relations, an inconsiderate or else a resolute critic might force out an inference in favor of "two percipient principles in the soul;" as with the same ease he might infer a similar dualism from the language of every man, not excepting the author of the seventh of Romans, and especially from the most carefully written treatises of this Reviewer. But the argument of the discourse is independent of that rhetorical and convenient phraseology; it might be conducted with the more cumbrous phrases of "the soul in the state of reasoning," "the soul developing itself in the mode of emotion or volition," etc. Indeed, the direct aim of a note to the sermon,¹ is to show that "the heart (*never*) perceives, for the intellect *only* is percipient, but holy feelings prompt the intellect to new discoveries, furnish *it* with new materials for examination and inference, and regulate it in its mode of combining and expressing what *it* has *discerned*. An affection of the heart towards a truth develops a new relation of that truth, and the *intellect* perceives the relation thus suggested by the feeling," etc. If there are any principles underlying and pervading the whole dis-

¹ Bib. Sac. pp. 564, 565. This note is not even referred to by the Reviewer, and still seems to have drawn from him the concession, that the author would "deny that he held to any such dualism in the soul." Bib. Rep. 660.

course, they are that "the theology of the intellect is the one *system* which recommends itself to a dispassionate and unprejudiced *mind* as *true*," (perceived to be true by the intellect); and that "the theology of the heart is the *collection of statements* which recommend themselves to the healthy moral feelings as *right*," (not *perceived* to be *true* by the heart);¹ that while the intellect is the only faculty which apprehends truth, and while it forms various conceptions of it, the feelings are more gratified with some of its conceptions than with others, and those conceptions of doctrine, which are peculiarly congenial with the excited heart, belong to its favorite cast of theology; that the Bible teaches one and only one definite system of doctrines; these doctrines contemplated by the mind arouse the sympathies of the heart, and these sympathies prompt to varied forms of expressing the same doctrine. As the Reviewer has well said, p. 657, "it is because such doctrines are didactically taught in the Bible, and presented as articles of faith, that they work themselves into the heart, and find expression in its most passionate language," language, however, which the critic must and does repeatedly affirm to be different from the style fitted for speculation.

What does the Reviewer mean, then, when he represents² the sermon as teaching, that "conflicting apprehensions are equally true," and as ascribing "to the sacred writers conflicting and irreconcilable representations?" Over and over it is asserted in the discourse, that while the intellectual theology is "accurate not in its spirit only but in its letter also," the emotive theology involves "the substance of truth, although when *literally* interpreted it may or may not be false."³ The purpose of one entire head in the sermon⁴ is to prove, that the one theology is precisely the same with the other in its real meaning, though not always in its form; that the expressions of right feeling, if they do contradict each other "*when unmodified*," can and must be so explained as to harmonize both with each other and with the decisions of the judgment; that "literally understood these expressions are dissonant from each other; their dissonance adds to their emphasis; their emphasis fastens our attention upon the principle in which they all agree; this principle is too vast to be vividly uttered in a single formula, and therefore branches out into various parts, and the lively exhibition of one part contravenes an equally impressive statement of a different one; the intellect educes light from the collision of these repugnant phrases and then modifies and reconciles them into" the

¹ Bib. Sac. p. 563.² Bib. Rep. p. 664.³ Bib. Sac. pp. 534, 535.⁴ Bib. Sac. pp. 545-550.

harmonious and harmonizing truth. The sermon repeats, again and again, that it is *impossible* to believe contradictory statements "without qualifying some of them so as to prevent their subverting each other;" that the reason "being that circumspect power which looks before and after, does not allow that of these conflicting statements each can be true save in a qualified sense;" and that such statements *must* be qualified by disclosing the fundamental "principle in which they all agree for substance of doctrine," "the principle which will rectify one of the discrepant expressions by explaining it into an *essential agreement* with the other."¹

But there is a third way in which the Reviewer makes a wrong impression with regard to the very object of the sermon. He implies and assumes, that the representations fitted for the excited sensibility are supposed in the sermon to be always different from the representations fitted for the calm intelligence. He feels satisfied that he has annihilated the distinction between the style of the intellect and that of the feelings, when he has cited passages which belong to *both*! He hurries on to the inference, that if the theology of the intellect "aims to be intelligible rather than impressive," then of course the theology of the heart must *always* not only aim to be, but absolutely *be* unintelligible! And he gives plausibility to this (his undesigned) caricature of the sermon, by omitting its oft-repeated explanations. One of these explanations is stated in the most prominent paragraph of the discourse, thus: "*Sometimes*, indeed, both the mind and the heart are suited by the *same* modes of appeal."² A second of these explanations is stated as an introduction to the analysis of the style suited to the heart, thus: "In some respects, *but not in all*, the theology of feeling *differs* from that of intellect."³ A third of these explanations is stated in another prominent passage, thus: "Both of [these forms of theology] have *precisely the same* sphere with regard to *many* truths, but not with regard to all."⁴ Yet not a single one of these explanations has the Reviewer so much as even noticed. He has quoted passages immediately *before* and immediately *after* them, but has not quoted *them*. In despite of numerous other repetitions of the same modifying thought, as where the sermon so often says that the representations prompted by feeling are often minutely and literally accurate, this critic has persisted in reasoning as if the sermon had affirmed precisely what it has denied, that the two generic forms of theology differ at all times, in all respects, and

¹ Bib. Sac. pp. 546, 548.

² *Ibid.* p. 535.

³ *Ibid.* p. 534.

⁴ *Ibid.* p. 551.

in regard to all doctrines. One object of the sermon is, to state the differences between the two generic forms, where any differences exist, and it is repeatedly announced that they do exist at some but not all times, in some but not all respects, in regard to some but not all truths. The Reviewer might as well say, that when we speak of prose as distinct from poetry, we must mean that no passages are suitable both for an essay and a poem; he might as well say that when we speak of "doctrinal" as distinct from "experimental" preaching, we must mean that they are unlike in all particulars, as he can say that when we speak of the intellectual theology as distinct from the emotive, we must mean that all parts of the one are unfitted for the other. Turretin's Theology is called scientific, because in its primary intent and as a whole it is fitted to aid our speculations; still, in some particulars, it is practical in its tendencies. Baxter's Saints' Rest is called practical, because in its primary intent and as a whole it is fitted to move our affections; still, in some particulars, it is scientific. So the theology of and for the intellect is represented in the sermon as likewise suited in a degree to the heart, and *vice versa*; but the primary and general scope of the one is easily distinguished from the primary and general scope of the other. The style of the pulpit would be as much improved as the style of our doctrinal treatises, if this distinction were more faithfully observed.

Without staying to comment on the many similar instances in which our critic has begun his quotations directly *after*, or has broken them off directly *before* the remarks in the sermon which qualify them, let us proceed to another class of his undesigned mis-statements.

2. He gives an erroneous view of the main theory of the discourse, with regard to the peculiar language of the emotions. We have just seen, that the expressions of the heart are not described in the sermon as uniformly differing from those of the judgment. Here is one error of the Reviewer. He has committed another in supposing, that the sermon "does not discriminate between mere figurative language, and the language of emotion."¹ Now, the sermon not only repeats the idea that the theology of feeling differs from that of intellect in other particulars than in its use of figures, for it differs in "proportions of doctrine," in "the especial prominence given to" certain features of it, etc. etc.; but the sermon also reiterates the idea, that the language appropriate to the sensibilities is not uni-

¹ Bib. Rep. p. 674.

formly figurative, but "may or may not be false when *literally* interpreted," and "aims to be impressive, *whether it be* or be not minutely accurate;"¹ that it often consists of those earnest, intense expressions which, not being hyperbolic, are not ordinarily termed figures of speech; that *merely* figurative expressions do not constitute the language of emotion, for this language is often characterized by the *abundance* and *boldness* of its metaphors; that it is not merely figurative or poetical in the sense of arbitrary or unsubstantial,² and still mere poetry often admits the most literal expressions. From the saying that the heart "sacrifices abstract remarks to visible and tangible images," must an expert critic infer that the heart is *never* satisfied with a plain expression? Must he rush on from "often" to "always," from "frequently" to "universally," from a qualified sentence to a rash one?

The Reviewer³ makes the following criticism: "Our author represents the feelings as expressing themselves in figures, and demanding 'visible and tangible images.' We question the correctness of this statement. The highest language of emotion is generally simple."—And suppose we concede to the Reviewer, that the *highest* language of feeling is *generally* simple, must we therefore retract the remark that "sometimes both the mind and the heart are suited by the same modes of thought, but often they require dissimilar methods"? (Sermon, p. 534.) The Reviewer proceeds to say that "nothing satisfies the mind when under great excitement, but literal or perfectly intelligible expressions. *Then is not the time for rhetorical phrases.*" And after these remarks, which he ought to have qualified, he quotes some impassioned phrases of the Bible, as specimens of "the simplest form of utterance." And suppose that these phrases were every one apposite, must we therefore recant the remark that, "in some respects, *but not in all*, the theology of feeling differs from that of intellect"? (Sermon p. 535.) Has not our critic, however, made some unexpected mistakes in his citations of simple as opposed to figurative phrases? Has he not quoted some passages which Gerhard would not record as literally accurate statements? He has, for instance, actually cited as unrheterical, the well known words, "Against thee, thee only have I sinned." Now, it so happens that John Milton has specified these very words as an example of a highly figurative style. "Yet some would persuade us," says the poet, "that this absurd opinion was king David's, because in the fifty

¹ Bib. Sac. pp. 535, 536.

² Ibid p. 538.

³ Bib. Rep. p. 650.

first Psalm he cries out to God, 'Against thee only have I sinned;' as if David had imagined that to murder Uriah and adulterate his wife, had been no sin against his neighbor; whereas that law of Moses was to the king expressly, Deut. xvii. not to think so highly of himself above his brethren. David, therefore, by those words could mean no other, than either that the depth of his guiltiness was known to God only, or to so few as had not the will or power to question him, or that the sin against God was greater beyond compare than against Uriah. Whatever his meaning were, any wise man will see that the pathetic words of a Psalm can be no certain decision to a point that hath abundantly more certain rules to go by."¹ We have heard of a respectable clergyman in our land, who from the passage, "Against thee, thee *only* have I sinned," attempted to prove that "all sin is against God only," that David committed no offence against Uriah, who must soon have died, even if he had not been slain in battle; nor against Bathsheba, who was elevated in consequence of the sin to great renown; nor against the Jewish people, etc. etc. Now, if the expression of David be not rhetorical, not figurative, not distinguishable, and our Reviewer cites it as not distinguishable from the simple language of the judgment, this preacher's inferences were correct. Another divine of no mean name has inferred from the phrase in the same penitential prayer, "Create in me a clean heart," that the Psalmist had not been regenerated before the sin which he here laments; for, in praying that a clean heart may be *created*, he implies that it did not antecedently exist. Now, it is very obvious that the sermon under review was aimed against such a use of such phrases, a use which is far too frequent and too lamentable to be sanctioned by the precipitate assertions of even so eminent a Reviewer.

There is one more particular in which our critic mis-states the theory of the discourse with regard to the peculiar language of emotion. He implies that the discourse represents this language as not at all under the supervision of the intellect, as entirely independent of logical rule. Assuming that the style for the feelings is identified with the figurative, and is described as uniformly different from the intellectual style, he criticizes the sermon as not only giving two intelligences to one man and making two radically opposite theologies, but also as justifying figures of speech which are intended to express a doctrinal error. He says that the author of the sermon "evidently

¹ English Prose Works of Milton, Vol. II. pp. 164, 165.

confounds two things which are as distinct as day and night; viz. a metaphor and a falsehood; a figurative expression and a doctrinal untruth. Because the one is allowable, he pleads for the other also.¹ But is it not sufficiently easy for the Reviewer to perceive, that one design of the sermon is to justify the emotional, or, as the Reviewer will have it, the figurative theology, because when explained aright it never opposes but contains the substantial truth? Does not the sermon repeat over and over that the fit language of emotion never really *means* what is logically incorrect; that it is "substantially accurate when not literally so," and that whatever diversity there may be in the modes of faith which the mind or heart adopts, yet "the central principles of it" are always one and the same truth?² Does the Reviewer really suppose, that because "the theology of feeling when literally understood may or may not be false," therefore, according to the sermon, it is to be literally interpreted and believed although false? "It is a canon of criticism," says the sermon (p. 541), "that we should express all the *truth* which our hearers need, and express *it* in the *words* which they will most appropriately feel."

But the Reviewer goes farther still. He has read in the discourse that the Bible, when "it represents Christians as united to their Lord," "*does not mean* to have these endearing words metamorphosed into an intellectual theory of our oneness or identification with Christ," and when "it declares that God has repented," etc., "it *does not mean* that these expressions, which as inflected by times and circumstances impress a truth upon the soul, be stereotyped into the principle that Jehovah has ever parted with his infinite blessedness," and when the Psalmist cried, "Awake! why sleepest thou, O Lord," and Martin Luther exclaimed, "Hearst thou not, my God; art thou dead?" they used "words that excite no congenial glow in technical students, viewing all truth in its dry light, and disdaining all figures which would offend the decorum of a philosophical or didactic style, but words which wake the deepest sympathies of quick-moving, wide-hearted, many-sided men, who look *through* a *superficial* impropriety and discern *under* it a *truth* which the nice language of prose is too frail to convey into the heart, and breaks down in the attempt."³ But although the Reviewer has seen this idea repeated more times than there are pages in the sermon, he yet without a blush represents this very sermon as teaching that the feelings do not need to be nourished by the truth, and that in devotional exercises we may express

¹ Bib. Rep. p. 665.

² Bib. Sac. pp. 535, 537, 540, 545, 555, 561, etc.

³ Bib. Sac. pp. 588, 589.

doctrines which we do not believe. He says, "In *opposition* to this view, *we* maintain that the feelings demand truth, i. e. truth which satisfies the intellect in the approbation and expression of their object;" the soul "cannot believe what it knows to be a lie;" "the hymn book or liturgy of no church contains doctrines contrary to the creed of that church."¹ What the sermon calls the "poetic license" of hymn books, the "style of remark which for sober prose would be unbecoming, or even, when associated in certain ways, irreverent;" what it calls "the words, not the truths, but the *words* which have been embosomed in the love of the church," all this the Reviewer confounds with a meant doctrinal falsehood. When the sermon says that some poetic stanzas "are not accurate expressions of dogmatic truth," the critic flies to the conclusion that they are intended to teach dogmatic error! He thus complains of the sermon as recommending a style of worship "profane to the feelings and a mockery of God." He makes the impression that he is impugning the discourse when he asserts, that "to use in worship expressions which the intellect pronounces to be doctrinally untrue is repudiated by the whole Christian church as profane."² — We are willing to forgive the Reviewer seven times and seventy times seven; but we beg leave to ask, how many times he really needs to be told, that the sermon never justifies expressions which are untrue in the *doctrines* designed to be taught by them, and that it only justifies some expressions which overpass "at times the proprieties of the didactic style," and which are untrue in their *literal meaning*? It insists as plainly as it can insist, that men must understand the language of the intellect "according to what it *says*," for it is definite and precise; and must understand the language of the heart "according to what it *means*," for the words "God came from Teman," do not mean that he moves from place to place, etc. It insists that the hyperbolic language, so called, is to be interpreted "as it is meant," and when so interpreted it "never transcends" but rather "falls short of" the real verity; that all the emotional language, indeed, is the "most natural utterance" of "a heart moved to its depths by the *truth*."

One cause of the Reviewer's mistakes on this subject is, that he does not seem to recognize the power or even the existence of those conceptions which the mind forms for the sake of illustrating and vivifying its ideas of the substantial truth, as such conceptions are distinct from the mind's ideas of the substantial truth itself; and therefore he

¹ Bib. Rep. p. 665.

² Ibid. p. 667.

does not properly estimate the force or design of figurative language. We were not prepared to expect from so learned a man such a sentence as the following, (Bib. Rep. p. 652): "Figurative language when interpreted literally will of course express what is false to the intellect, *but it will in that case be no less false to the taste and to the feelings.*" Now, of what use is the figure? What is the power of its primary, as distinct from its secondary meaning? The obvious principle is, that figurative language causes the mind to form certain conceptions which, although not according to the exact truth, yet often illustrate it. These conceptions are, often at least, combined with a momentary belief in the presence of the objects conceived, and thereby they often so interest the mind as to give it a more vivid idea of the truth to be illustrated; further, the comparison between the conception proximately, literally suggested, and the idea remotely, figuratively suggested, often interests the mind in its examination of the exact truth; and thus the taste is pleased, the intellect aided, and the feeling awakened by the conception, which the mind would not form, were it not for the figurative language, and which would have no influence were it not for the understood literal meaning of that language.

But all figures are not equally adapted to illustrate, to please, and to excite. Some are used merely for convenience, as many figures of syntax and etymology. Others are used chiefly for illustration, as what rhetoricians call the "explaining comparisons." Others are used mainly for ornament, as what rhetoricians call the "embellishing comparisons." Others still are used for the excitement of feeling, as what rhetoricians call, the "figures of passion," which are distinct from "figures of the imagination." The figures of passion belong to the peculiar language of feeling; the other figures are appropriate, under proper restraint, to the language of the intellect, although many of them are more frequently used in that of the heart. If the literal terminology were of itself copious and versatile enough, it would be, as it is not now, uniformly employed in our reasoning processes. As the argumentative style *abounds* with plain, so the emotive style *abounds* with figurative diction. Because the sermon under review asserts that the intellectual theology prefers "the literal to the figurative" we must not leap to the conclusion that the sermon would exclude the figurative altogether from this theology. Because a man prefers gold to silver, we must not infer that he would trample silver in the dust. Still there are some figures, those of passion, which the well known rule is to exclude from the didactic theology.

They are too bold for calm discussion; they need to be modified too laboriously; they suggest conceptions so vivid, as to be mistaken for the premises of an argument, rather than to be regarded, as they should be, the illustrations of the truth.

Of these passionate figures, so often found in the theology of feeling, some are used by impulse more than by design. "When the mind," says Dr. Campbell,¹ "is in confusion and perplexity, arising from the sudden conflict of violent passions, the language will of necessity partake of this perturbation. Incoherent hints, precipitate sallies, vehement exclamations, interrupted perhaps by frequent checks from religion or philosophy, in short, everything imperfect, abrupt, and desultory, are the natural expressions of a soul overwhelmed in such a tumult." The words which are uttered in such a state, though obscure in themselves, are perspicuous as expressive of the feelings, they work upon our sympathies and prompt us to form more vivid ideas of the object which thus excites the soul than we could form, if the words uttered had been in themselves more precise. Let these words, however, be transferred from their fit connections into a didactic treatise, and they *may* be absolutely unintelligible. There are other figures of passion which are designed to give us vivid ideas of an object in one of its particular aspects, when the mind has no power to form a definite, precise idea of that object as a whole. These figures, also, are often obscure in themselves, and their very obscurity rouses the imagination and heart, and under the stimulus of this excited sensibility the mind forms a more impressive notion of the entire object than it would form were it not thus stimulated. Thus, says Dr. Blair,² obscurity "is not unfavorable to the sublime. Though it render an object indistinct, the impression, however, may be great; for, as an ingenious author has well observed, it is one thing to make an idea clear, [precise], and another to make it affecting to the imagination; and the imagination may be strongly affected, and in fact often is so, by objects of which we have no clear [precise] conception. Thus we see that almost all the descriptions given us of the appearances of supernatural beings, carry some sublimity, though the conceptions which they afford us be confused and indistinct. Their sublimity arises from the ideas which they always convey, of superior power and might joined with an awful obscurity." And Mr. Burke³ says, "I think there are reasons

¹ Philosophy of Rhetoric, Book II. Ch. VIII.

² Rhetoric, Lecture III.

³ On the Sublime and Beautiful, Sect. IV.

in nature, why the obscure idea when properly conveyed, should be more affecting than the clear." "The mind is hurried out of itself by a crowd of great and confused images, which affect because they are crowded and confused." "In nature, dark, confused, uncertain images have a greater power on the fancy to form the grander passions, than those have which are more clear and determinate." On some subjects, he adds, "a clear idea is therefore another name for a little idea." So in his celebrated parallel between Dante and Milton, Mr. Macaulay says,¹ that the former "gives us the shape, the odor, the sound, the smell, the taste, he counts the numbers, he measures the size" of all which he describes. "His similes are the illustrations of a traveller" "introduced in a plain, business-like manner," "in order to make the meaning of the writer as clear to the reader as it is to himself." "Now, let us compare," proceeds Mr. Macaulay, "with the exact details of Dante, the dim intimations of Milton. — The English poet has never thought of taking the measure of Satan. He gives us merely a vague idea of vast bulk. In one passage the fiend lies stretched out huge in length, floating many a rood, equal in size to the earthborn enemies of Jove, or to the sea-monster which the mariner mistakes for an island. When he addresses himself to battle against the guardian angels, he stands like Teneriffe or Atlas; his stature reaches the sky. Contrast with these descriptions, the lines in which Dante has described the gigantic spectre of Nimrod. 'His face seemed to me as long and as broad as the ball of St. Peter's at Rome; and his other limbs were in proportion; so that the bank which concealed him from the waist downwards, nevertheless showed so much of him, that three tall Germans would in vain have attempted to reach his hair.'"

In accordance with these very simple principles, not dug out of the depths of German metaphysics, but taken from the surface of Blair's Rhetoric, the sermon under review describes the theology of feeling as introducing "obscure images," "vague and indefinite representations," all of which, however, so affect the heart as eventually to aid the mind in forming more vivid ideas of the truth than it would have otherwise formed. These very obscurities are intelligible as exhibitions of excited feeling, but often would not be intelligible if used as didactic statements. The emotive theology is also described as introducing other figures 'the most expressive which the debilitated heart will appreciate, but which yet fail of making a full disclosure,

¹ *Miscellanies*, Vol. I. p. 32.

and are only the foreshadowings of the truths which lie behind them.¹ But the Reviewer, opposing the theory of the sermon with regard to figurative language, says,² that this language "is just as definite in its meaning, and just as intelligible as the most literal." He ought to have qualified his remark, and said, first, that *some* figurative language is thus perspicuous; and secondly, that some is in itself designedly indefinite, and its indefiniteness is more expressive than its precision would be; thirdly, that some is easily intelligible if properly used in its fit connections, and yet may not be intelligible out of those connections; and fourthly, that there are some kinds of writing, the prophetic for instance, of which the minute signification was not intended to be obvious to all readers. But, according to the Reviewer's unmodified statement, the prophetic style would be as perspicuous to us as the style of the Gospel narratives; the highly wrought figures of Hebrew poets would present no more difficulty to commentators than do the simplest phrases in John's epistles, and figurative language would be as common as plain language now is in works of science. The Reviewer sweeps on too fast and too far. He fails to discriminate between a vivid idea of one feature of an object, and a definite idea of the whole object; and also between clearness and preciseness. Figures of speech may be clear, when they express not only the notion intended, but also something more; in expressing more they are not precise. He also fails to discriminate between the intelligibility of figures when they are used in their proper place, and their intelligibility when they are used out of their proper place;³ just as if the figure, "a man ought to hate his father and mother, brother and sister," which is perfectly clear in one connection, would be equally clear if transferred without a qualifying phrase to a dogmatic treatise; just as if "The Way of Life," might fitly contain an unmodified exhortation to "The duty of hatred towards parents and benefactors." The Reviewer himself, where he has no theory to controvert, has hit the truth far more nearly than in these controversial criticisms; for in commenting on the seventh of Romans, he represents Paul as exclaiming: "It is not I therefore, my real and lasting self, but this intrusive tyrant [sin] dwelling within me that disobeys the law;" and then the commentator adds: "This *strong* and *expressive* language, though susceptible of a literal interpretation which would make it teach not only error but nonsense, is still perfectly perspicuous and correct because accurately *descriptive of the common*

¹ Bib. Sac. pp. 550, 566, etc. ² Bib. Rep. p. 651. ³ Bib. Sac. pp. 551, 555, 566.

feelings of men." In different words,—this vehement language in *other connections* might be nonsensical, but in its present connection it is clear in its import, because it is perfectly expressive of agitated feeling. Again, the very gentleman, of whom it has been said without any sinister intent, that no one can mistake "his hand" in this Review, explains the celebrated passage, Rom. 9: 3, "I could wish that myself were accursed," etc., with the remark, "The difficulty arises from pressing the words too far, making them express *definite ideas*, instead of *strong and indistinct emotions.*" Similar criticisms are frequent in this commentator, who is in an ungraceful *dualism* with the Reviewer. If we should retort upon him his own courteous accusations we should say, "It is to be remembered that it is not the language of excited, fanatical, fallible men that our [critic] undertakes thus to eviscerate," by representing it as having been uttered *without definite ideas*, etc. But are these the fitting accusations for a Christian and a *divine*?

In what way can we account for it, now, that when the learned commentator comes to criticise a New England sermon, he should have forgotten the rhetorical principles with which he was once familiar? He does not discriminate between the truth that often "obscurity favors the sublime," and the error that obscurity is proper for science. Because the sermon says that "*often*" when a passionate phrase is wrested from its fitting adjustments and transferred to a dogmatic treatise, it appears unintelligible or absurd, the Reviewer represents the sermon as teaching that all passionate phrases are absurd or unintelligible. We shall soon see that, according to him, the theory of feeling is characterized in the discourse, as a collection of statements which are false and incapable of being understood. He reasons on the principle that because a mathematician could not, without an absurdity, attempt to prove that something is less than nothing, therefore when men confess in prayer that they are less than nothing, they have no meaning. He might as fairly say, that because a natural philosopher would be unintelligible in advancing the proposition that there can be a point in space which is underneath the very lowest point, therefore there is no idea conveyed in the poetic hyperbole:

"Which way I fly is hell, myself am hell;
And in the lowest depth, a lower deep
Still threatening to devour me, opens wide
To which the hell I suffer seems a heaven."

In regard to the nature of such figurative language as is peculiarly

appropriate to the theology of the heart, there is indeed an obvious difference between the sermon and the Review, but there is a difference equally obvious between this Review and some other productions of its reputed author. The following is a notable illustration. The sermon says,¹ in a style which might appear to be sufficiently guarded: "*Left to its own guidance,*" (the intellect) "would never suggest the unqualified remark² that Christ has fully paid the debt of sinners, for it declares that this debt may justly be claimed from them; nor that he has suffered the *whole* punishment which they deserve, for it teaches that this punishment may still be righteously inflicted on themselves; not that he has *entirely* satisfied the law, for it insists that the demands of the law are yet in force. If it should allow those as logical premises, it would also allow the salvation of all men as a logical inference, but it rejects this inference and accordingly, being self-consistent, must reject those when viewed as literal premises. It is adapted to the soul in her inquisitive moods, but fails to satisfy her craving for excitement. In order to express the definite idea that we are exposed to evil in consequence of Adam's sin, it does not employ the passionate phrase, 'we are guilty of his sin.' It searches for the proprieties of representation, for seemliness and decorum. *It gives origin* to no statements which require apology or essential modification; no metaphor, for example, so bold and so liable to disfigure our idea of the divine equity, as that Heaven imputes the crime of one man to millions of his descendants, and then imputes their myriad sins to him who was harmless and undefiled." Now, the Reviewer confronts this passage with remarkable decision,³ and avers, not that some, but that "*all the illustrations*" [and among them is the phrase, "God the mighty Maker died"] "which our author gives of modes of expression which the theology of the intellect would not *adopt*" [give origin to, suggest] "are the products of that theology. They are the language of speculation, of theory, of the intellect, as distinguished from the feelings." What, then, are

¹ Bib. Sac. p. 535.

² The sermon admits, p. 568, that the intellect may make an occasional use of such remarks, *when* they are qualified, and *after* they have been suggested by the feelings, but says that, "*left to its own guidance* it would never suggest" them. But the Reviewer, while he fairly quotes the rest of the sentence, drops from it the important qualifying words, "*left to its own guidance,*" and he thus fails to give its full meaning. Afterwards, also, he confounds the words "suggest," "give origin to," which the sermon uses, with the word *adopt*, which he seems to use as their synonym.

³ Bib. Rep. p. 648.

these illustrations? One is the "*unqualified* remark that Christ has *fully* paid the debt of sinners." Does not the Reviewer himself qualify this phrase, in his common explanations of it? Why does he so often teach that Christ has not paid the debt of sinners *in any such sense* (which would be the ordinary sense of the phrase) as to make it unjust for God to demand the sinner's own payment of it? Why does he teach, that although the debt of sinners is paid, *in a very peculiar sense*, yet it is not so paid but that they may be justly "cast into prison until they themselves have paid the uttermost farthing?" Another illustration is, the "*unqualified* remark that Christ suffered the *whole* punishment which sinners deserve." And does not the Reviewer elsewhere thrust in various modifications of this phrase, saying that Christ did not suffer *any* punishment in such a sense as renders it unjust for the entire punishment of the law to be still inflicted on transgressors; that he did not suffer the whole, the precise eternal punishment which sinners deserve,¹ that in fact he did not suffer any punishment at all in its *common* acceptation of 'pain inflicted on a transgressor of law on account of his transgression, and for the purpose of testifying the lawgiver's hatred of him as a transgressor?' Why, then, does the Reviewer here represent this "unqualified remark" as identical with the ambiguous phrase, "Christ bore our punishment," and as a "summation of the manifold and diversified representations of Scripture?" Another of these illustrations is, the equally unmodified statement that "Christ has entirely satisfied the law." How many times has the Reviewer elsewhere asserted that Christ has not satisfied the law *as a rule of duty*, but that it still continues and will always continue its demand for perfect obedience? Of course he does not believe, without a qualification, that "Christ has *entirely* satisfied the law." Why, then, does he here treat this "unqualified remark" as identical with the loose phrase "Christ has satisfied the law," and as a "*precise* representation" of the truth. The statements that "Adam's sin is imputed to us, and our sin is imputed to Christ," are likewise characterized by the Reviewer as not less "purely addressed to the intellect," not less

¹ Dr. Joseph Huntington, believing that Christ literally endured the precise punishment threatened in the law, reasons thus: Sinners "in their surety, vicar or substitute, i. e. in Christ, the head of every man, go away into everlasting punishment, in a truly gospel sense. In him, they suffer infinite punishment i. e. he suffers (it) for them, in their room and stead;" and therefore as they have once suffered the whole curse of the law, they cannot be justly exposed to it the second time; hence Universalism.

“purely abstract and didactic formulæ,” than any others. It is a matter of literary history, that to impute sin to a man is, in the common primary use of the terms, the same as to accuse him of having committed it; and that when these terms are employed in the sense of merely treating a man in certain respects as if he had committed the sin, they are used with a secondary meaning, stronger and more nervous than the unimpassioned intellect would have prompted for itself. So the phrase, “guilty of Adam’s sin,” is a figure of speech; i. e. “a mode of speaking or writing in which words are deflected from their ordinary signification, or a mode more beautiful and *emphatical* than the ordinary way of expressing the sense.” As all of these phrases have originally a like figurative character, (in the best meaning of the term, figurative,) so they retain this character after they have been transferred to the technical dialect. They retain it just so long as their scientific is different from their primitive and ordinary signification. They were originally prompted by a desire to enstamp deeply upon the heart, certain doctrines in certain individual relations. They were not *originally* intellectual statements, but have been *transferred* from their pristine to the dogmatic sphere. They still continue, however, to be impressive rather than transparent, to be vehement rather than explicit. And therefore it is notorious, that long after they have been explained and re-explained so as to abate their primitive force, and give them a technical diverse from their obvious meaning, the common usage will yet reassert its claims, and these very terms are to be again qualified, and once more softened down, limited, restricted, hedged in with adjuncts, defined as often as employed, and after all, they are misunderstood by multitudes who contend for them, who *will have* it that doctrinal terms are used in their plain sense, and who thus make it needful for these giant-like and long-suffering divines, whose business is the taking care of these evasive words, “to pace forever to and fro on the same wearisome path, after the same recoiling stone.” Such is the character of these emphatic utterances, even when transmuted into what are called “intellectual propositions.” Their history has made them useful for reference. Their own nature makes them often eloquent in use. They are natural modes of developing the heart’s deepest affections in certain pensive moods; but ‘left to its own guidance, the intellect would never have suggested them as *unqualified*.’ Being figurative in the scientific sense of the term, they are exciting; some of them being often obscure when used in prosaic connections, irritate their already excited devotees, and induce them to upbraid where they

ought to reason. John Foster says of such devotees to the technical style, that "if a man has discarded or has never learned the accustomed theological diction, and speaks in the general language of good sense, as he would on any other subject, they do not like his sentiments, even though according with their own; his language and his thoughts are all Pagan; he offers sacrifice with strange fire." And a celebrated political writer has said of such men, "They will themselves die or make others die for a simile."

3. This topic, however, introduces another class of the Reviewer's unintended mis-statements. He gives a wrong idea of the doctrinal illustrations in the discourse.

It is a melancholy truth, distinctly asserted by the writer of the sermon, that man has a "fallen," "evil," "loathsome," "corrupt," "odious" "nature, which precedes and certainly occasions (his) first actual sin." This is the doctrine in its prosaic, but it may be stated in an intensive form; and one aim of the sermon is to justify the occasional use of such words, as that this "diseased" and "disordered" state of the sensibilities is "sinful," "blamable," "guilty;" provided that such words be used, not for implying that there can be a literal sin which is uncondemned by conscience, i. e. the power of deciding on the moral character of acts; not for implying that our "inborn, involuntary corruption" can be the sole ground why a subject of it, *if he can be supposed to be innocent of all actual disobedience*, should be condemned to a punishment which supposes that the punished one is personally and literally ill-deserving on account of his "transgression of the law;" not as implying that a soul merits a legal penalty merely for the passive condition in which it was created; but the words "sinful, blamable, guilty nature" are to be sometimes justified, provided that they are used for historical reference, or for vehemently expressing "our dread or hatred of this" evil nature, which is so intimately connected with our actual sins, and so surely as well as justly exposes us to punishment on account of them.¹ But the Reviewer, without any fair attempt to explain the principles on which the use of these words is allowed or disallowed, satisfies himself with reiterating the charge, that the doctrine of our sinful nature is affirmed in the discourse to be true to the feelings and false to the intellect.² We think that the Reviewer would have done more justice to himself, if he had acknowledged that when *he* uses the term "sinful nature" as denoting a nature antecedent to all sinful exercise of it, he

¹ Bib. Sac. pp. 567, 568.

² Bib. Rep. pp. 664, 673.

does not mean by "sinful" what men generally mean by the word, a quality which is condemned by our "power of discerning the moral character of acts;" he does not mean by sinful a quality for which the being who has never harbored it is personally ill-deserving; but he means a peculiar kind of sin, and uses the term with a very peculiar signification; and he differs from the sermon, therefore, not so much with regard to the doctrine, as with regard to the propriety of often designating that doctrine by a common word used in a sense which men in common life do not give it, a sense which they frequently and fatally misunderstand. What does a man gain by calmly denominating that passive condition a sin, for which alone the subject of it cannot be personally reproved by conscience, nor be condemned as himself deserving of a real and proper punishment.

It is another sad truth, plainly declared by the author of the sermon, "that man with his unrenewed nature will sin and only sin in his moral acts;" that "man, with no extraordinary aid from divine grace, is obstinate, undeviating, unrelenting, persevering, dogged, *fully set* in those wayward preferences which are an abuse of his freedom;" and "so important is it that this infallible certainty be felt to be true, that our hearts often incline us to designate it by the most forcible epithets," to express an accurate *dogma* in a more impressive *form*. It was, therefore, one design of the sermon to justify the occasional use of such phrases as, "man is unable to repent," "sin is necessary," provided that such terms be used to express strongly and impressively the certain, fixed unwillingness of unrenewed man to do right.¹ But the Reviewer, although he must know full well that this doctrine of the sermon has the sanction of President Edwards, yet with apparent coolness represents the sermon as denying the doctrine of inability and affirming this doctrine to be "false to the intellect."² He goes farther still³ and declares that the theory of the discourse represents feeling and knowledge "in *perpetual* (?) conflict," "the one teaching the doctrine of inability, the other that of plenary power," and he implies that the discourse represents the same man as having "the *consciousness* of inability to change his own heart, and yet the *conviction* that he has the requisite power." The critic means well, but it would be interesting to learn how he became unable to see that man is not once represented in the sermon as having a *consciousness* opposed to his conviction, but is uniformly represented as having both a *consciousness* and a *conviction* of his *unwil-*

¹ Bib. Sac. pp. 548, 566, 567.

² Bib. Rep. pp. 664, etc.

³ Bib. Rep. pp. 673, 661.

lingness to repent, and as often expressing this unwillingness by the forcible word inability. Will the Reviewer never distinguish between "two doctrines," and the same doctrine expressed in two forms? He has not done honor to himself as a fair-minded critic, in so strangely perverting or *ignoring* the following passage of the sermon: "The emotive theology, therefore, when it affirms this [i. e. the natural] power is correct both in matter and style; but when it denies this power, it uses the language of emphasis, of impression, of intensity; it means the *certainty* of wrong preference by declaring the *inability* of right; and in its vivid use of *cannot* for *will not* is accurate in its *substance* though not in its form;" and this "discordance being one of letter rather than of spirit is removed by an explanation which makes the eloquent *style* of the feelings at one with the more definite *style* of the reason."¹

Besides often affirming that there is an infallible certainty of man's continued impenitence until he be regenerated by the Divine Spirit, the sermon introduces the statements, that man's "*unvaried* wrong choices imply a full, unremitted *natural* power of doing right," and that "the character of our race needs an essential transformation by an interposed influence from God."² The Reviewer now springs to the charge that the first of these statements is "a vapid formula of Pelagianism," and the second is "a very genteel way of expressing the matter which need offend no one, Jew or Gentile, Augustin or Pelagius."³ Does the Reviewer mean to say, that Pelagius would have sanctioned either of the above cited statements when fairly presented in its connections? Did Pelagius recognize our "disordered nature," our "unvaried, undeviating wrong choices," our "natural" as *opposed* to our "moral power?" Did he suppose that the character of the *race*, as well as of particular individuals, needs not only an improvement but also an *essential transformation*, and that this radical change must be effected not only by moral suasion, but by the *interposed* influence of the Holy Spirit? Will not the Reviewer acknowledge then, that the two statements so offensive to him are wrested from their adjuncts and merely caricatured, when they are held up as involving the substantial error of Pelagianism?

The author of the sermon has never doubted but firmly believes, that in consequence of the first man's sin all men have at birth a corrupt nature, which exposes them to suffering, but not punishment, even

¹ Bib. Sac. p. 548. See also 547, 565-567.

² Bib. Sac. pp. 547, 548.

³ Bib. Rep. pp. 656, 656.

without their actual transgression ; which, unless divine mercy interpose, secures the certainty of their actual transgression, as soon as they can put forth a moral preference, and of their eternal punishment as the merited result of this transgression ; a corrupt nature, which must be changed by the supernatural influence of the Holy Ghost before they will ever obey or morally please him ; and therefore the author believes that men are by nature, i. e. in consequence, on account of it, sinners, and worthy of punishment "for all have sinned." But the Reviewer is bold enough to say, that the two passages "a sentence of condemnation passed on all men for the sin of one man," and "men are by nature the children of wrath," are represented by the author of the sermon as "impressive but not intelligible," "true to the feelings but false to the reason."¹ We do not believe that the Reviewer intended to make a false as well as injurious impression by these words ; he probably leaped to the inference, as untrue in itself as it is illogically drawn, that if some figures of speech do *sometimes appear* false and unintelligible when they are transferred from their proper to an improper place, then *the two above cited passages* not only appear but are both false and unintelligible *in this place* and as they are ordinarily used. This inference, however, is rejected as a mere paralogism by the writer of the discourse.

The author of the sermon has never doubted but fully believes, that all converted men will be, on the ground of Christ's death, not only saved from punishment but raised to happiness, will be not only pardoned but justified, not only treated in important respects as if they had never sinned, but treated in important respects as if they had been positively and perfectly holy. Still, the Reviewer, both without and against evidence, has preferred the charge that the author represents the passage "men are not merely pardoned but justified," as "not intelligible," and as "false to the reason."² Now here is a definite and an unfair accusation, to which we reply by asking a definite and a fair question. When and where has the author denied that the doctrine of justification as distinct from that of pardon, is intelligible or true? If the Reviewer has not borne "false witness against" the author, let him prove his witness to be correct. If he has been thoughtlessly betrayed into an accusation not more injurious than it is groundless, let him have the kindness to remember the words of Mr. Pitt : "Whoever brings here a charge without proof, defames." It is of no use for him to say that because the sermon represents *some*

¹ Bib. Rep. p. 674.

² Ibid p. 674.

figures of speech as absurd when in their wrong connections, therefore the sermon represents the phrase "men are not merely pardoned but justified" as absurd in the particular connections in which it is generally used. The primary meaning of the word justify, is altogether less conspicuous and embarrassing than the primary meaning of the word impute, and *if* the sermon *had* affirmed the word impute to be ordinarily "*unintelligible*," the Reviewer had no right to draw the false inference that the word justify would be characterized in the same manner. Because some pictures appear to be mere daubs, unless viewed at *one* specified angle, the Reviewer must not dash on to the conclusion that the Sistine Madonna is a mere daub, when it is viewed at all the angles which are commonly taken.

It is a solemn truth, distinctly avowed in the discourse,¹ that "There is a life, a soul, a vitalizing spirit of truth, which must never be relinquished for the sake of peace even with an angel. There is (I know that you will allow me to express my opinion)² a line of separation which cannot be crossed between those systems which insert, and those which omit the doctrine of justification by faith in the sacrifice of Jesus. This is the doctrine which blends in itself the theology of intellect and that of feeling, and which can no more be struck out from the moral, than the sun from the planetary system. Here the mind and the heart, like justice and mercy, meet and embrace each other; and here is found the specific and ineffaceable difference between the Gospel and every other system. But among those who admit the atoning death of Christ as the organic principle of their faith, there are differences, some of them more important, but many far less important than they seem to be." And, again, the author of the discourse avers,³ in the most prosaic language, that "the atonement has such a relation to the whole moral government of God, as to make it *consistent* with the honor of his legislative and retributive justice to save all men, and to make it essential to the highest honor of his benevolence or general justice to renew and save some. Therefore it satisfies the law and justice of God *so far and in such a sense*, as to render it proper for him not only to give many temporal favors, but also to offer salvation to all men, bestow it upon all who will accept it, and cause those to accept it, for whom the interests of the universe allow him to interpose his regenerating grace." But

¹ Bib. Sac. p. 559.

² As the discourse was delivered before a Convention of Trinitarian and Unitarian clergymen, such a parenthetic clause seemed to the author to be decorous.

³ Bib. Sac. pp. 562, 563.

our critic represents the sermon as denying that Christ satisfied the law and justice of God, as "explaining away the scriptural representations of the satisfaction of divine justice by the sacrifice of Christ," and as intimating that "because I may express the truth that Christ was a sacrifice by calling him the Lamb of God who bears the sin of the world, I may in solemn acts of worship so address him without believing in his sacrificial death at all."¹ It is a noticeable fact, that while the sermon *deduces* the intellectual truth of a vicarious atonement from the demands of holy feeling, and definitely affirms, p. 544, that "the doctrines which centre in and around a vicarious atonement are so fitted to the appetences of a sanctified heart as to gain the favor of a *logician*, precisely as the coincidence of some geological or astronomical theories with the phenomena of the earth or sky, is a part of the syllogism which has those theories for its conclusion;" yet the Reviewer inverts this whole process, and, p. 673, unblushingly represents the sermon as teaching that feeling and knowledge are in "perpetual (?) conflict," "the one craving a real vicarious punishment of sin, the other teaching that a symbolical atonement is all that is needed." Anxious to find some excuse for this charge of the Reviewer, we have searched for one in vain. He will not attempt, we imagine, to extenuate his fault by pleading that the author speaks of a "vicarious atonement," while the Reviewer speaks of a "vicarious punishment;" for the Reviewer himself will acknowledge that "in the most strict and rigid" meaning of the term, "punishment has reference to personal guilt."²

The author of the sermon believes, and has never implied the contrary, that Christ's death being vicarious, his sufferings being substituted for our punishment, we are literally unable, after having once sinned, to be saved without him; that we are not only redeemed from eternal punishment by his propitiatory sacrifice, but, even after we have been regenerated by his Spirit, we are entirely dependent on his grace in sending the same Spirit to secure our continuance in holiness; and, moreover, that we are every instant preserved in being by his Almighty power, so that without him we literally *cannot* even exist; and still it is boldly declared in the Review, that the sermon represents the passages, "without Christ we can do nothing" and "he hath redeemed us from the curse of the law by being made a curse for us," as "not intelligible" and as "false to the reason!"³ But the accom-

¹ Bib. Rep. pp. 653, 664, 665, 674. ² Princeton Theol. Essays, Vol. I. p. 141.

³ Bib. Rep. p. 674.

plished critic, not satisfied with inflicting this injury, has actually made the following cool statement: "The phrase that 'God came from Teman' or 'he made the clouds his chariot,' *when interpreted according to the laws of language*, expresses a truth. The phrases, 'Christ took upon him our guilt,' 'he satisfied divine justice,' *when interpreted by the same laws*, express, as our author thinks, what is false."¹ If the Reviewer is able to say all this, what will he not say next? He has not only concealed some of the most important *declarations* of the sermon, but has published the non-existent thoughts of its author. "*As our author thinks!*" Is it not a rule of comity in letters, never to report that a man believes what he emphatically denies that he believes? The phrases "Christ took upon him our guilt, and satisfied divine justice" are false, "as our author thinks," "when they are interpreted according to the use of language!" Really, unless we had learned long ago not to be surprised at anything which can be said by anonymous critics, even when in the main they are good men, we should be astonished at this apparently sober charge. Might not the Reviewer have easily seen it to be one aim of the discourse to prove, that all such phrases, when interpreted according to the laws of language, express what is intellectually and morally true? to prove that they must be explained according to what they *mean*, and that they always mean what the intellect can reconcile with other truths? The eager critic has here committed two faults. The first is a fault of logic; for he has taken the premise, that passionate phrases when explained literally and without qualification, and so not according to the laws of language, are *often* untrue, and has hence inferred that these phrases when explained with the proper qualification, and according to the laws of language are untrue. His reasonings may be reduced to this enthymem: The sermon states, pp. 522, 563, that Christ has satisfied the law and justice of God, so far and in such a sense as to render it not a matter of legal obligation, but a matter of propriety and consistency for him to regenerate some men, offer salvation to all men, and bestow numerous favors on the elect and non-elect; therefore, it follows that the phrase Christ "satisfied divine justice," *when interpreted according to the rules of language, expresses, as our author thinks, what is false.*

As the first error of the Reviewer in this charge is one of logic, so the second is one of controversial ethics. He has asserted that his own inference from the sermon is the actual opinion of the author of

¹ Bib. Rep. p. 665.

that sermon. And here his ethical fault is the more unseemly, because the Reviewer's inference is illogical, and the author's premise is a simple one, laid down in many of our elementary works. We should advise our critic to review Dr. Hey's *Canons of Controversy*, if we could suppose him ignorant of the rule, that one should never impute his own inferences, especially his unwarrantable inferences, to another man who is innocent of them. He should not impute them literally, by affirming outright that the innocent has committed these errors; nor should he impute them figuratively, by treating the innocent as if he had been guilty of these wrong conclusions.

If the Reviewer had pursued to its full length the principle which he seems to have adopted in some of his criticisms, he would have said, that the sermon denies the doctrine of *Eternal Punishment*, because it implies that this doctrine would be true, even if there were to be no literal fire or worm; that the sermon denies the doctrine of the *General Judgment*, because it implies that this doctrine would be true, even if there were to be no opened books; that the sermon denies the doctrine of the *Resurrection*, because it implies that this doctrine would be true, even if the same particles of matter composing our earthly bodies should not compose our spiritual bodies. For the Reviewer seems to have reasoned on the strange principle, that if the same doctrine be presented in two forms, one prosaic and one poetical, then the doctrine is denied, or is described as false to the intellect. Obviously, the sermon never intimates that any truth is false to the intellect. This language, and the idea suggested by it, are merely of the Reviewer's imputation. He has, apparently, reasoned thus: the sermon affirms that certain doctrines are, at certain times, associated with certain images, and expressed in certain words, which the intellect would never have suggested for the purposes of speculation; and therefore the sermon affirms that those doctrines are false to the reason. Just as if the sermon would have denied the truth of *John 21: 25*, provided that it had declared the possibility of the world's containing more books than can be ever written.

But the Reviewer is not satisfied even with these imputations. Although the sermon was designed to be homiletical rather than doctrinal, yet it incidentally teaches the dogmatic truths of *Eternal Punishment*, the *Resurrection*, the *General Judgment*, man's *Entire Sinfulness*, his *Native Corruption*, his need of *Regeneration* by the *interposed influence of God*, the *Vicarious Atonement*, and "the doctrines which centre in and around" it; and it repeatedly represents all Christian truth as that "which God himself has matched to our

niciest and most delicate springs of action, and which, so highly does he honor our nature, he has interposed by miracles for the sake of revealing in his written word.¹ Still, the Reviewer often characterizes the sermon as "inimical to the proper authority of the Bible," "subversive," "destructive" of it, as exhibiting sad affinities to Rationalism; and as fit to be associated in some of its doctrinal tendencies, with the writings of Schleiermacher, Röhr, Morell, etc.² In his Eleventh Letter on Clerical Manners and Habits, Dr. Miller says: "Let all your conduct in judicatories be *marked* with the *most perfect candor and uprightness*:" "Men in the main upright and pious, do sometimes indulge in a species of indirect management, which minds delicately honorable and strictly desirous of shunning the very appearance of evil, would by no means have adopted. Such are the little arts of concealment," etc.: "Never employ language toward any fellow member (of a judicatory) which you would not be willing to have directed toward yourself."³

Suppose, now, that in criticising this Review, we should use his own *argumentum ad captandum vulgus*. There are fundamental heresies, that of the Theopaschites that of denying the Trinity to be eternal, the Godhead to be perfect, etc., of which he might be convicted, as easily and as honorably as he has convicted the sermon of a neological spirit. Take a single illustration. It is an established principle, that the properties and attributes of either nature by itself, may be applied and ascribed to the whole person who combines two natures, but that the properties and attributes of the whole person cannot be ascribed, without qualification, to either nature by itself. Thus we may affirm that man, compounded of soul and body, eats and thinks, but not that the soul eats, nor that the body thinks; the complex being is perhaps corpulent and sentimental, but the body is not sen-

¹ Bib. Sac. pp. 561, 544.

² We will do justice to the charitable spirit of the Reviewer, and say, that in one passage on p. 646, he makes the following concession: "We are far from supposing that the author regards his theory as subversive of the authority of the Bible. He has obviously (?) adopted it as a convenient way of getting rid of certain doctrines (?) which stand out far too prominently in Scripture, and are too deeply impressed on the hearts of God's people, to allow of their being denied."—The charm of this passage lies in the fact that it purports to be apologetic. It begins to be a serious question with us, whether we have any acquaintance with the author whose designs are thus charitably explained; whether we have ever read a paragraph of his discourse. Either we are lamentably ignorant of the sermon, or else the gentleman who has assailed, has radically misapprehended it.

³ Miller's Letters, pp. 320, 328.

timental, nor the soul corpulent. On the same principle we may affirm, that Christ, compounded of God and man, is immutable, and died, but not that the man is immutable, or the God died. If we say that God has died, we speak poetically or erroneously. But the Reviewer defends the phrase, "God the mighty Maker died," as "a dogmatic truth," for "its strict doctrinal propriety," its "doctrinal fidelity," and even goes so far as to state that this phrase belongs to "the language of speculation, of theory, of the intellect, as distinguished from the feelings."¹ But, if it be true that God the mighty Maker died, then it is true on the principle that all which Christ did and suffered, God did and suffered; and all which was done by Jehovah, was done also by the man Christ Jesus. And this profane principle the Reviewer adopts; and so accordingly he believes, not only that the worlds were made by a man, the eternal decrees formed by the son of a carpenter, but also that, as Christ, so the eternal Deity was born, was educated, was ignorant, was lost by his parents, was carried about from place to place, was fatigued; God the Spirit was refreshed by food and sleep; God the Mighty was unable to bear his cross, was weak and not mighty; God the Maker was (contrary to one of the Reviewer's creeds) both begotten and also made; God the immutable grew in stature, was subject to daily, hourly change; God who is ever blessed, was at one period the greatest sufferer on earth, was nailed to the cross; the everlasting God was dead, not living; and therefore unchangeable power, wisdom, blessedness, and even life cannot be ascribed to him, "as our Reviewer thinks." Now, we will do this Reviewer the *justice* to say, that if we should imitate him in imputing to him as his own belief, the inferences which he has never avowed, but which might be drawn from his words, as fairly as he has drawn inferences from the sermon, we should do what our self-respect forbids us to do.

Pitiable indeed is the logomachy of polemic divines. We have somewhere read, that the Berkeleians who denied the existence of matter, differed more in terms than in opinion from their opponents who affirmed the existence of matter; for the former uttered with emphasis, "We cannot prove that there is an outward world," and then whispered, "We are yet compelled to believe that there is one;" whereas the latter uttered with emphasis, "We are compelled to believe in the outward world," and then whispered, "Yet we cannot prove that there is one." This is not precisely accurate, still it

¹ Bib. Rep. pp. 666, 648.

illustrates the amount of difference which exists between the Reviewer and the author of the humble Convention sermon. Let us listen to them in an imagined colloquy. The Reviewer exclaims aloud, "I believe in a sinful nature preceding all sinful exercise of it," and then whispers, "This passive nature is not sinful in the sense of being condemned by the conscience of one who never acted amiss; men are not personally blamable for being born with it; they do not deserve the fatal sentence at the judgment merely for the way in which they were made." The author exclaims aloud, "I believe that man's nature preceding all exercise of it contains no such sin as itself deserves to be tried, blamed, condemned at the judgment, and punished forever," and then he whispers, "Still this nature, as it certainly occasions sin, may be sometimes called sinful in a peculiar sense, for the sake of intensity." The Reviewer cries on a high key, "I believe that the sin of the guilty is imputed to the innocent under a just administration," and then adds in a lower tone, "The word impute, however, is not here used in its more obvious meaning, and does not imply that the imputation affects the character of the innocent or makes them actually displeasing to God." The author cries with a loud voice, "I believe that the sin of the guilty is not imputed to the innocent," and then adds on a lower key, "The innocent, however, are made to suffer in consequence of the guilty, and being thus treated in certain respects as if they had done wrong, sin may be sometimes said, for the sake of a deep impression, to be imputed to them." The Reviewer exclaims in a loud tone, "I believe that the innocent are justly punished for sin which they have never committed," and then adds in a milder accent, "They are not punished however in the most strict and rigid meaning of the term, but are only made to suffer on account of the sin of those with whom they are connected, and for the purpose of sustaining the law as inviolable." The author exclaims in a bold tone, "I believe that the innocent are not justly punished for sin which they have never committed, for, in the words of Andrew Fuller,¹ "*real* and *proper* punishment is not only the infliction of natural evil for the commission of moral evil, but the infliction of the one upon the person who committed the other, and in displeasure against him; it not only supposes criminality, but that the party punished was literally the criminal?" still in a milder accent the author adds, "The suffering of the innocent for the guilty may be sometimes called punishment with a peculiar meaning, for the

¹ Fuller's Works, Vol. IV. p. 34.

sake of unusual force." The Reviewer exclaims with earnestness, "All men sinned in Adam," but he explains with deliberation; "They did not literally exist in him, and his voluntary acts cannot be reckoned theirs strictly and properly." The author is earnest in saying, "All men did not literally exist in Adam, and could not have strictly and literally sinned before they existed;" but he is careful to add, "Adam's fall was so infallibly connected with the total depravity of his descendants, as to give a true and deep meaning to the phrase, which may be sometimes used as an intense one, that they sinned in him." The Reviewer proclaims aloud, "I believe in a limited but not general atonement," and then whispers, "It is sufficient, however, for the non-elect as well as the elect." The author proclaims aloud, "I believe in a general but not limited atonement," and then repeats with diminished emphasis, "It was never decreed, however, that this atonement should result in the regeneration of the non-elect." Says the Reviewer, "I will use terms in their technical, although it is not their most obvious meaning;" says the author, "I will generally use terms in their more obvious, although it is not their technical meaning." Whereupon the Reviewer speaks out: "You are inimical to the proper authority of the Bible;" to which the author responds, "You found this charge upon a mere difference about words, about the emphasis to be given them; about the modifications of voice with which the words are to be uttered; and it is notorious that a dispute about words leads to more and still more words, and ends, if it end at all, in hard and sharp words; it is what our polemic divines ought by this time to be tired of, logomachy."

4. But we have already anticipated a distinct class of the Reviewer's unintentional mis-statements. He represents the sermon as unguarded in its tendencies. He says that "it enables a man to profess his faith in doctrines which he does not believe,"¹ and thus to advocate opposing creeds. Is such an objection worthy of such a critic? Does not he himself cling to the creed that the children of Adam are punished for the sin of their father, and also to the Biblical creed "that the son shall not bear the iniquity of the father;" "neither shall the children be put to death for their fathers; every man shall be put to death for his own sin?" But the critic will respond, these apparent discrepancies can be reconciled; and we rejoin, one aim of the sermon is to show that all creeds which are allowable can be reconciled with each other; for, as far as allowable, they contain underneath their diversified forms the substance of the truth and of nothing but the truth.

¹ Bib. Rep. p. 646.

Dr. Blair remarks¹ what every body knows, that "all passions, without exception, love, terror, amazement, indignation, anger and even grief throw the mind into confusion, aggravate their objects, and of course prompt to a hyperbolic style." In accordance with this trite saying, the sermon makes an hypothetical assertion,² that if a creed be wrongly viewed as "a triumphal song of thanksgiving," and if agreeably to this view it be written in the style of a highly poetical effusion, and if when written in this style it be chanted under the influence of thrilling music and amid the pomp of a gorgeous ceremonial, then, in such a false position, the cantilator of such a creed may be so rapt in enthusiasm as to sing the ecstatic words without inquiring for their "precise" import. Who could imagine that the following inference would be drawn from the foregoing truism: — If a man with *false* views of the nature of a creed, may be so overcome by the minstrelsy of a cathedral as to cry out, "credo quia impossibile," while he cantilates an imaginative Confession, which is obscure in its sublimity, and confusing by its crowd of images; then it follows that a student acting, as a student ought to act, deliberately and circumspectly, may with set purpose subscribe a plain and precise creed when he knows it to be false both in its language and in its meaning. The man who can reason thus will soon conclude that if Peter spoke on the mountain without knowing what he said, then he wrote his epistles under the same kind of *afflatus*. We cannot imagine what a person means by extorting such inferences, but whatever he means, we forgive him.

That the Reviewer arrives at any of his accusations by reasoning in this way, we do not affirm. We cannot divine the process by which he comes to some of his charges. Sometimes he appears to adopt the premise, that the language of the Bible or of a creed must not be qualified at all, and if it be qualified then it is, (to use a word of his own) "eviscerated" of its meaning. But he "explains away" the literal import of many technical terms, just as really as they are explained away in the sermon. And as for qualifying the language of the Bible, does the Reviewer infer the "real presence" from the plain phrase "this is my body;" or the necessity of the pedilavium from the still plainer phrase, "ye ought to wash one another's feet." It were just as fair for us to affirm that he "explains away" the Bible when he denies that God manifests frowardness, Ps. 18: 26, as it is for the Reviewer to affirm that the sermon "explains it away." He has used, *totidem verbis*, the same argument of "rationalistic tenden-

¹ Rhet. Lect. XVI.

² Bib. Sac. pp. 553, 554.

cies," which the Romanist brings against the Protestant. It is the notorious *argumentum ad invidiam*.

But he is more definite in one of his charges. He says that the sermon proposes "no adequate criteria for discriminating between the language of feeling and that of the intellect," leaves "every one to his own discretion in making the distinction, and the use of this discretion, regulated by no fixed rules of language, is of course determined by *caprice* or taste;" that the sermon is "*perfectly arbitrary*" in explaining figurative language, etc., and its operation "must be to subject [the teachings of the Bible] to the opinion and prejudices of the reader," etc.¹

All the principles of Morus and Ernesti on Interpretation, cannot, of course, be collected into one Convention Sermon. But this sermon does propound some criteria for discriminating between the true and the false.

One of these criteria is, the agreement of a doctrine with right or Christian feeling. Whatever *words* this feeling sanctions are thereby signified to be correct in form; whatever *meaning* it sanctions, is thereby signified to be *true* in fact. Every statement is to be disapproved "which does not harmonize with the well ordered sensibilities of the soul." "In this light we discern the necessity of right feeling, as a guide to the right proportions of faith," pp. 546, 555.

A second of these criteria involved in the first, is the agreement of a doctrine with the *necessary* impulses of the soul. Reason "will sanction not only all pious feelings, but likewise all those which are *essential* developments of our original constitution," p. 567. "Whenever a feeling is constitutional, and *cannot* be expelled—whenever it is pious and cannot but be approved, then such of its impulses as are uniform, self-consistent and persevering, are data on which the intellect may safely reason, and by means of which it may add new materials to its dogmatic system." "Has man been created with *irresistible* instincts which *impel* him to believe in a falsehood? Or has the Christian been inspired with holy emotions, which allure him to an essentially erroneous faith? Is God the author of confusion, in his Word revealing one doctrine, and by his Spirit persuading his saints to reject it?" p. 544. Whatever the Reviewer may say of these necessary impulses, Dr. Hodge cannot disparage them, for he says in his Commentary on Rom. 8: 1-8, "What God forces us, from the very constitution of our natures, to believe, as for example, the existence of the external world, our own personal identity, the differ-

¹ Bib. Rep. pp. 652, 653, 673, 674.

ence between good and evil, it is at once a violation of his will and of the dictates of reason to deny or to question."

A third of these criteria involved in the two preceding is, the moral tendency of a doctrine. Whatever belief is on the whole useful, the same is thereby signified to be true; whatever mode of expressing this belief is useful, the same is thereby signified to be right. "So far as any statement is hurtful, it parts with one sign of its truth. In itself, or in its relations, it must be inaccurate whenever it is not congenial with the feelings awakened by the Divine Spirit. The practical utility, then, of any theological representations, is one criterion of their propriety." "Here also we learn the value of the Bible in unfolding the suitable adaptations of truth, and in illustrating their utility, *which is on the whole so decisive a touch-stone of their correctness,*" p. 555. The Reviewer may say, perhaps, that this tendency of a doctrine is "no adequate criterion" of its truth; but Dr. Hodge says in his Commentary on Rom. 3: 1-8, "There is no better evidence against the truth of any doctrine, than that its tendency is immoral." Now, the preceding extracts from the sermon are not desultory passages, but are parts of lengthened paragraphs, the *main object* of which is to show that a standard of truth is to be found in the congeniality of a statement with pious or constitutional feeling, and in its moral tendencies; see pp. 544, 545, 555-558. *So far forth* as, and *in whatever sense* it is agreeable and healthful to our moral feelings, to say that God exacts of men more than he gives them power to perform, to say that he imputes to them a crime which they never committed, just so far forth, and in just that sense, may we be entitled to believe those sayings as substantially true.

But a fourth criterion propounded in the sermon is, the agreement of a doctrine with the feelings of good men in general. "These *universal* feelings provide us with a test for our own faith." Pious men differ in the minute philosophical forms of truth, but their unanimity in the substance of it, indicates "the correctness of their cherished faith, as the agreement of many witnesses presupposes the verity of the narration in which they coincide." "The broad substance of doctrine around which the feelings of all *renewed* men" (the point of the argument lies in the word "*renewed*," which the Reviewer changes into "reverent")¹ cling ever and everywhere, "*must be right,*" for it

¹ The sentence of the Reviewer is the following: "The church is not infallible in her bodies of divinity, nor her creeds, nor catechisms, nor any logical formula; but underneath all, there lies a grand substance of doctrine, around which the feelings of all reverent men cling," etc., Bib. Rep. p. 654.

is precisely adjusted to the soul, and the soul was made for it," pp. 544, 545. In whatever sense the feelings of all good men welcome the Reviewer's "dogma," that the Maker of the world has once died, *in that sense* is the dogma indicated to be correct.

A fifth criterion is the agreement of a doctrine with other well known truths. Correct figures of speech disagree with each other; correct literal statements, never. The intellectual theology "regards a want of concinnity in a system, as a token of some false principle. And as it will modify itself in order to avoid the error involved in a contradiction, so, and for the same reason, it has authority in the last resort to rectify the statements which are often congenial with excited emotion," p. 546.

A sixth criterion mentioned in the sermon is, the agreement of a doctrine with the inferences of reason enlightened by revelation. The chief aim of pp. 546-550 is, to show that "as the head is placed above the heart in the body, so the faith which is sustained by good argument, should control rather than be controlled by those emotions which receive no approval from the judgment." "In all investigations for truth, the intellect must be the authoritative power," it "explains, modifies, harmonizes the meaning" of all conflicting statements; must bring them all "into unison with the intellectual statements which, however unimpressive, are yet the most authoritative." And the reason draws its inferences from the works of God, but chiefly from his "miraculously attested" word. So far forth and in whatever sense it can be *proved* that the innocent are punished for the guilty, just so far forth and in that sense, is the statement true. It is now a noticeable fact, that at the very time when the Reviewer condemned the sermon, as leaving every one to his "*caprice or taste*" in distinguishing between literal and figurative language, he had upon his table the edition of the sermon containing these words:¹

"No one hesitates to say that the poetic view of astronomy, in which the sun is described as masculine, the moon as feminine, the stars as children of the moon, should be reduced into a consistency with the philosophical view, and that the demonstrable science should not be distorted so as to harmonize with the graceful fable. Neither does any one shrink from interpreting the assertion, God is a rock, into an accordance with the assertion, God is a spirit; for both statements cannot be literally true, and the one which commends itself to the intellect, is the rightful standard by which to modify the one suggested by the heart. Else the *fancies* and *caprices* of man will be, what his reason and conscience ought to be, his guide."

If, then, an interpretation be intuitively perceived to be correct, or be proved so by valid argument from the word or works of God, if it

¹ Second pamphlet edition, p. 46.

substantially agree with other interpretations known to be right, if it have been generally received as true by "renewed" men, if it have a healthful moral influence, if it accord with our constitutional or pious feeling, then it has so many signs of its correctness. All these criteria, and others also, are stated by the author, who is "perfectly arbitrary in the application of his theory," and according to the Reviewer "adopts or rejects the representations of the Bible at pleasure, or as they happen to coincide with or contradict his own preconceived opinions."¹

The author does, indeed, recognize (Sermon, p. 555) the solemn truth that "here," in his theme, "we see our responsibility for our religious belief. Here are we impressed by the fact that much of our probation relates to our mode of shaping and coloring the doctrines of theology." We cannot escape from this probation. Our Almighty Sovereign designs to try our hearts in our detection of the principles which are communicated to us in symbols. It were, indeed, congenial with our love of ease, to have our duties for every day written out with exactness on the palms of our hands, that we may simply look and read. It were pleasant if God had arranged the stars of heaven into letters and sentences all unfolding our precise relations to him, and modifying themselves into new testaments of truth whenever we needed new light. But instead of thus accommodating our listless spirit, he has required us to dig for our knowledge, to work out our salvation with fear and trembling; and has made the probation of all men, and the chief probation of some men to consist in their mode of regulating their judgments, imagination and feelings in the pursuit of wholesome doctrine. Let us not attempt to flee from our appointed trial, but let us endure it as men with humility and prayer. Let us not arraign our Maker because he has sown the path of investigation with perils; but let us meet the perils with a manly trust in his guidance. All study is dangerous; but the neglect of it is more so. Candor may be abused to our hurt; bigotry will be used to our sorer mischief. If we aim to be fair inquirers for truth, we may err; if we strive to be pugnacious defenders of a party we shall lapse into sad mistakes. Let us ever bear in mind that we are to give account at the great day, not only for every idle, injurious, defamatory word, but also for the narrow, clannish, sectarian spirit with which we may have discussed the truth. Who is sufficient, without God's help, for preaching or even for thinking of that Gospel which "is set for the fall and rising again of many in Israel."

¹ Bip. Rep. p. 684.