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ARTICLE III.

THE DOCTRINAL ATTITUDE OF OLD SCHOOL PRESBYTERIANS.

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INTRODUCTION.

IN responding to the call to contribute to the catena of expositions of the polemics of various evangelical churches and schools, now in course of publication in this Journal, the link which represents the attitude of the body of Presbyterians known as Old school, in the premises, the writer will not long detain his readers with preliminaries. He will, at this point, offer but one or two cautionary remarks. First, the author only is responsible for this Article and its statements, except so far as it quotes the testimony of others. No one else is committed by it. It, therefore, can carry no authority beyond the confidence reposed in his qualifications for the task, and the intrinsic, self-evidencing weight of its statements and reasonings. More than this he cannot claim. Thus much, doubtless, all parties in interest will cordially concede.

Secondly, the doctrinal principles which Old school Presbyterians have been called, in providence, to maintain against the assaults of parties within or without the pale of evangelical Christendom, they do not regard as peculiarities, either sectarian or provincial. They are often characterized as such by adversaries and outsiders, as if they constituted a special body of dogmas peculiar to Old school Presbyterians, or even to some one of their theological schools, as Princeton. So we often hear not only of Old school Presbyterian, but of "Princeton theology"; and this, as if they respectively were made up of a set of singular tenets un-

known, or little accepted, elsewhere in the Christian church. Old school Presbyterians regard this matter in a different light. Their own doctrines which have brought them into conflict with others, they regard as catholic in the sense immediately to be pointed out, and the counter doctrines, with which these have been impugned, as the peculiarities of parties or sects or individuals hurled against the common faith. In order to preserve this in its integrity and purity, it has been requisite to defend it against the intrusion of such singularities, novelties, and long-exploded but resurgent errors. In saying that their contested doctrines are catholic, we mean either, 1. that, with insignificant exceptions, they are part of the avowed faith of all the great branches of the Christian church, Latin, Greek, Lutheran, and Reformed; or, 2. that, with like unimportant exceptions, they are professed by the evangelical churches of the Reformation, both Lutheran and Reformed; or, 3. that, so far as disputes among those called Calvinists are concerned, the doctrines maintained by us are the doctrines of catholic Calvinism of the Reformed and Puritan churches, as shown by their symbols, the writings of their great theologians, and the vast preponderance in numbers among those reputed Calvinists, who hold with us on controverted points, over any of the parties who embrace either of the antagonistic schemes whereby they are assailed. Claiming thus to set up no peculiarities of our own, and to maintain only what is common to us, either with all, or with the evangelical, or with most of the Calvinistic portion of the Christian church, we come at once to our main work — the presentation of the views of Old school Presbyterians on points of difference between them and other evangelical Christians. Assuming, of course, that all agree in the sufficiency of the evidence for the being and more fundamental attributes of God, and that any controversies in regard to the nature or persons of the Godhead, are to be determined by the authority of the scriptures, the first questions to be disposed of, are those which pertain to:

The Rule of Faith.

The holy scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are held to be the only and the sufficient rule of faith and practice, and the ultimate arbiter in all controversies. They are such because they are the word of God, and therefore infallible. This position, in general terms, probably will be scarcely questioned by any who call themselves evangelical. Yet we think it virtually assailed and endangered by the denial of verbal inspiration. We hold strenuously that inspiration extends not only to the thoughts but the words of scripture, else it is not the word of God, but man's word attempting to express the mind of God; hence it declares itself to be the word of God, spoken "not in words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth," "given by inspiration of God," who "spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets," the "holy men of God who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost."

By the "inspiration of God" we understand the infallible guidance of God so given to the writers of the sacred oracles as to lead them to write the precise words in which he would express his mind and will, and no other; to preserve them, in short, from all error, not only of thought, but of language. This is perfectly consistent with each writer preserving his own individuality of style, as is undeniably the case. To prove these things incompatible or contradictory is impossible. And unless for an author to preserve his own style, and yet use words which the Holy Ghost selects for the accurate expression of his mind, be proved impossible, all arguments against the verbal inspiration of the scriptures founded on this individuality of style are without foundation. This is wholly aside of all questions as to the manner of this guidance. It is enough that He who can so marvellously work upon the secret springs of the soul, unobserved, except by his marvellous effects in transforming that soul from unbelief to faith, from enmity to love, from despair to hope, can, in a manner no less secret

and wonderful, move it to write the words which he teacheth.

The questions pertaining to revelation, whether or how far it be by suggestion, dreams, afflatus, or articulate, vocal utterance, are irrelevant, and, in regard to the great question in issue — the nature and extent of inspiration — immaterial. Revelation is one thing; inspiration another. The former is the revealing to men of things before unknown; the latter is the securing of infallible accuracy in writing the truth, whether acquired through special supernatural revelation, or, in whole or in part, from natural human means of information. This, we say, extends both to the thoughts and words — the matter and manner of the subject of inspiration.

Not only does this appear from such scripture testimonies as those already cited, but from the impossibility of securing an infallible and authoritative communication of the mind of God to men by any other means. If the sacred penmen were left to the choice of their own words, without being divinely guided in all instances to the use of the right words, which truly express the thoughts of God, then there is no certainty that in any instance the words are employed which truly declare the mind and will of God. Nothing is more notorious than that the ablest and best men frequently fail adequately and rightly to express what they mean to express. If this be so in human things, must it not, much more, be so in divine things? How will it ever be possible thus to tell what is the real mind of God, from these attempts to speak it by the human authors of the words of scripture? The words may indeed assert something very different from what "man's wisdom teacheth." But how does this bind the conscience of any one offended by the doctrine thus declared? The words are the words of man, after all, and may very erroneously express the mind of God. Hence, if verbal inspiration be denied, then the whole authority of the scriptures, as an infallible rule of faith and arbiter of controversies, is subverted. No one is concluded

by any words of scripture, for the simple reason that they are not the words of God, and may not truly express his mind.

Moreover, so far as revelation is concerned, it is more than a question whether it can be made except in words, either to the writers or, through them, to the readers of scripture. Thought, and words — the articulate signs of thought — are so vitally intertwined, that to separate the former from the latter is like tearing the nerves from the flesh. It is true that the mind can and does take cognizance of single objects by intuition, without the intervention of language. But those discursive intellectual processes and products which constitute thought cannot go on, to any extent, without the aid of language. Those products of abstraction and generalization which involve the formation of conceptions represented by common terms, cannot be retained in the mind, or conveyed to other minds, without the aid of such terms. But without such conceptions, thus set in general words, there can be no judgments or propositions beyond empty tautology, much less reasonings or arguments. Let any one try to present to his own mind the propositions, thoughts, and arguments of one of Paul's Epistles without expression in language; or try to conceive how they could be revealed to any mind so as to be conveyed by that mind to another without the mediation of language, and he will, we think, see the impossibility of any real revelation of God to man, except through the vehicle of language. Such language then must be inspired, if there be a real revelation. A wordless thought is like a shapeless body; and a wordless revelation is, like a mute oracle, a dumb teacher. Presbyterians, therefore, as we suppose, in common with most evangelical Christians, hold that verbal inspiration is requisite to the authority and sufficiency of the scriptures as the only rule of faith and life, and the supreme arbiter of controversies. As to any real or supposed inaccuracies of fact, historic or scientific, they are capable of explanation, either by the unavoidable errors that

would creep into the successive manuscripts in the process of transcription, or by the solutions which will be furnished by a further advance in knowledge.

As to the principles which should control the interpretation of scripture, we hold that it should be interpreted by scripture: the obscurer parts by those more plain; exceptional passages by the general scope and harmony of the whole.

The province of human reason in interpretation is, to ascertain what the scriptures teach; to put its varied teachings in systematic form; to construe them so as to shun obvious contradictions with each other, with the indisputable testimony of sense, and of unperverted reason; and humbly to bow to them when so ascertained and determined, however incomprehensible, unwelcome, or irreconcilable with our feelings, judgments, or predilections.

This gives reason a very high office in ascertaining and accepting the teachings of revelation; a very humble office as an orginal authority touching any matters in regard to which God speaks in his word. The form in which human reason rebels against the authority of God's word, while professing to receive it, is, in claiming that the Bible cannot teach given doctrines, although its language seems plainly to teach them, because they are alleged to conflict with its own decisions or with right feeling. In this way nearly every distinctive Christian doctrine, whether of theology, anthropology, or soterology, has been in turn assailed, and widely rejected. And if reason may be exalted to this authority, it is supreme, and overbears the authority of the divine word. Reason soars beyond its true level when it assumes to judge what can or cannot be true or possible relative to the infinite God; what, therefore, he cannot mean to declare, although he seems to declare it, in his word. Human reason is competent to no such office. It cannot span infinity. A being, all whose nature, ways, and proceedings could be compassed by human reason, could not be God. That a revelation from God should contain much

which surpasses human comprehension, is only what reason should expect, *a priori*. In such cases it is our privilege as well as duty, not to doubt or reject, but to believe and adore. "Oh the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God! how unsearchable are his judgments, and his ways past finding out! For who hath known the mind of the Lord, or who hath been his counsellor? Or who hath first given to him, and it shall be recompensed unto him again? For of him, and through him, and to him are all things: to whom be glory for ever. Amen" (Rom. xi. 33–36).

While this disposes of a class of mysteries which are above the normal human intellect, such as the Trinity, Incarnation, Predestination, there are doctrines which the unregenerate soul cannot clearly see and appreciate, on account of the blindness induced upon it by sin. It is very certain that the Bible makes a broad distinction between the power to judge and appreciate scriptural truth in the regenerate and in the unregenerate soul. "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned; but he that is spiritual judgeth all things" (1 Cor. ii. 14–15). Much more of the same purport might be cited from scripture. And it all shows, beyond all doubt, that the human intellect is disqualified for authoritative judgment, as to what it is compatible with the nature and character of God to reveal, not only by its finitude, but by its corruption. However it may retain its speculative insight comparatively unimpaired, its power in moral and spiritual aesthetics, i.e. to discern the beauty of holiness, the beauty of the Lord, the loveliness of Christ, the glory of his salvation in all its parts, is seriously impaired. Hence, with regard to the whole range of soterology, it is wholly disqualified and unwarranted to erect its judgment against the obvious meaning of the inspired record.

The only function that can be conceded to reason in constraining an interpretation into accord with its own

decisions, is what theologians have known as the *judicium contradictionis.* Truth cannot contradict truth. It is impossible that anything should be and not be at the same moment. Therefore the scripture must be so interpreted as not to contradict itself, or any other undeniable truth evidenced by sense or reason. To assert that Christ's body is ubiquitous is to assert a contradiction. For it is the very nature of body to be bounded. To assert that the bread and wine of the eucharist are literally, not emblematically, the body and blood of Christ, is to deny that they are bread and wine.

Yet this power of rejecting contradictions, must be duly guarded, lest it be strained to be a pretext for rejecting real and fundamental truths and high mysteries, to which a little perverse ingenuity may give the aspect of seeming contradiction, while, properly stated, they have not even the appearance of it. How many have rejected the Trinity, on account of the supposed contradiction of asserting the same being to be both one and three; whereas it asserts him to be three in one respect, one in another. The incarnation likewise, as asserting that two persons are one person; whereas it only asserts two natures in one person. So others have rejected the doctrine of vicarious atonement, because it contradicts their intuitive convictions of justice that the innocent should suffer for the guilty; others still, the sinners helplessness because it contradicts their ideas of responsibility and much more the like. All this only shows the great caution with which the *judicium contradictionis* should be exercised. We must be sure that the apparent sense of scripture does contradict some undeniable truth, before we, on this ground, strain it to a figurative, allegorical, or other non-natural interpretation. We must presume that the apparent meaning of scripture is its real meaning, and that any apparent contradiction in this meaning to known truths, must be owing to some flaw in our own conceptions, until the contrary is indubitably established. But when the contradiction is indisputably established, then scripture must be

interpreted consistently with known truth; for truth cannot contradict truth. This cautious spirit, however, does not prevent our saying with all confidence, that "the seven good kine are seven years" (Gen. xli. 26), means they represent seven years; or that "This is my body," in the words of our Lord instituting the eucharist, means this represents my body; that, in the light of indubitable modern science, the "pillars of the earth" (2 Sam. xx. 8) have existence only in the forces that hold it in its orbit.

As to the authority of tradition and the church, while, with all evangelical Christians, we deny to either the power to make any additions to the teachings of the canonical scriptures; and, while we further deny that any visible ecclesiastical organization is empowered to make any infallible or authoritative interpretation of scripture, which shall be *ipso facto* binding on the conscience, or binding at all, except as it is supported by the authority of scripture itself speaking to the conscience; we nevertheless hold that what the true church — meaning thereby the true people of God — have ever held to be the meaning of scripture, on essential points, must be its true meaning. If in regard to fundamental doctrine, the saints in all generations have not found out what Christianity is, then it may safely be assumed to be past discovery. Revelation is a failure. Infidelity must triumph. This does not imply that there is not a vast field of revealed truth, beyond these "first principles of the doctrine of Christ," yet to be explored, or that these fundamental doctrines are not capable of fuller discovery, explication, definition, and defence. But it does imply that there are certain doctrines known which constitute the essence of Christianity, to profess which is to profess Christianity; to deny which is to deny Christianity. Such, to go no further, are the Trinity, Incarnation, and Redemption.

The Godhead.

There is no material difference among evangelical Christians in regard to the attributes of God, unless on the

question whether all his moral perfections are resolvable into benevolence. We maintain, in common with nearly all Christendom, that holiness, and vindicatory or distributive justice are distinguishable from, or rather involve more than, mere benevolence, while they are no less essential elements in the divine excellence. This has important bearings on the punishment and expiation of sin, the nature of the atonement, and the tone of Christian ethics. Other questions pertaining to the nature of the foreknowledge, purposes, and decrees of God will find their place appropriately hereafter.

THE TRINITY.

The language of our Confession is the brief but adequate expression of our faith in regard to the persons in the Godhead: "In the unity of the Godhead there be three persons of one substance, power, and eternity: God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost. The Father is of none, neither begotten nor proceeding; the Son is eternally begotten of the Father; the Holy Ghost eternally proceedeth from the Father and the Son" (Chap. II. 3).

This, of course, excludes all tritheistic and Sabellian theories, or formulas tending thereto. But here there is little dispute among those known as evangelical. In regard, however, to the sonship of Christ and procession of the Spirit, especially the former, vehement controversy has been waged against them by some prominent American theologians. It is hardly necessary to say, that though called to defend these doctrines, they are no peculiarities of ours. They are the common creed of the church. Simply remarking that the Holy Spirit is represented as proceeding from the Father, and being sent forth by the Son (John xv. 26), we pass on to consider the Sonship of Christ — a relation to the Father variously expressed otherwise, by the phrases "eternal generation," "eternally begotten of the Father."

The Sonship of Christ.

The main point which all these terms set forth is, that the title "Son of God," so abundantly bestowed in scripture on the Second Person of the Trinity, expresses a real relation to the First Person, which is the ground of their receiving the mutual appellations of Father and Son — a relation not primarily founded upon Christ's humanity, or any accidents thereof, but eternally subsisting in the divine nature.

This relation differs as much from any human or creaturely relation, as God differs from man — the Creator from the creature. Yet it more nearly resembles the filial relation than any other, and hence is most adequately shadowed forth to us in the words indicative of that relation. As understood by the church, it means nothing inconsistent with the immutability, eternity, and absolute Godhead of the Son. All ideas and definitions contradictory to this are to be rejected. The Son, though begotten of the Father, is so begotten, by a mysterious and eternal generation, as to be co-equal, co-eternal, and consubstantial with him. He is described as having "made the worlds," and "upholding all things by the word of his power," and yet as being, relatively to God the Father, "the brightness of his glory," and the "express image of his person" (Heb. i. 2, 3); "the image of the invisible God," by whom "all things were created" (Col. i. 15, 16). Thus this mysterious and adorable relation is shadowed forth to us by that of radiance or brightness to light, of an image to its original. But these, more fully than any other mode of representation, import, first, what is generated from another, and yet is co-etaneous and consubstantial with it. This is still further indicated in the title λόγος (word), used by the apostle John to denote Christ; and of which he declares that it "in the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God and was God." This points also to his being the eternal, outshining, or articulate expression of God, and yet no other than God. This adorable relation is still further indicated to us in the title "only begotten" (μονογενής), used

to denote this sonship (John i. 14, 18; iii. 16). This title shows that the sonship of Christ is forever distinguished from any relation which creatures, or the human nature of Christ, can sustain to God as their Father or Maker; and not only so, but that it refers to his divine nature. In the following passage (John i. 18) it is connected with his expressive or declarative function as the Word: "No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, he hath declared him." All which adorable mysteries, and the faith of the church therein, is well summed up in the great Athanasian symbol to which Christendom reverently clings: "one Lord Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God, begotten of his Father before all worlds; God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten, not made, being of one substance with the Father, by whom all things were made."

Further proofs that the sonship of Christ refers to his divine nature are:

1. The Jews understood Christ to "make himself equal with God," by calling God his father (John v. 18). Christ did not dispute this interpretation of his meaning, but virtually assented to and confirmed it, by the divine prerogatives he asserted for himself, in his subsequent discourse. This could not be, if his sonship referred merely to his humanity.

2. In Rom. i. 4 it is said, in contrast to his being of the seed of David, according to the flesh, he was "declared [or evinced] to be the Son of God with power [or powerfully], according to the spirit of holiness, by the resurrection from the dead."

3. The greatness of God's love to us in the gift of Christ appears pre-eminently in that he gave his *only* begotten Son: "God *so* loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life." This can hardly consist with the idea that he became the Son of God in consequence of his mediatorship, his incarnation, or resurrection, or aught pertaining to his humanity. For then he would not be "the only

begotten son" until after God had sent him, and in consequence of his sending him, for our salvation. But the greatness of his love appears in that he sent for this purpose him who was his only begotten Son. Any other view greatly detracts from the force of this and all other passages which argue the exceeding greatness of his love in giving his Son to die for us. If he was not his Son as a person in the Godhead, and from eternity, how does this filial relation evince the incomparable love implied in the passages referred to? A love, too, which the church has ever felt to be peculiarly indicated by the gift and sacrifice of the only begotten Son?

4. The fact that, with insignificant exceptions, Christians, the world over, have ever taken the scriptures to mean, in the passages we have quoted and others, that Christ is the Son of God, as to his divine nature, is strong proof in point. Whatever the plain people of God quite unanimously take to be the meaning of his word, and the mind of the Spirit, on cardinal points of faith and practice, carries a very strong presumption in its favor, especially in a case like this, in which the endearment of the Son to the Father by virtue of his divine sonship, gives rise to no little of his endearment to themselves.

Finally, There is force in the opinion that the doctrine of the Trinity is more readily held in its integrity, if it have its roots, as the scriptures indicate, in the nature, or the eternal interior relations, of the Godhead. The balance is thus more readily held between extremes of tritheism and Sabellianism, and all tendencies thereto; which we think evinced not less by the history than the logic of the case.

Decrees, Providence, and Predestination.

The sum of our doctrine on this subject is well stated, in our Confession of Faith, Chap. III. 1, 2.

"1. God from all eternity did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to

the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established.

"2. Although God knows whatsoever may or can come to pass, upon all supposed conditions, yet hath he not decreed anything because he foresaw it as future, or as that which would come to pass upon such conditions."

This probably is a fair representation of the doctrine generally held by evangelical Christians. Still, portions of it have been impugned more or less widely and persistently: 1. By those who make God the author of sin. Presbyterians, in common with almost the whole church, earnestly deny, as their Confession does, that "God is the author of sin." Herein they are adversaries of those who, limiting all moral quality to exercises, make God the author of sinful as truly and completely as of holy exercises; an opinion which they have from time to time been called to confront and oppose. 2. They deny that sinful dispositions, whether native or acquired, are the positive creation of God. Such dispositions arise from the withdrawment of his presence and positive agency. God's agency in the premises is wholly privative, like that of the sun to darkness. Darkness comes of the absence of the sun, not of his presence or agency. So when God withdraws from the soul, and the higher principles, which ought to regulate and balance its powers, are thus unsustained, the lower propensities fall into disorder and lawlessness. This withdrawment of God's spirit and favor, we hold, as will yet more fully appear, to be only in judgment or punishment of sin. This is what is meant by God's hardening the heart. It is a withdrawment of divine influences, which leaves it in more abject bondage to its own evil lusts. So the "want of original righteousness," which is the fontal and originant source of native corruption, we hold is due to the withdrawment of the divine favor and communion vouchsafed to unfallen man, in punishment of that sin by which our first parents, and their posterity in them, fell. It is no positive creation of God. It is simply privative and punitive.

Although much misrepresented or misunderstood in re-

gard to our views of predestination and decrees, as if they interfered with the freedom of the will, or subjected it to compulsion or necessity incompatible with freedom, and equivalent to fate, we strenuously maintain the contrary: that "no violence is offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established." What is established by the decrees of God is the certainty of future events, or their certain futurition, and this according to their several kinds. "Although in relation to the foreknowledge and decree of God, the first cause, all things come to pass immutably and infallibly, yet, by the same providence, he ordereth them to fall out according to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely, or contingently" (Confession of Faith. Chap. V. 2). Events in material objects are necessary relatively to those objects, though they may be free relatively to any free agents who voluntarily cause them. The voluntary acts of free agents are free in those agents. Events contingent on determining conditions known or unknown to us, though certain to God, come to pass "contingently," in this sense and to this extent. On these points there is really no ground for controversy. All are agreed that events come to pass in this way. The real question is, whether such a futurition of events by decree, as we maintain, can be accomplished, without destroying free-agency and contingency, as above described. This is vehemently denied by one class, who therefore deny that God purposes or decrees all events. We say, on the contrary, that there is nothing in free-agency which is inconsistent with its being previously made certain that the free agent will act in some given way rather than the opposite; nay, we say, that if he acts freely he will act in some certain way, rather than its opposite, and that this may be previously certain, and made certain. Is it not certain how a miser will act, if he acts freely, when a heap of gold is offered him? How the holy angels will receive all proposals of Satan? And, unless such certainty can be predetermined, how can events be

foreknown? What becomes of foreknowledge, providence, and prophecy?

The answer made to this is, in effect, that although the will is in such a sense a power of contrary choice or self-determination that God cannot foredetermine its action without restraint upon this power and destruction of its freedom, yet God foresees what such free agents so endowed will do, and foreseeing ordains it. This view we earnestly repudiate. In the language of our Confession already quoted: "Although God knows whatsoever may or can come to pass, upon all supposed conditions, yet hath he not decreed anything because he foresaw it as future, or as that which would come to pass, upon such conditions.

So far as the present question is concerned, it is enough to say that, as the objects of knowledge are divisible into two great classes, to wit, the possible and the actual, without any intermediate *tertium quid*, so the knowledge of them is twofold, and only twofold, according to the nature of the things known. That is to say, there may be the knowledge of things considered simply as possible to the Divine Omnipotence, *scientia naturalis;* and there may be the knowledge not only of things considered as possible, but the knowledge of whatever, out of the whole range of possibilities, actually has been, is, or shall be, *scientia libera, seu visionis.* Now in regard to things that have not yet occurred, they can be known only either as things possible to be, or as what, out of the infinite number of things possible to be, shall actually be. There is no foreknowledge, unless it be of events not merely possible but certain to come to pass. But God's absolute and universal foreknowledge of all events is undisputed. He knows them, not merely as what *may* be, but as what *will* be. How then do they pass from the category of simple possibility to that of futurition? In regard to all but the acts of free-agents and their consequences, it will scarcely be denied that it is by virtue of the divine purpose that they shall come to pass. But in what other way, can the future acts of free-agents

be matters of certainty, ages before they exist, unless there be causes then in being to render them certain? And what antecedent eternal ground of such certainty can there be, except the divine decree? As to the knowledge of what is not in itself certain at the time of knowing it, it is simply absurd and self-contradictory. What is not in itself certain cannot be known as such. No *media scientia*, between the knowledge of things as possible and as actual, can be admitted, for the simple reason that there is no possible object of such knowledge, as the Reformed theologians demonstrated over and over again, "*contra Jesuitas, Socinios, et Remonstrantes.*"[1] The denial of eternal decrees which ensure the futurition of all events, therefore, subverts the foreknowledge of God. And it cannot be denied that it is out of harmony with the scriptural representations, which ever exhibit him as "working all things after the counsel of his own will" (Eph. i. 2). "He doeth according to his will, in the army of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth; and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, what doest thou (Dan. iv. 34, 35)?" The same thing is more distinctly and unquestionably implied in reference to the particular acts of free-agents that are pre-ordained, as the crucifixion of Christ (Acts iv. 27, 28).

The reason alleged, moreover, for founding fore-ordination on prescience, rather than prescience on fore-ordination, is suicidal. It is simply that the rendering of the actions of free-agents certain by an antecedent decree, is incompatible with free-agency; that, if actions are previously rendered certain, to the exclusion of the contrary actions, they are divested of the element of freedom. It is sufficient to say in reply, that the previous certainty or futurition of any event or action, according to its kind, does not alter its nature. Further, if such free acts cannot previously be made certain without losing their freedom they cannot be certain; and if they are not certain, they cannot be known as such. Thus foreknowledge is impossible. Not only so.

[1] Turretin, Loc. III. Quaest. 13.

Providence is impossible. If the actions of free agents may not be predetermined, it is impossible to govern and dispose the events of the universe in wisdom, or bring them to a happy issue; for by far the most frequent and momentous of these events are the acts of free agents, and their consequences. To be unable to control them is to be unable to control the universe. We do not, as we may yet have occasion more fully to show, admit free-agency to be such, or to involve any such, power of self-determination or contrary choice, as to be inconsistent with the previous certainty of actions. Whatever of these powers is not inconsistent with this, we do concede. It is hardly necessary to add, that in fore-ordaining acts, God, of course, foreordains all and singular the conditions and consequences thereof.

It results from the universality of God's decrees, as now set forth, that they who accept it must also accept the distinction between the decretive and preceptive will of God; i. e. inasmuch as many things occur contrary to his commands, while yet he fore-ordains all things, it must be that in these cases he purposes one thing and commands another. This cannot be evaded by any who admit the universality of his decrees or purposes. That it presents difficulties, and rises into the region of mystery, none can deny; but they are no more incumbent on us to solve, than on all others who do not reject the universality of God's decrees and providence. It is only necessary to say that the decretive will respects what, all things considered, God determines shall come to pass. But this does not imply that he produces it, if it be sin, by his own efficiency, or that in itself he is pleased with it, or does not abhor it; but that he permits the wickedness of men to execute it, "and that not by a bare permission, but such as hath joined with it a most wise and powerful bounding and otherwise ordering and governing them in a manifold dispensation, to his own holy ends; yet so, that the sinfulness thereof proceedeth from the creature and not from God, who being most holy and righteous, neither is nor can be the approver of sin." "But

as for you, ye thought evil against me; but God meant it for good, to bring to pass as it is this day, to save much people alive" (Gen. l. 20).

His preceptive will simply respects what he approves and will reward in his creatures, the want or opposite of which he condemns and punishes. That in many instances he permits the opposite of what he commands, to occur, or does not prevent it, proves not insincerity.

All comparisons between the procedures proper to God and man, are of course inadequate. They can only be pressed a little way, and the parallelism must soon close, on account of the infinite distance between God and the creature. But still they may have a negative value in invalidating objections. Now, because the government of the United States takes measures to induce the rebels to give battle at a particular time and place, it does not follow that it is not sincere in forbidding all rebellion and insurrection. However, this difficulty is not of our making, and no special responsibility rests on us for its solution. All must admit that the conduct of Herod, and Pontius Pilate, and their confederates, was contrary to the command or preceptive will of God. Will any one, with whom we are here concerned, claim that it was contrary to God's decretive will? or that herein, "they did not do whatever God's hand and counsel determined before to be done?" Or that this deed, in itself most nefarious, as in its results it was the most resplendent manifestation of God's glory in the universe, was not a part of God's eternal plan, or that its execution was left to the mere caprice and contingency of the uncertain choice of human wills? Or, did this pre-ordination in the least impair the freedom, or lessen the guilt of these crucifiers of the Lord of glory?

Is it not declared in regard to them: "Him [Christ] being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and with *wicked* hands, have crucified and slain (Acts ii. 23)?"

After the foregoing statements and explanations, the

Reformed doctrines of personal and eternal election, and reprobation or preterition follow. It is only necessary to present the language of our Confession, and point to its scriptural proofs on these subjects. Chap. III. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8.

"3. By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others fore-ordained to everlasting death.

"4. These angels and men, thus predestinated and fore-ordained, are particularly and unchangeably designed; and their number is so certain and definite that it cannot be either increased or diminished.

"5. Those of mankind that are predestinated unto life, God, before the foundation of the world was laid, according to his eternal and immutable purpose, and the secret counsel and good pleasure of his will, hath chosen in Christ, unto everlasting glory, out of his mere free grace and love, without any foresight of faith or good works or perseverance in either of them, or any other thing in the creature, as conditions, or causes moving him thereunto; and all to the praise of his glorious grace.

"6. As God hath appointed the elect unto glory, so hath he, by the eternal and most free purpose of his will, fore-ordained all the means thereunto. Wherefore they who are elected, being fallen in Adam, are redeemed by Christ; are effectually called unto faith in Christ by his Spirit working in due season; are justified, adopted, sanctified, and kept by his power, through faith, unto salvation. Neither are any other redeemed by Christ, effectually called, justified, adopted, sanctified, and saved, but the elect only.

"7. The rest of mankind God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of his own will, whereby he extendeth or withholdeth mercy, as he pleaseth, for the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures, to pass by, and to ordain them to dishonor and wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious justice.

"8. The doctrine of this high mystery of predestination is to be handled with special prudence and care, that men attending the will of God revealed in his word, and yielding obedience thereunto, may, from the certainty of their effectual vocation, be assured of their eternal election. So shall this doctrine afford matter of praise, reverence, and admiration of God; and of humility, diligence, and abundant consolation to all that sincerely obey the Gospel."

PSYCHOLOGICAL, ETHICAL, AND METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES RELATED TO THEOLOGY.

Before proceeding to the contested points in anthropology and soterology, it will facilitate our progress to define certain

controverted terms, as also our attitude in regard to certain psychological and metaphysical principles inseparable from such discussions. We begin with the latter:

1. As to the will. All are agreed that it is free, and that its acts or choices involve moral quality or accountability. The only question agitated is: What does this freedom imply or involve? It involves the power of self-determination, in the sense of choosing any object or its opposite, in accordance with our preponderating desires. But we deny any power of self-determination or contrary choice beyond this, i. e. any power of determining or choosing at any given moment of choice, not only as we do choose, or as we please, but the contrary of what we desire or are pleased to choose. So far from being requisite to freedom, moral agency, and responsibility, such a power would subvert them. It would destroy the very nature of freedom, which has its being in acting as we please, or not at all. It would make it a thing of indifference, of blind hap-hazard, irresponsible contingency. It would leave the universe under the dominion of almighty chance, and subvert the sovereignty and universality of divine Providence. Our most intimate consciousness denies any other liberty than that already set forth, or that we can be accountable for any fortuitous acts that spring up in defiance of our own pleasure or inclination.

The other chief psychological and metaphysical questions respect the morality of desires, feelings, and dispositions. Many contend that these are all void of moral quality in their own nature, or, at all events, beyond the point at which the will has had part in producing them. In regard to this, we hold: 1. That the acts and traits of the human soul having moral quality, have it in virtue of their own nature; not in virtue of any originating cause back of themselves. Love to God and man is right, malice and envy are wrong, in themselves, irrespective of their origin. 2. The moral character of volitions depends on the feelings, desires, or intentions which prompt them, but not *vice versa*. If a man

determines to pull the trigger of a gun, the moral character of the volition depends entirely on the feeling and purpose with which it is done. Desires, then, do not receive from, they give to, volitions their moral character. 3. The ancient scholastic division of the mental faculties, which appears in such authors as Reid and Edwards, was into understanding and will, including under will all the non-cognitive powers. In this sense of the word "will," it is of course true that no desires or feelings which are not the effect of will, have moral character. But this is by no means admitting that no desires or feelings are moral which are not the fruits of will as a mere faculty of choice. It rather implies the opposite doctrine, maintained by us, denied by our opponents.

The question whether the spontaneous feelings and desires have moral quality is to be determined, not by any *a priori* judgments or theories, but by the simple testimony of the unperverted consciousness of mankind, and of the sacred oracles. Now the feelings, and the desires, which are all dependent and consequent on the feelings, since we desire what, and only what, awakens agreeable or complacent feelings, are divisible into two great classes — the animal and rational. The animal are those which arise blindly, without any intervention of reason or intelligence, as hunger and thirst. These have no moral character in themselves. The undue inflamation or indulgence of them, voluntarily and knowingly, is culpable. In contrast to the animal are the rational feelings and desires, which are those evoked by objects apprehended by the intelligence — as pleasure in and desire for knowledge, heaven, righteousness, the service and glory of God. Now these are divisible into three classes, according as they respect objects morally good, bad, or indifferent. Feelings and desires relative to things indifferent are themselves indifferent, as in regard to colors and shapes. Feelings and desires in regard to things morally good or evil are themselves morally good or evil. This is clearly settled: 1. By the consciences of men, which condemn feelings of envy, malice, of delight in wickedness, and

of pain in view of whatsoever is pure and lovely and of good report. It condemns not only such feelings, but the corresponding desires and affections. When the chief priests and captains were "glad" at Judas's purposed betrayal of Christ, were they not so far forth culpable? And is not the testimony of the Bible explicit as to the moral quality of feelings and desires regarding moral objects? Do they not signify, not only that they who do things worthy of death are wicked, but also those who "have pleasure in them that do them" (Rom. i. 32)? And where do they rank the "desires of the flesh and the mind" (Eph. ii. 3)? "the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eye, and the pride of life" (1 John ii. 16)? But the explicit command of God is conclusive on this point: "Thou shalt not covet." That this is decisive of the present question clearly appears from the experimental exegesis of the apostle (Rom. vii. 7): "I had not known sin but by the law, for I had not known lust, except the law had said, thou shalt not covet."

This incidentally *settles* the question so much controverted, whether concupiscence is of the nature of sin. So far as mere blind animal cravings, or cravings for things indifferent are concerned, it is doubtless void of moral quality. But so far as it consists in lawless cravings for what is morally wrong, it is in every degree of it sinful.

A deeper question still, respects the morality of dispositions, or permanent habits of the soul which involve a tendency and facility to any given class of exercises. The only dispositions here in question are moral dispositions; that is, to good or bad moral exercises. On this point we have no doubt what is the judgment of the unperverted human conscience. Holy, benevolent, magnanimous dispositions men judge morally excellent and praiseworthy. And they no less certainly judge wicked, perverse, and malevolent dispositions criminal. They attach blame and ill-desert to a disposition to lie, steal, slander, blaspheme, and this whether such disposition be natural or acquired. No ingenuity of metaphysics or metaphysical torture can en-

tirely wrench such convictions out of the human soul. The collective dispositions of a man constitute his character. If they have no moral quality, his character has no moral quality. The scriptures clearly indicate the reality, and the good or ill desert of moral dispositions, when they tell us of the "good treasure of the heart" and "the evil treasure of the heart;" of the "good tree" and the "bad tree;" of the "old man" and the "new man;" the *σάρξ*, the *φρόνημα τῆς σαρκὸς*, and the *φρόνημα τοῦ πνεύματος* (Rom. viii. 6, 7). However any may criticise one or more of these instances as inconclusive to our purpose, it cannot be questioned that, as a whole, they, with other like phrases, import an inward state which disposes to act, and is, in its own nature, either morally good or evil, praise or blame worthy. Nor does this, as some contend, imply that the substance or essence of the soul is polluted. The substance or essence of anything does not consist of changing or separable states, which may be present or absent, that substance still remaining in its entirety. Such are all habits, all moral dispositions, all treasures of education and culture, all continued yet changeable states of the soul, whether innate, acquired, or infused. Take the soul of the habitual drunkard or libertine, as it is between his acts of debasing indulgence. Is its state precisely as pure as it would be without such polluting practices? But does the very essence and substance of his soul therefore consist of corruption? Take that "governing purpose" into which some resolve the predominant character of man, be it holy or sinful. Whatever be its origin, it is none the less a state involving tendency or facility for a given kind of acts. It has moral character. But it is not the substance of the soul.

Nor does our psychology put the intellect, in some of its operations, wholly without the sphere of moral responsibility. It is so implicated in the moral states and exercises of the soul, that its judgments connected with them cannot be wholly void of moral quality. To this the unperverted human conscience and scripture alike testify. If we find

men justifying iniquity and approving the wicked, or condemning righteousness, we condemn them. The conscience and the Bible are alike severe in their condemnation of false moral judgments. The woe is upon those who "call good evil, and evil good; who put light for darkness, and darkness for light." If a man is blind to moral excellence, so that he does not appreciate and love it, we condemn him. In this region of what we may, so to speak, call moral aesthetics, such want of discernment of the beauty of moral excellence is the very core of depravity and guilt; and, so far as the soul is blinded, the necessity of spiritual illumination in regeneration becomes indispensable. This, whatever theories we may have, accords with the uniform representations of scripture. The language of the apostle (Eph. iv. 18), describing the blindness induced by sin, cannot readily be misunderstood: "Having the understanding darkened, being alinated from the life of God, through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their hearts." All familiar with these subjects know that abundant citations, no less significant and unequivocal can be made; to some of which we may yet refer, as we come to speak of sin and grace.

The Nature of Virtue.

Our theology rejects all utilitarian theories of the nature of virtue, or moral goodness; that is to say, theories which deny that it is a good intrinsically, and make it a mere means to some extraneous good beyond itself, such as happiness. We deny that it can be analyzed into a mere means of anything other, simpler, better, than itself. We not only deny the Epicurean form of this theory, that it is a mere means of the happiness of the agent; but its broader and more generous form, which asserts virtue to be merely the means of happiness to the sentient universe. We hold that right is an intrinsic quality of actions, involving obligation to do them; that what is right is what ought to be done, and is meritorious; that what is wrong is what ought to be

shunned, and, if done, deserves punishment. We hold it right indeed, within due limits, to pursue our own happiness and the happiness of the universe. We hold that it is evermore right and obligatory to obey the will of God, because the will of God is evermore conformed to the perfect goodness and absolute rectitude of his own nature, wherein is found the first original standard, the norm of all righteousness. But much as might be said on this point we must hasten forward, to the

DEFINITION OF CERTAIN THEOLOGICAL TERMS.

"*Sin* is any want of conformity to, or transgression of, the law of God" (*ἀνομία*). Shorter Catechism, 9. 1 John iii. 4.

Righteousness is perfect obedience or conformity to the law of God. "For whosoever shall keep the whole law and offend in one point shall be guilty of all" (James ii. 10).

To justify is to declare or adjudge righteous, not to make inherently righteous. It is the opposite of condemning. "He that justifieth the wicked, and he that condemneth the just, even they both are abomination to the Lord" (Prov. xvii. 15).

To impute means, not the transfer of inherent qualities, but to reckon or put to the account of any one, as a ground of judicial treatment. This is the uniform scriptural meaning of the word, and also that which it bears in our standards. That this is the scriptural meaning can hardly be the subject of rational dispute to those who candidly examine the passages in which it is found, especially Rom. iv. 5. and the Greek words translated "impute," viz. *λογίζομαι* and *ἐλλογέω*. What else, indeed, can it mean when the apostle speaks of "not imputing iniquity," of "imputing righteousness without works," or, as the same original Greek word is employed in the phrase "counted for righteousness." That this is the meaning of the word in our symbols and standard theological writers is no less evident.

Guilt is equivalent to the Latin *reatus*, and means obligation to, or the being obnoxious to, the punishment of sin. Says Turretin (Loc. IX. Quaest. 3): "Duo vulgo peccati effecta dicuntur, *Macula Reatus*. M teacula est pollutio spiritualis et ethica, quo hominis anima inficitur. *Reatus* est obligatio ad poenam ex praevio delicto." Two effects of sin are commonly noted, its *stain* and *guilt*. Its *stain* is the moral and spiritual pollution with which the soul of man is infected. *Guilt* is obligation to punishment arising from previous fault." This is beyond doubt the usage of scripture. Thus one word translated guilty is ἔνοχος, (ἐνέχω) held or bound to. When Christ's accusers charged him with blasphemy, they said, "he is guilty (ἔνοχος) of death;" i.e. held obnoxious to the punishment of death (Matt. xxvi. 66; Mark. xvi. 64). The same word is translated "in danger of," in the phrase "in danger of eternal damnation," for the sin of blasphemy against the Holy Ghost (Mark iii. 29). The word translated guilty (Rom. iii. 19), in "all the world shall become guilty before God," is ὑπόδικος, under condemnation, or obnoxious to punishment. In Matt. xxiii. 16, ὀφείλει is rendered "he is a debtor," in vs. 18, "he is guilty," showing very clearly that it means the debt of, or obligation to, punishment. When David prays (Psalm li.): "Deliver me from blood-guiltiness," what else does or can he mean, than from my exposure to punishment for blood-shedding? Even the lexicographer Webster tells us that, according to one probable derivation of the word, "it denotes a debt contracted by an offence, a fine, and hence came its present signification." He also quotes Chancellor Kent as saying: "A ship incurs guilt by the violation of a blockade," in illustration of the definition "exposure to forfeiture or other penalty." We have dwelt thus on the theological definition of this word as used in the Reformed theology and confessions, because it appears so unwarrantable to many, who have been accustomed only to its present popular meaning of personal criminality in the subject of it. Such criminality is the normal ground

of guilt, and criminality in some person is the only ground of guilt or obnoxiousness to punishment. But the latter may be transferred from those who are to those who are not personally subjects of the former, as in all cases, under the providence of God, of bearing the iniquities of others; which means simply to bear their punishment.

Punishment is evil judicially inflicted for sin. It is correlative to guilt. It may be inflicted on the offender personally, or on those who, through a representative or other relation, have such a community with him, that the punishment of his sins may be justly laid upon them.

ANTHROPOLOGY. — THE DOCTRINE OF SIN.

As the doctrine of sin logically precedes and underlies that of grace and redemption, so it may be considered in three aspects — with regard to the subjects, the degree, and the origin of it. Although the question of its origin may be logically first, yet it is so related to the degree and subjects of it, that it will be most readily solved, in the present state of controversy among evangelical schools, by some preliminary consideration of the subjects and degree of it. With regard to these, to the best of our knowledge, all parties recognized, or claiming to be recognized, as evangelical, agree that the present condition of human nature is such, or that all men are found in such a state, that they are subject to suffering and liable to death from the first; and that they sin, and sin only, from the beginning of moral agency in the knowledge of the moral law, except so far as any may have been the subjects of a saving change of character. Indeed, these are undeniable facts of divine providence, which exist with or without a divine revelation. The Bible does not make them. Nor are believers in the Bible, which in some degree explains them, and provides the only adequate remedy for them, nor is any school of theologians, specially bound to account for them. Whatever burdens or perplexities these facts may involve, they equally burden all schools, not only of Christians, but of theists, who are

concerned to justify the ways of God to man. But, with this amount of agreement, there is still a wide margin fo disagreement, in regard to this antecedent connatural stater which brings with it suffering, liability to death, and a dread certainty of sinning on the opening of moral agency. Some regard it as a weakness, wholly devoid of moral character. Others as more than a weakness, as a debasement, but still indifferent as to moral quality. Another class regard it as indeed moral depravity, or a corruption of the moral nature, and some of them are willing to call it sinful, but still insist that it is innocent and not justly obnoxious to punishment. All these go upon the ground that nothing can be morally corrupt or, if so, punishable which is not produced by the will of the subject of it. They include some parties in both the Protestant and Romish churches. But a much larger class, including many Romish divines, all the Reformed and Lutheran, as shown by their confessions, the adherents of the Westminster and Savory confessions, the Edwardeans and Hopkinsians in this country (many of the latter, however, believing in moral agency from birth) hold that this native moral depravation is truly and properly sin, and constitutes the essence of original sin, in whole or in part. It is hardly necessary to say that the Articles of the Episcopal church pronounce this to be "original or birth-sin," and also that "in every person that cometh into the world it deserveth God's wrath and damnation." It is hardly necessary to show that the Presbyterian symbols, in common with those of the Reformation, aver the same thing, viz. that "original sin, together with all actual transgressions which proceed from it,"[1] is "conveyed from our first parents unto their posterity by natural generation, so as that all who proceed from them in that way are conceived and born in sin,"[2] and that "every sin, both original and actual, being a transgression of the righteous law of God, and contrary thereunto, doth, in its own nature, bring guilt upon the sinner, whereby he is bound over to the wrath of God and curse of the

[1] Shorter Catechism, 2, 18. [2] Larger Catechism. 2. 26.

law, and so made subject to death, with all miseries — spiritual, temporal, and eternal." [1]

The reasons why Presbyterians, in common with so large a portion of Christendom, certainly of Protestant Christendom, take this view of the original native corruption of man, whence proceed all actual transgressions, are: 1. It corresponds with the scriptural representations of our being conceived in sin and shapen in iniquity; that that which is born of the flesh is flesh; that we are by nature children of wrath. These, and like passages, answer to nothing short of native pollution and guilt. 2. Infants experience pain and are liable to death. But in mankind death is the penalty of sin. It was the penalty originally threatened agaist and executed upon the first sin of our race. It is that which is declared to be the "wages," i. e. the penalty or retribution of sin. "The soul that sinneth it shall die." In like manner, the scriptures universally connect tribulation and anguish with sin as its righteous ground. And herein they do but echo the dictates of the universal conscience of men, which refers suffering to sin as its meritorious ground. The barbarians on the island of Melita, seeing the viper fasten on Paul's hand, said: "Surely this man is a murderer, whom vengeance [or retributive justice] suffereth not to live." But that death is a penal visitation on all our race for sin, is explicitly asserted by the apostle, in a way which Presbyterians can neither get over nor around. "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned" (Rom. v. 12). Whether this refers to sinning in Adam or not, it none the less certainly asserts that death comes by sin, and upon all men for their sin, in person or in their representative. And if it refers to sinning in Adam as federal head, this brings upon all the subjects of it, as an immediate penal consequence, the loss of righteousness, and resulting inherent corruption, which being transgressions of, incur the penalty of, the law. It is not only far more scriptural, but far more consonant with our ideas of justice,

[1] Confession of Faith, VI. 6.

that suffering and death should be the penalty of sin, than that they should be the effect of any mere arbitrary appointment of God. 3. Another reason why this natural pravity of disposition is judged sinful and ill-deserving, is its fruits. This is a scriptural test: "For a good tree bringeth not forth corrupt fruit, neither doth a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit. For every tree is known by its fruit." The root which bears only sin, is itself sinful. "The works of the flesh are manifest" (Gal. xix. 20, 21). It is equally manifest that what produces them cannot be innocent. And here the principle applies, that the moral quality of dispositions is determined by their nature and fruits, not by their origin. Their origin may have to do with the vindication of God's relation to it, but not with their moral quality or ill desert. 4. A final reason why so large a part of the Christian world attribute a sinful moral quality to native human corruption is, that infants are capable subjects of the salvation of Christ, which has reference only to the sinful and the lost. "Neither is there salvation in any other, for there is none other name given under heaven whereby we must be saved." "That which is born of the flesh is flesh." Therefore "except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." It will, indeed, be scarcely maintained, that any are saved, out of Christ. But his salvation is from sin only, first its guilt and punishment, then its bondage and pollution. Infants dying in infancy are, as we believe, saved from both, through Christ.

The Imputation of Adam's Sin to his Posterity.

It being conceded, then, that all men are born with their moral nature so depraved as either to be itself sinful, or to insure the certainty of sinning in and from the first moral action, the question arises: How is this degraded and ruined condition of our whole race to be accounted for? The light of nature which reveals the fact, reveals no explanation of it. The instincts and traditions of the race, however, point more or less distinctly to a state of purity and felicity, from

which it has fallen. It is conceded, moreover, by all with whom we are now concerned, that the word of God connects the fall of the race with the fall of its first progenitor, as the primal cause thereof. It is perhaps proper to note as exceptions to this remark, the small class who, like Coleridge, Dr. Julius Müller, and others, hold to a sort of transcendental probation and "timeless" fall of all and singular the members of our race, before birth and entrance into the body in time. This is virtually the doctrine of a probation and fall of all men in a pre-existent state, of which the degradation and misery of their native state is the punishment. In this more common-sense or non-transcendental form, the theory finds an occasional advocate. This scheme, of course, denies any causative connection of Adam's first sin with the fall of the race, and accounts for the scriptural eminence assigned him in the matter, by his case being the first in order, and so an eminent type or example of the lapse of all his descendants. This theory has significance, as conceding, or rather as constrained by, the overbearing evidence of two points: 1. That the natural state of our race is such as to admit of no explanation, unless it be a punishment for sin; 2. that this is inexplicable without a previous state of probation in which the sin and fall so punished occurred. This being so, no alternative remains but either that all men personally lived, and each for himself was on trial, and fell, in a pre-existent state, or that, in some way, they had their trial in Adam, and fell in his fall, of which their present degraded natural condition is the penal consequence. The objections to the former view are: 1. There is no evidence of any such pre-existent state, trial, and fall. 2. This hypothesis does not adequately explain the phenomena which it is desired to account for. What it seeks to provide is a fair trial for each one of our race, whereby he had a fair opportunity to escape a fall, and consequent ruin and misery. This could not be, unless they were created with a bias toward holiness as strong as their propensity to sin, so that there was at least an even chance in their favor. But

if this were so, how are we to account for the fact that all fell, went in one way, with no universal preponderating bias in that direction? This explanation, therefore, itself needs explaining in the same way as that which is explained by it. But, 3. The conclusive reason is, that this view is contrary to scripture, which, in the judgment of nearly all Christendom, attributes to Adam's sin, not a mere typical or exemplary, but a causative, relation to the sin and death of his posterity; an interpretation which candid readers of Rom. v. 12 et seq. cannot easily avoid.

If then we, with the scriptures, give to Adam's sin this causative relation to the fall of our race, it must, in some way, have possessed the nature of a probation, not only for himself, but his posterity, in order to warrant the infliction of so dire a punishment upon them. We will not overlook, however, a large, and respectable, and in some parts of this country predominant, class of theologians, who, while admitting that the fallen condition of our race is the effect, deny that it is the penal effect, of Adam's sin. They say that it is not a punishment or judicial infliction for Adam's sin, but that it arises solely from a sovereign constitution, whereby, upon his sinning, his posterity were to be brought into a state of sin and misery. This dread calamity is a mere sovereign allotment, without any trial or sin, either in themselves or an appropriate representative. To this we object, in common with the Reformed, not to speak of other branches of the church: 1. It is in direct conflict with the scriptural representation, which affirms not only a sovereign causation, but a judicial relation between Adam's sin and the ruin of the race. "The judgment was by one to condemnation." "By the offence of one (judgment came) upon all men to condemnation" (*κρίμα εἰς κατάκριμα*), Rom. v. 16, 18. These, supported as they are by the whole context, are plain words, and mean something more than mere sovereign infliction, not in punishment of sin. 2. We object further that it rejects the only solution of our deplorable estate, as related to the administration of

a righteous and benevolent God, afforded by his word. Nature confessedly sheds no light here. The Bible affords us this clew, that "in Adam all die," because all are under "condemnation" for his "one offence" in paradise, which implies that they had a probation in him, so that his sin is justly reckoned to their account, and they are dealt with as if it were their own personally. But to reject this solution is to leave the infliction of the most tremendous evils on a race of moral beings wholly unaccounted for, and to sever the nexus in such beings between sin and suffering, which is a first law of natural conscience and the word of God, and an essential bond of the moral universe. 3. We reject it because of the parallelism exhibited between the relation of Adam's sin to the condemnation of his posterity, and the righteousness of Christ to the justification of his people (Rom. v. 12 et seq.). If the way in which Adam's sin inures to our ruin is by mere sovereign allotment, and not by being its meritorious ground, then the righteousness of Christ works our salvation by mere arbitrary allotment, and not as its meritorious ground. This invalidates justification through the alone merits and righteousness of Christ. For "as by the offence of one (judgment) came upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life. For as by the disobedience of one many were made sinners, even so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous" (Rom. v. 18, 19).[1] In view of these and

[1] Says Chalmers, "On the authority of revelation, and in obedience to the analogy of the faith, we feel inclined to the highest view that has been given of the subject of imputation. ..... We confess that we hailed it as a great acquisition when we first became acquainted with Edwards's view of the mediate imputation, and rejoiced in it as another instance of the accordance which obtains between the evangelism of the Bible and those discoveries which are gained by a deeper insight into the constitution of human nature, or into the secrets of mental and metaphysical science. It is the parallelism which the scripture affirms between the imputation of Adam's guilt and the imputation of Christ's righteousness which has broken up this illusion, as I now regard it to be, because consistent neither with the statements of the Bible nor the findings of experimental Christianity." — Chalmers's Posthumous Works (Harper's ed.), Vol. VII. pp. 482, 483.

other considerations, a much larger number have embraced the doctrine that Adam's first sin is not only the cause, but, by virtue of a just imputation to his posterity, the meritorious cause, of their depravation and ruin, these being the penal effects of it. But here the problem has been, so to connect Adam and his sin with his descendants, as to furnish a reasonable ground of its imputation to them. The prevailing doctrine of the Reformed, not to speak of other churches, as shown by their symbols and standard theologians, is that he, by covenant, was constituted their representative, so that his act was in this sense and in legal effect accounted and treated as their act, and, on this ground, imputed to them. It is not denied that this view has its difficulties, but, as we think, incomparably less than other schemes which have all its difficulties with many others peculiar to themselves. It is not denied that it at length roots itself in mystery. But bereft of this solution, we sink from mystery to rayless depths of "darkness visible," "insomuch that man is more incomprehensible without this mystery, than this mystery is incomprehensible to him." Some, however, have endeavored to escape these difficulties, by resorting to the scheme which accounts for the transmission of hereditary depravity by the natural laws of propagation, according to which, like begets like. So Adam "begat a son in his own likeness, after his image" (Gen. v. 3). It is obvious, however, that this law of propagation, whatever it may be, is God's sovereign creation, unless it be constituted, as it is, for the purpose of carrying into execution the penalty inflicted on the race for the sin of Adam. In this latter alternative, it is a part of the means of a judicial infliction, which is our view. In the former, it is a means of a mere sovereign infliction, and exposed to all the objections just brought against that view. Moreover, the law of descent, throughout animated nature, only insures the transmission of the essential qualities of the kind or species propagated. It does not, of itself, insure the transmission of separable accidents. It insures the transmission in men

of an animal and rational nature—the essence of manhood; but not of those separable accidents which distinguish the individuals, races, and varieties of mankind from each other. Now sin and holiness are, as we have before seen, separable accidents, in the presence or absence of either of which, manhood remains. The necessary laws of propagation, therefore, do not account for the universal degradation, corruption, and misery of the descendants of Adam. It can only be accounted for, in our judgment, as a judicial infliction for the sin of their first parent, on some fit ground, reckoned to their account.

Some other methods of accounting for the charging of Adam's sin to the account of his posterity, must not be overlooked.

One of these is the realistic theory of our race, according to which manhood is one substance, and whatever Adam did, all men did; therefore, his first sin was their sin. But the obvious difficulty here is, that on this scheme, not only the first sin, but all the sins, of Adam were those of his posterity; their acts too are his acts, all personal identity and accountability are confounded and vacated. Moreover, realism, by necessary consequence, has its logical terminus in pantheism. It comes to one substance of the universe, or of that *summum genus*, called being, which includes all things. This scheme, therefore, generates a hundred difficulties for one it removes. Withal, it invalidates the doctrine of justification by Christ's righteousness. As before shown, the scriptures draw a parallel between the mode of condemnation by Adam's sin and of justification by Christ's righteousness. If, then, Adam's sin condemns us because it is ours inherently, Christ's righteousness justifies us because it is ours inherently. We are thus justified by our own inherent virtues. This subverts the whole Protestant doctrine of justification by faith alone. Others maintain a sort of literal sinning in Adam by his descendants, because they were potentially in his loins, as the branches in the root. This implies that we were literally present, and participating in

Adam's first sin. This is obviously impossible, and exposed to some of the most serious and fatal objections lying against the realistic scheme. Many, however, have used such language as sinning in the loins, or because we were in the loins, of Adam, to denote either sinning in him interpretatively, as our federal head and representative, or to indicate the reason of his being constituted such. With such we have no controversy, further than that some of them have used language so loosely as to invite or cause serious misinterpretation of their meaning.

Another scheme is that of mediate imputation. By this is meant, that Adam's sin is imputed to his posterity not immediately, but mediately, through their own innate depravity, whereby they are supposed to consent to it; that in virtue of such supposed or implied consent to his sin, it may be reckoned, or they be treated, as if it were their own. This, however, is no real imputation of Adam's sin, but simply of their implied consent to it. Moreover, this does not account for the universal degradation and misery of our race. It presupposes them, either as a sovereign infliction or hereditary transmission, without any previous trial of any sort. It therefore stands on the same footing as those schemes already considered. Especially if Adam's sin is imputed to us on account of our previous sin, then, from the apostle's parallel between the two (Rom. v.), Christ's righteousness must be imputed to us mediately, through or on account of our previous righteousness. This grounds our justification on works of righteousness that we have done, and thus logically subverts the evangelical system.

In stating our objections to other theories, thus successively eliminated, we have virtually stated our own — that to which we, and, as we understand it, an immense majority of Old school, to say nothing of other Presbyterians, feel shut up. This is affirmed, while it is freely admitted that some, we know not how many, hold to some of the explanations of the imputation of Adam's sin already referred and excepted to by us. Our position, as shown by our

standards and standard writers, may be briefly summed up in the following points:

1. That God not only laid Adam under the simple obligation of a reasonable being to obey his law, but entered into a covenant with him, promising life upon "condition of perfect and personal obedience," and death upon the first act of disobedience (Con. of Faith, vii. 2.; Larger Cat. 20). This is hardly to be questioned. According to the account in Genesis ii. iii., certainly death is expressly stipulated upon the first disobedience; and, by inevitable implication, life was promised upon continued perfect obedience. But if this implication were doubtful, it is made certain by the express condition everywhere ascribed to the fulfilment of the law: "the man that doeth these things shall live by them" (Rom. x. 5; Gal. iii. 12).

2. Our first parents forfeited the blessings and incurred the penalties of this covenant, in that they, "being left to the freedom of their own will, through the temptation of Satan, transgressed the commandment of God in eating the forbidden fruit, and thereby fell from the estate of innocency in which they were created" (Larger Cat. 21). This needs no comment.

3. "The covenant being made with Adam, as a public person, not for himself only, but for his posterity; all mankind descending from him by ordinary generation, sinned in him, and fell with him, in that first transgression" (Larger Cat. 22). This explains beyond a peradventure in what sense our standards affirm that "we sinned in Adam," viz. as he acted not only for himself, but as our representative. Hence the imputation of that sin and its guilt to his descendants. Hence both catechisms put the first element of man's fallen state in "the guilt of Adam's first sin," while the Confession (vi. 3) declares "they [our first parents] being the root of all mankind, the guilt [obligation to punishment] of this sin was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation." The proofs that this

stipulation included their posterity with our first parents, are: 1. That the penalty denounced against our first parents (Gen. iii. 15 – 17), has been undeniably executed upon their descendants, showing that they were included in the covenant of which this is a part. 2. As has before been shown, it is affirmed, Rom. v. 12 et seq., that while "by one man sin entered the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned," while it "reigned from Adam to Moses, even over them that had not sinned after the similitude of Adam's transgression" (probably infants), yet this was in such wise, that the "judgment was by one to condemnation"; yea, "by one offence upon all men to condemnation"; moreover, that they are made sinners by the disobedience of Adam as they are made righteous by the obedience of Christ. This proves that Adam's posterity were so included with him in the covenant broken by him in eating the forbidden fruit, that his sin was imputed to them, reckoned to their account, as a basis of judicial treatment, and that sentence of condemnation issued against them for it.

3. The same thing appears from the parallel between Adam and Christ, of whom Adam is declared the figure (Rom. v. 14), who is the "last Adam" (1 Cor. xv. 45), and (vs. 47) the "last man," in contrast with the "first man." This parallel must refer to the single point of headship, and the manner in which these two great heads of our race respectively bring condemnation and justification upon the parties represented by them. As it is undeniably by the merits of Christ's righteousness reckoned to our account that we are justified, so it is by the charging to our account of Adam's sin that we are condemned. As has been before shown, it is this view alone that preserves, to our apprehension at least, the gratuitous justification of the sinner, through Christ's merits exclusively, intact, or protects it logically from subversion.

4. As before shown, it is the only way of reconciling the deplorable, lapsed condition of our race with the justice of

God. According to other theories, this terrible visitation has come upon us without any previous probation, either in ourselves or a fair representative. It seems to us, therefore, that by the rejection of this view much is lost, and nothing gained towards a sound theodicy.

5. The concessions of opposers. Dr. Hopkins opposed this doctrine, yet over and over again admits its main elements in such language as the following: "Adam was considered and treated as comprehending all mankind..... The covenant made with him was made with all mankind, and constituted him the public and confederating head of the whole race of men, and he acted in this capacity as being the whole; and his obedience was considered as the obedience of mankind; and as by this Adam was to obtain eternal life had he performed it, this comprehended and insured the eternal life of all his posterity. And, on the contrary, his disobedience was the disobedience of the whole, of all mankind; and the threatened penalty did not respect Adam personally, or as a single individual; but his whole posterity, included in him and represented by him" (Hopkins's System of Divinity, Vol. I. pp. 192, 193). We could hardly wish for a more explicit statement of what we have set forth. It is not our province to reconcile it with much of a contrary sort. It is quite common for the extreme and strenuous opponents of the doctrine to fall into such phrase as that "Adam was not on trial for himself alone, but for his posterity," which, developed in all its implications, involves all that we have maintained. The great objection to this doctrine has been, that according to it, Adam was constituted representative of his posterity without their consent. But if this objection is valid, it impeaches many of the natural and providential arrangements of God. Are not parents and magistrates representatives of those who never could consent to their assumption of this position, so that the children of a family, or a nation, are often dealt with as if the acts of those set over them in the Lord were their own? Cannot a ruler plunge into the horrors of war those of his

subjects who were opposed to him and the war? Are not children, in spite of themselves, born to the poverty and degradation of poor or worthless parents? The objection, therefore, proves itself groundless by proving too much, and assailing the undeniable proceedures of the Almighty.

But it is objected again, that according to this scheme God inflicts sin as the punishment of sin; and this is incongruous with his nature, making him the author of sin. To this we reply, that this language of "punishing sin with sin," is chiefly, if not wholly, that of opponents. We hold to what the scripture undoubtedly teaches, when it represents God as giving men up to their own hearts' lusts, or to a strong delusion, or of hardening their hearts, for their sin and obduracy; not that God thus positively creates sin; but that, in punishment of it, he withdraws the gifts, endowments, and restraining grace of his Spirit, without which the mere natural principles of action become inordinate, unbalanced, and at once sink into *ἀτάξια* and *ἀνόμια*. Such withdrawment of God's favor and Spirit is undeniably set forth in scripture as a penalty of sin often inflicted. So in the present case; original sin is exhibited in all our standards as taking rise in the "guilt of Adam's first sin"; then the "want [absence or loss] of that righteousness wherein he was created," as the immediate consequence of incurring this guilt; then, next in order, and as the instantaneous effect of this loss, is the "corruption of his whole nature," the disorder and abnormity arising from the loss of the regulative, harmonizing, and purifying power of original righteousness. The Confession of Faith(VI. 2) puts the same truth in another aspect: "By this sin they fell from their original righteousness and communion with God, and *so* became dead in sin, and wholly defiled in the faculties and parts of soul and body." Here their sin and the loss of original righteousness are spoken of as if they implied each other,[1] while it is by

[1] The standard view on the two preceding heads is well put in the following language of Turretin: "Poena quam peccatum Adami in nos accersit, vel est *privativa* vel *positiva*. Prior est carentia et privatio justitiae originalis. Posterior

virtue of this that they became "dead in sin," etc. The next article proceeds to say that "the guilt of this sin was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity," etc. That this is the present condition of our race, who are both "by nature children of wrath" and "dead in trespasses and sins," is the undeniable representation of scripture (Eph. ii. 1–3). That this view of the genesis of the successive stages of original sin, given in our standards, accords with scripture, and sufficiently disposes of the objection that thus God "punishes sin with sin," we think needs not to be further argued.

A single observation further. While, on this scheme, the withdrawment of divine favor and communion from our race,—of which corruption is an instantaneous consequent,—is due to Adam's sin, yet the further punishment of subsequent misery and death is inflicted with primary reference to this inherent personal pollution and attendant guilt, originating as aforesaid, and the actual transgressions proceeding from it.

The question whether we are called on to repent of Adam's sin as if we committed it personally, is sufficiently answered by what has been already presented. As it was not a sin committed by us personally, we are not to repent of it as such. We are to feel humbled as members of a race fallen from its integrity and purity, on a most favorable trial, in short, as "degenerate plants of a strange vine."

We will now inquire a moment as to the extent of this fall. This will help to estimate how far there is any ability on the part of man to recover himself from it. Presbyterians find no language more clear and exact than their own

est mors tum temporalis, tum aeterna, et in genere mala omnia, quae peccatoribus immittuntur. Etsi secunda necessario sequitur primam ex natura rei, nisi intercedat Dei misericordia, non debet tamen cum ea confundi. Quoad primam dicimus Adami peccatum nobis imputari immediate ad poenam privativam, quia est causa privationis justitiae originalis, et sic corruptionem antecedere debet, saltem ordine naturae; Sed quoad posteriorem potest dici imputari mediate quoad poenam positivam, quia isti poenae obnoxii non sumus, nisi postquam nati et corrupti sumus."—Loc. IX. Quaest. IX. 14.

standards, to express their views. "From this original corruption, whereby we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil, do proceed all actual transgressions" (Con. of Faith, VI. 4). A previous article declares them "wholly defiled in all the parts and faculties of soul and body." All evangelical Christians agree that the will is indisposed to good, and perverse in all its actions. That the desires, feelings, and dispositions partake of this depravity and consequent culpability has been sufficiently evinced already. That the intellect, as it is implicated in the moral and spiritual actings of the soul, is also defiled and blinded, has been shown heretofore. It is a necessary inference from the necessity of spiritual illumination so constantly asserted in the scriptures. How could this be more strongly asserted, even past all power of self-recovery, than in the following words, so familiar to all conversant with these subjects? "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them because they are spiritually discerned" (1 Cor. ii. 14). The body not only has in it the seeds of disease and death, but, in so far as it is mysteriously united to the soul and is manifoldly its organ and instrument, as libidinous and intemperate appetites have their seat in the body as animated by the conscious soul, so the body partakes of the defilement of our sin. Hence the exhortation: "Let not sin, therefore, reign in your mortal bodies, that ye should obey it in the lusts thereof, neither yield ye your members as instruments of unrighteousness unto sin" (Rom. vi. 12, 13). "If ye through the spirit do mortify the deeds of the body, ye shall live."

Inability.

All this involves inability for self-restoration. They are "indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good." These terms are expository and complementary of each other. The indisposition is inability. The inability consists in such indisposition as involves a disordered state

of the faculties, cognitive, sensitive, and volitional. It is needless to rehearse the direct assertions of the sinner's inability; the arguments from his being dead in sin, having a heart of stone; from the new creation by the Holy Ghost, and the exceeding greatness of his power to us ward who believe. All this has satisfied all parties that the sinner labors under some sort of inability. But precisely what it is, and how far it is a real inability, is in question. We hold it to be a moral inability, a sinful inability, and a real inability. With respect to the distinction between natural and moral inability so much insisted on by some, we hold to whatever of truth it contains, although most of us are not fond of the phrase, on account of its liability to be misunderstood or perverted. We hold that our inability is moral, and is our sin; and that it is natural in one sense, and not so in another sense, of the word "nature." It is natural in the sense that it is native to fallen man, and not acquired, so being like the depravity in which it consists. It is not natural in the sense of belonging to human nature in its original, normal, unfallen state. It is a depravation of this nature induced by the fall. Further, it is irremoveable by the sinners own power, else it would be no real inability. We thus stand opposed to those who affirm a natural ability, meaning thereby a real, present ability, to perform works spiritually good, without divine grace. If by natural ability they mean, as some do, only the possession of natural faculties which constitute a moral agent, or which are essential to mankind, we maintain it. But these faculties are in a distempered state, governed by an evil bias, which needs to be purged away, by the Holy Spirit "creating us anew in Christ Jesus unto good works," before we can truly serve God in the spirit. This meaning of our Confession is put beyond all doubt, in the following language:

"Man by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation; so, as a natural man, being altogether averse from that which is good, and dead in sin, is not able, by his own strength, to convert himself, or prepare himself thereto." — Chap. IX. 3.

As to the objection, that we are not accountable for not doing what we are unable to do, it applies to outward acts, but not to sinful dispositions. The more inveterate and invincible they are, by so much are they the more culpable. If the disposition to slander and backbite is so powerful that one cannot repress its actings, does this excuse it? Or does it not rather evince its aggravated criminality?

Soterology.

In regard to the way of salvation from this deplorable state, we are concerned first with the persons who accomplish it, and next with the means they employ for this purpose. And in regard to the persons there is little dispute among the evangelical, all finding the germs of their creed here in the apostolic benediction: the love of God, the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the communion of the Holy Ghost. To effect this salvation, belongs to the Son and the Holy Ghost. The only question mooted by parties here recognized, is in regard to the constitution of Christ's person. Our doctrine, and certainly the catholic doctrine, is, that "the eternal Son of God became man, and so was, and continueth to be, God and man, in two distinct natures and one person forever." This stands opposed to those who in any manner confound or identify the human and divine natures in Christ; to all who, in any degree, merge the divine in the human, or the human in the divine, or both in a *tertium quid* neither human nor divine, an undefinable, intermediate, theanthropic being. We maintain that he is "very God and very man." Thus, being of the rank and nature of each of the alienated parties, he is fitted to be the "one Mediator between God and man."

The offices to be performed for our recovery correspond to the various aspects of the evil from which we are to be saved. Now sin involves, 1. Misery and guilt, or exposure to punishment; 2. Pollution and blindness; 3. Dominion over us, and our consequent bondage to it. Now Christ delivers us from the guilt of sin by bearing our punishment for us; he procures for us a title to the rewards of ri

through the imputation of his righteousness to us. He cleanses us from the pollution and liberates us from the dominion of sin through the Holy Spirit dwelling in us. In regard of the various offices of Christ for our salvation, in virtue to which he is called our prophet, priest, and king, all which need attention in relation to our present object, have been or will be sufficiently treated under other heads in this Article, except what relates to his priestly office.

It is proper, however, to remark that the Old school Presbyterians cleave to that view of redemption which represents it as a covenant transaction, first between the Father and the Son, according to which the Father stipulated to the Son the chosen seed as the reward of his sufferings, and the Son stipulated to suffer and do whatever was requisite to ransom them from the curse and bondage of sin. This is clearly set forth in John vi. 37: "All that the Father giveth me shall come to me, and him that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out." Secondly, there is a further stipulation indicated in the last clause, and manifoldly reiterated, that whoso cometh to or believeth on Christ shall be saved. Thirdly, there is the further covenant wherein God stipulates to give the grace of his Spirit to those whom he hath promised to Christ, to "persuade and enable them to embrace Jesus Christ, freely offered to them in the gospel." "This is the covenant that I will make with the house of Israel after those days, saith the Lord: I will put my laws into their mind, and will write them in their hearts; and I will be to them a God, and they shall be to me a people" (Heb. viii. 10). So it is promised that they shall come to Christ, and declared that none can come except the Father draw them (John vi. 37–44).

The topics connected with Christ's priestly office requiring notice are:

REDEMPTION AND JUSTIFICATION.

1. As to the manner in which Christ's sufferings and death become efficacious for our redemption. We maintain

that they are efficient for this purpose by being a true and proper satisfaction to divine justice for all penal obligations of sinners saved through him. By justice we understand distributive justice,—that perfection of God which is immutably determined to render to all their deserts, either in their own persons, or by an accepted substitute. As to what some call "general justice," as distinguished from distributive, we understand them to define it substantially as benevolence in the government of the universe. When we speak of satisfying divine justice, we do not mean justice in this sense, which, in our view, is no proper meaning of the word "justice." We mean justice proper, or distributive justice, whereby God "will render to every man according to his deeds" (Rom. ii. 6), and "every transgression and disobedience received a just recompense of reward" (Heb. ii. 2), and "it is a righteous thing in God to recompense tribulation" to evil doers (1 Thess. i. 6). Now when we say that Christ satisfied divine justice, we do not mean, as some appear to imagine, that God has pleasure in his sufferings *per se*, but that the claims of his justice for the punishment of the sinner are satisfied or discharged by the sufferings and death of Christ substituted and accepted in lieu thereof. That, on some ground, they are so accepted and substituted, is conceded by every scheme recognized as evangelical. How then do the sufferings of Christ discharge the penal claims of the law, in lieu of the believing sinner's punishment? We say, because we think the scripture says, by being themselves truly penal, and accepted as such, in lieu of the sinner's punishment. That Christ was thus our substitute and surety, bearing the punishment of our sins, is manifoldly taught by the sacred writers: "God sent forth his Son, made of a woman, made under the law, to redeem them that were under the law, that we might receive the adoption of sons" (Gal. iv. 4, 5). Christ then was made under the law. In whose behalf, unless for his people, whom he undertook to redeem? How did he redeem them? "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being

made a curse for us; for it is written, Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree" (Gal. iii. 13). Does this mean less than that Christ delivers us from the condemning sentence of the law by assuming and bearing it in our stead? Again, he is often represented as "bearing our sins," or having them "laid upon him." There can be no doubt that the universal scriptural sense of the phrase to "bear sin," is to bear the punishment of it, as a due collation of the passages containing it will show. Indeed, in what other way could our sinless Saviour bear sin? He could not surely be contaminated with its pollution. It is directly affirmed that the "chastisement [or punishment] of our peace," or required for our peace, "was upon him, and by his stripes are we healed" (Isa. liii. 5). He was "stricken, smitten of God, and afflicted" (vs. 4); and for whom? "For the transgression of my people was he stricken" (vs. 8). "Christ died for our sins according to the scriptures." To die for sin, to be smitten of God, stricken for transgression, is not this punishment? Is it not evil judicially inflicted for sin, and in support of law?

If this be so, then it follows that those transgressions of his people for which he was stricken, must have been reckoned to his account, i. e. imputed to him; and that thus he assumed their guilt, i. e. their obligation to punishment, not their pollution, in accordance with our previous definitions of terms. God "hath made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin" (2 Cor. v. 21). How could he, thus personally sinless, be "made sin for us," in any other possible way, than by the imputation of our sins to him? Whether these reasonings be accepted as conclusive or not, it will at least show what Old school Presbyterians mean in saying that Christ's sufferings were penal, that our sins were imputed to him, and he assumed our guilt, and why they say so.

As to the objection that Christ could not have endured the penalty of the law in the sinner's stead, because his sufferings could not have been equal in amount, or similar in kind, with those of the sinners whose substitute he was, we

meet it with the obvious answer, that his sufferings had a boundless worth on account of the infinite dignity of his person. True, he did not undergo remorse of conscience, as sinners do for their personal sins; still he became a *curse* for us, and "poured out his soul unto death." What mean the terrible anguish of soul, and the bloody sweat of Gethsemane, and those dreadful hidings of the Father's face on the cross, which called forth the fearful exclamation: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me"? Doubtless there is an awful mystery here. But are these heavy shadows of God's wrath explicable except as a visitation upon sin? And what sin, unless those of his people imputed, and for whom he was made sin and a curse, and smitten of God, and afflicted?

Thus far of the nature and efficacy of Christ's sufferings, which, substituted for ours, serve to deliver us form merited wrath and woe. More than this they cannot accomplish. They leave us in a neutral position, without any title to the rewards of righteousness. In order to this we need interest in the merits of a perfect righteousness. Such a righteousness Christ, who for our sakes was "made under the law," wrought out for us. It is imputed to us, or reckoned to our account, as the ground of our justification, so that we are treated and judicially dealt with as if it were ours. The evidence of this is manifold and cumulative. "By the righteousness of one (the free gift) came upon all men unto justification of life." What this righteousness is is indubitably shown in the verse following. "For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous" (Rom. v. 18, 19). It is the righteousness or obedience of Christ, then, that makes us righteous. How, unless it be so imputed to us, that in the eye of the judge we are regarded and treated as righteous on account of it? We are dealt with forensically, as if we were inherently righteous, solely for the sake of "the righteousness of Christ imputed to us, and received by faith alone." Even so David describeth "the blessedness of

the man to whom the Lord imputeth righteousness without works" (Rom. iv. 6). So Christ is "the Lord our righteousness," is "made unto us righteousness" (1 Cor. i. 30), and "we are made the righteousness of God in him" (2 Cor. v. 21), i. e. made righteous with the righteousness which God provides and accepts in Christ. As being such, it is often called "the righteousness of God," in contrast to our own, and as being received by faith, the "righteousness of faith," in opposition to that by works, and for both reasons "the righteousness of God which is by faith of Jesus Christ unto and upon all them that believe" (Rom. iv. 22). So the apostle charges against the Jews, that "they being ignorant of God's righteousness, and going about to establish their own righteousness, have not submitted themselves, unto the righteousness of God. For Christ is the end of the law for righteousness, to every one that believeth" (Rom. x. 3, 4) Paul sought to "win Christ, and be found in him, not having on mine own righteousness, which is of the law, but that which is through the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith." In view of all this, and much more the like, Presbyterians see no reason for discarding or modifying the doctrine of our catechism. "Justification is an act of God's free grace unto sinners, in which he pardoneth all their sins; accepteth and accounteth their persons righteous in his sight; not for anything wrought in them or done by them, but only for the perfect obedience and full satisfaction of Christ, by God imputed to them, and received by faith alone" (Larger Cat. 70).

Thus the atonement is no mere governmental expedient; no merely didactic, or symbolical, or influential exhibition. It is a true and proper satisfaction of divine justice by Christ's endurance of the penalty due the sinner, and his perfect obedience imputed to him for his full justification. It is often said, that in this scheme salvation comes, through the merits of Christ imputed, to be a matter of justice, and not of grace. It is indeed a matter of justice, in one view, that salvation be given to those whose debt of punishment

their surety has discharged, and for whom he hath purchased the gift of eternal life. "We are bought with a price," for God hath purchased the church with his own blood. God is "just, and the justifier of him that believeth in Jesus." It is the grand peculiarity of this method of reconciliation to God, that it displays his mercy in accordance with, not in derogation of, his justice; that he is a just God and our Saviour. But it is none the less, it is all the more, of grace for being conformed to justice. It is still of God's free grace that he provided and accepts this satisfaction and obedience of Christ for their justification. So "grace reigns through righteousness," not in subversion of it. We are "justified freely by his grace, through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus." "In whom we have redemption through his blood, the forgiveness of sins, according to the riches of his grace." The objections just considered are of older date than our standards, which dispose of them thus: "Christ by his obedience and death, did fully discharge the debt of all them that are thus justified, and did make a proper, real, and full satisfaction to the Father's justice in their behalf. Yet, inasmuch as he was given by the Father for them, and his obedience and satisfaction accepted in their stead, and both freely, not for anything in them, their justification is only of free grace; that both the exact justice and rich grace of God might be glorified in the justification of sinners" (Confession of Faith, xi. 3).

This view of the atonement seems to us to accord with the manifold scriptural representations of it, and alone to meet adequately the real need of the sinner's soul. The convinced sinner knows "the judgment of God, that they who commit such things are worthy of death," that his sin deserves God's wrath and curse, that God's justice requires him to punish sin, and that He "cannot deny himself," and, therefore, that he (the sinner) cannot be safe unless this curse and penalty are borne by a sufficient and accepted substitute. Until he sees that debt discharged, he cannot but fear that it will be exacted of him by the eternal and

immutable justice of God. On no other ground can his soul stay itself except on this, that Christ bore our sins, and became a curse for us. Otherwise it is still "a fearful thing to fall into the hands of the living God."

THE SUBJECTS AND EXTENT OF REDEMPTION.

All who know anything of the Westminster standards, know that they represent Christ as the "Redeemer of God's elect," and that they limit the redemptive efficacy of his death to his people: "For the transgression of my people was he stricken" (Isa. liii. 8). "He laid down his life for the sheep" (John x. 15). "He purchased the church with his own blood" (Acts xx. 28). "He gave himself for us, that he might redeem us from all iniquity, and purify unto himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works" (Tit. ii. 14). The end for which Christ gave himself is thus, and in manifold other passages, unmistakably indicated. It is to "redeem them for whom he gave himself from all iniquity, to purify unto himself a peculiar people." This is not merely to render salvation possible, but actually to impart and complete it in those for whose salvation he gave himself. These are those whom the Father stipulated to give him as the reward of his sufferings: "All that the Father giveth me shall come to me, and him that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out" (John vi. 37). These beyond all question, constitute the special objects of his redemptive work, his sufferings, and death. While this view accords with the manifold and unambiguous representations of the scriptures, yet it is perfectly consistent with another set of scriptural representations, which, whatever may be said to the contrary, we heartily accept, in common with all evangelical Christians. We adopt the old formula that the atonement is "sufficient for all men; efficient only for the elect." The sacrifice that is adequate to atone for the sins of one man, would be adequate to atone for the sins of all, if it were applied to them. Hence it is ample foundation for the gospel offer of Christ to all men, which we all agree is made in

scripture, and is to be made, without hesitation or reserve, by the ministers of the gospel. It is in the embrace of this universal and unconditional offer to all, and as made to all, that the elect become partakers of its benefits. Hence the just condemnation of all rejecters of the gospel. They reject the salvation freely offered to them, which would be theirs for the taking of it, and "this is their condemnation."

The question then is not concerning the sufficiency of Christ's redemption for all, or the universality of its offer — the certain justification of all who accept it, and condemnation of all who reject it; but it is, what was the purpose of God in giving his Son, and of the Son in offering himself for the sins of men? Was he given, did he give himself, to redeem all, or to redeem his people? We think the answer of the scriptures is plain: "Christ loved the church, and gave himself for it" (Eph v. 25). To the same effect are several passages already quoted, and that might be quoted. The passages also which attribute the saving work of the Spirit to Christ, clearly limit the efficacy of his redemption to the subjects of that work — Christians are "quickened together with Christ" (Eph. ii. 5). "Who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ" (Eph. i. 3). "According to his mercy he saved us, by the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost, which he shed on us abundantly through Jesus Christ our Saviour" (Tit. iii. 5, 6). Moreover, it is the uniform testimony of scripture that we receive from Christ, not a mere possibility of reconciliation, forgiveness, justification, salvation, but these very gifts themselves. But those who receive these blessings are the people of God, the elect only. In short, both in the light of reason and scripture, the following statement of President Edwards appears unanswerable:

"From these things it will inevitably follow, that however Christ in some sense may be said to *die for all*, and to redeem all visible Christians, yea the whole world by his death, yet there must be something *particular* in the design of his death, with respect to such as he intended should be

actually saved thereby. As appears by what has been here shown, God has the actual salvation or redemption of a certain number in his proper absolute design, and of a certain number only; and therefore such a design can only be prosecuted, in anything God does, in order to the salvation of men. God pursues a proper design of the salvation of the elect in giving Christ to die, and prosecutes such a design with respect to no other, most strictly speaking; for it is impossible that God should prosecute any other design, only such as he has. He certainly does not, in the highest propriety and strictness of speech, pursue a design that he has not. And indeed, such a particularity and limitation of redemption will as infallibly follow from the doctrine of God's foreknowledge as from that of his decree."— Treatise on the Will, Sec. XIV.

A single remark is due before leaving this subject: Whatever opinions any may entertain of the doctrines of our church on this subject, it is believed that no body of Christians more exalt Christ in their public teachings and worship, or in their inward spiritual experience. This is freely admitted by all parties in any degree familiar with the tone of our thinking, feeling, and preaching. Whatever may be true of other bodies, among us Christ is everywhere lifted up as the substance and essence of our religion, the central object of faith, the spring of all that is sweet, holy, and heavenly in religious affections, "the power of God unto salvation." Nowhere is Christ more constantly and demonstratively set forth as having provided a full and free and finished salvation for all who will accept it, as the author and finisher of faith, the beginning and end of all piety. Explain all this as we may, it is not to be overlooked in estimating the tendency and effect of the doctrines they hold in the premises. "By their fruits ye shall know them."

It is also to be remembered that many of the objections urged against Particular Redemption presuppose that the gift and sacrifice of Christ, in order to put lost men in a salvable state, is a matter of justice, not of grace. They are groundless on any other hypothesis. But this hypothesis subverts the gospel, and destroys the very foundations of Christianity.

The Office of the Spirit.

In regard to that branch of soterology which respects the work of the Spirit in regeneration and sanctification, it is, of course, held to be co-extensive with the depravity of the soul and its enslavement to sin. The Spirit removes the perverseness, pollution, and impotence for acts spiritually good in the soul, which, as we have already seen, possess the natural man, darkening the intellect, corrupting the affections, infusing into the will an invincible bias to evil; altogether constituting a bondage to sin from which the mighty power of God's Spirit alone can deliver it. The sum of our faith on this point is stated, to our full satisfaction, in the following language of our Confession:

"1. All those whom God hath predestinated unto life, and those only, he is pleased, in his appointed and accepted time, effectually to call, by his word and Spirit, out of that state of sin and death in which they are by nature, to grace and salvation by Jesus Christ; enlightening their minds spiritually and savingly to understand the things of God; taking away their heart of stone, and giving unto them an heart of flesh; renewing their wills, and by his almighty power determining them to that which is good; and effectually drawing them to Jesus Christ, yet so as that they come most freely, being made willing by his grace.

"2. This effectual call is of God's free and special grace alone, not from anything at all foreseen in man, who is altogether passive therein, and being quickened and renewed by the Holy Spirit, he is thereby enabled to answer this call, and to embrace the grace offered and conveyed in it" (Confession of Faith, Chap. X).

According to this, man is passive in regeneration, which is the work of God upon and in him, and active in conversion, which is his own act of turning to God and embracing Jesus Christ. But, in what is properly the act of God upon him he cannot be active. He is the object on whom the work is wrought, and so necessarily passive. But the simul-

taneous effect of this work is his own active turning to God.

It is to be observed withal, that the work of grace in the human soul, though supernatural, is not miraculous. Though above nature, it is not contrary to nature, nor in contravention nor suspension of its laws. The Spirit operates upon the soul with a secret and resistless efficacy, and yet without violence to, yea, in perfect harmony with, the laws of all its faculties, cognitive, sensitive, and voluntary. But while thus in sweet accord with the laws of our rational and accountable nature, it is "even according to the working of the mighty power which God wrought in Christ, when he raised him from the dead" (Eph. i. 19, 20).[1]

It is in place to say a word as to the relative priority of faith and repentance in the soul, not in the order of time, but of nature. They are co-instantaneous beyond dispute. But it is disputed which is the logical antecedent or condition of the other. The definition of repentance in the Shorter Catechism happily expresses our view of this question. "Repentance unto life is a saving grace, whereby a sinner, out of a true sense of his sin, and apprehension of the mercy of God in Christ, doth, with grief and hatred of his sin, turn unto God, with full purpose of, and endeavor

[1] It has been quite a fashion with some parties to charge Old school Presbyterians with holding that depravity is a "physical" state, and therefore that regeneration is a "physical" change, meaning by the word "physical" something like material or corporeal. What we and the great body of Christians hold is, that the work of the Spirit on the soul in regeneration is *immediate*, producing an immediate change in its moral state or dispositions, so that it freely and sweetly is persuaded and attracted by the objective evangelical truth and motives which it previously rejected. This is in opposition to the doctrine of regeneration by the mere suasory influence of such external truth and motives, without any antecedent interior change in the soul itself. But this change is moral, i.e. in the moral nature and state; not physical in any sense inconsistent with this. It is true that some old standard writers used the term "physical" to denote the immediate character of the work of the Spirit on the soul, and in contrast to moral; this word being used by them in the sense of a mere external suasory influence. In this sense they pronounced the work of the Spirit physical, not moral. But this only means that it must be wrought upon and change that φύσις, or native moral state, whereby we are "children of wrath" (Eph. ii. 3).

after new obedience." The point to be noted in this definition is, that repentance flows out of, and therefore presupposes our "apprehension of, the mercy of God in Christ." Of course, such "apprehension," in order to be effective, must be a believing, confiding apprehension. So while faith and repentance are inseparable, like the fire and its heat, yet faith is the logical antecedent or condition of repentance. We think the whole scope of the scriptural exhortations to repentance, carries an express or implied reference to the "mercy of God in Christ," as the constraining motive thereto. "Repent and be converted that your sins may be blotted out, when the times of refreshing shall come from the presence of the Lord, and he shall send Jesus Christ which before was preached unto you" (Acts iii. 19, 20). "Let the wicked forsake his way and the unrighteous man his thoughts, and let him return unto the Lord, and he will have mercy upon him; and to our God, for he will abundantly pardon" (Isa. lv. 7). In the nature of the case it must be so. For nothing is genuine in religion which is not inspired by love to God. And can genuine love exist towards a being to whom we dare not trust ourselves, or whose honor and glory we know demand our destruction and misery? So there can be no real, cordial trust in God on the part of sinners which has not its root in faith in Christ as the expiation for our sins. "Without faith it is impossible to please God; for he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is the rewarder of them that diligently seek him" (Heb. xi, 6). How can the convinced sinner believe that God is the rewarder of those who seek him, otherwise than as he beholds him in Christ "reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses?" There may be legal and slavish repentance without faith in Christ, inducing a hard, reluctant service of God in "dead works." Evangelical and saving repentance can only be the daughter of faith in Christ; a faith, however, which instantaneously begets it, which works by love, and purifies the heart.

This subject has vital connection with the whole tone and spirit of preaching and religious experience. On the one system, the poor soul must become penitent and holy, consciously endowed with spiritual life, in order to feel warranted to come to Christ. On the other, it is invited to come to Christ "that it may have life;" in all its unworthiness, helplessness, and misery, to come at once to him for "all things pertaining to life and godliness," for "wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption." It it easy to see which system entangles the soul, in its access to Christ and peace and holiness, in inextricable toils, and which system clears the way to him in free and buoyant faith, hope, and love.

ECCLESIOLOGY.

It is unnecessary to go at any considerable length into our principles of church organization. The cardinal features of our ecclesiastical system are: 1. Representative government by officers chosen by the people, in contrast alike with government by the people in person, or pure democracy, which is congregationalism, and with government by officers not chosen by the people, i. e. by a prelatical and hierarchical government. Both extremes are avoided, not only the despotic, but what is elsewhere found impracticable, that of the people attempting to exercise legislative and judicial functions immediately themselves, instead of through the medium of their representatives. 2. The parity of the ministry as shepherds of Christ's flock, neither as lording it over God's heritage, nor over one another. Herein, again, Presbyterianism contrasts with all prelatical and hierarchical systems. 3. Unity. This binds all particular churches in one organization, composed of representatives of the lower courts. It is opposed to Independency, which, to the eye of a Presbyterian, runs towards disintegration and dissolution. It represents organically the unity of the Church. All its members become subject to their brethren in the Lord. The soundness of the whole body can be brought

to bear effectually to heal or expel distempers in particular parts. 4. Closely connected with this is catholicity. Her communion is open to all Christians of all nations. But this is not at the expense of purity. Our ministers and teachers are required to subscribe and conform to her Confession of Faith. This provides for the purity of their teachings, while at the same time, our church debars no credible Christian professor, competent to discern the Lord's body, from communion at the table of the Lord.

In regard to the reasons of the secession of a portion of our ministers and churches a quarter of a century ago, it is only necessary to observe that the main cause was doctrinal. Other influences, however, gave tone and intensity to this. Among them ecclesiastical differences were undoubtedly prominent. Of these, foremost in time, if not in influence, was the position of Old school Presbyterians, that church-work, such as educating ministers, regulating missions etc, should be done by agencies appointed and controlled by the church. On this point, as those who seceded from them are coming rapidly, avowedly, and exultingly to the same ground, there is no need of further remark. Another, and perhaps the most immediately impulsive, reason was the summary elimination of the congregational element from their system, which, with the best of motives, had been unconstitutionally introduced by the celebrated "Plan of Union" with Congregationalists in 1801. This alien and incongruous element had become a source of great discord and trouble. In the language of Chief Justice Gibson, in the celebrated opinion given in rendering the decision of the Supreme Court, which ended the legal contest, "the two systems [Congregational and Presbyterian] are as immiscible as water and oil." As the same conclusion, theoretically and practically, has been reached by the New school Presbyterians and Congregationalists themselves, no more is necessary to be said on the subject.

A few words on two other points, out of the many that suggest themselves, must close this Article, already too

protracted. First, as to the church-membership of the children of Christians. On this subject Old school Presbyterians are coming more and more into the fullest sympathy with their standards, however they may have, owing to various causes in the present century, lost sight of their precious significance, in placing children on the same footing in the visible church with their parents. The mind of our church is deeply moved on this subject, and is unresting in its efforts to bring her children to the closest intimacy and oneness with herself. She resists with a holy jealousy every effort to loosen this bond, in the utmost stringency of it, as set forth in our Book of Discipline. A striking evidence of this has appeared in connection with the attempt to revise and amend this book, which has for some years been in progress in our body. The committee appointed by the General Assembly to prepare the needed amendments, recommended that a clause be inserted in the article which declares baptized children subject to the "government and discipline" of the church, asserting that, before making a profession of religion, they were "not subject to judicial prosecution." This amendment chiefly prevented the acceptance of the amended Book of Discipline by the assembly of 1860. It has been expurgated from the subsequent revisions of the book, in obedience to the almost unanimous voice of the church, because it was feared that it would weaken the bond of union between the church and its baptized members. This growing recognition of the church-membership of the children of Christians, and the consequent treatment of them as persons who are recreant to their position, if they do not think and feel and live and act as becomes the children of God, is producing the happiest results. Much lost ground yet remains to be recovered in this regard. But enough has already been regained to give the highest promise for the future.

Next in regard to the sacraments, we will barely add, that Old school Presbyterians, repudiate the opposite extremes of attributing to them, on the one hand, an intrinsic

opus operatum efficacy, and, on the other, a mere emblematic and didactic character. We hold that they are not mere "signs," intended to illustrate the nature of Christ's salvation, but that they are "seals" also, designed to ratify the promises and covenants which, through faith, convey that salvation to the soul (Rom. iv. 11). This stipulatory character of the sacraments we deem of great moment. They are like the seal on a deed, designed to be solemn attestations of the sincerity of the promiser, and of the reality of the benefits stipulated by him. In regard to the efficacy of this, it is to be observed: 1. That, according to the constitution of our nature, such a visible and conspicuous attestation of solemn earnestness in making a promise has a power, beyond the mere word, to assure our faith, so apt to stagger, our hope, so apt to droop. It is analogous to the "oath for confirmation . . . . . wherein God, willing more abundantly to show unto the heirs of promise the immutability of his counsel, confirmed it by an oath" (Heb. vi. 16, 17). The word of promise is indeed sure in itself. But the seal of the promise makes it "more abundantly" sure to us. 2. Not only in their own nature, but as divine ordinances, the sacraments are channels of a peculiar grace to all who receive them aright. If we cannot tell why he has done it, it is enough that God has instituted them, and has been pleased to connect special gracious benefits with their appropriate use. 3. They are not efficacious of themselves, but only as they are received by faith. As Calvin says, we get only so much from them as we take by faith. 4. We admit and insist on the real presence of Christ in the sacraments, as we do in his word and ordinances generally, by his Spirit operating in and through them as the instruments or media of his agency. Any other real presence of Christ's person or body in the bread and wine, whether by transubstantiation, consubstantiation, or otherwise, we deny. 5. We reject that theory of the person of Christ now advanced in some Protestant communions, according to which Christ is denied to be truly God and truly man, and is

asserted to have a theanthropic nature, produced by confounding and identifying the two natures in a *tertium quid*, which is neither God nor man, nor God and man, but a divine-human intermediate between the two, whose divine-human life is deposited in the church, and dispensed, through the sacraments, to men for their salvation. This scheme really gives the sacraments an *opus operatum* efficacy, and is a kind of modern transcendental sacramentarianism and ritualism which we discard.

CONCLUSION.

Here we pause. Our exposition of the polemical attitude of our church has been prepared under the pressure of extraneous labors and hinderances, brought upon us in divine providence, and wholly unlooked for, when we engaged to furnish it. Such as it is, however, it must speak for itself. While it has been our endeavor to set forth the controverted doctrines of Old school Presbyterians, as we understand them, it has been no less our endeavor to avoid charging the doctrines we oppose upon any specified communion or school of Christians. Thus we have hoped to consult the interests of truth and charity; with what success our readers must judge. What we insist on for ourselves and others is simply the grand old maxim: *In necessariis unitas; in non necessariis libertas; in omnibus caritas.*