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ARTICLE II.

THE VICARIOUS ELEMENT IN THE DIVINE
GOVERNMENT.

BY THE REV. N. S. BURTON, D. D., NEEDHAM, MASS.

THE chief objection made to the doctrine of the Atonement is that it offends our ethical instincts. It is said that our instinctive sense of righteousness forbids that an innocent person should take the place of a criminal, and the criminal be released from penalty. The principles of righteous government, it is said, require not merely that penalty follow crime, but that the criminal himself be punished; transfer of guilt or merit seems as impossible as of character or personal identity, and we do not see how there can be a transfer of penalty or reward, or how such a transfer can satisfy either justice or mercy.

Is it not possible that this objection claims too much for what we call our intuitive sense of righteousness? Is such an *a priori* judgment of equal authority with our intuitions respecting time and space, and to be treated as infallible? Does not the scientific method require us to ascertain what are the facts in providential government, as an astronomer takes observation of a comet to determine its orbit, and when we have made a sufficient number of observations to enable us to define the orbit in which the divine administration does actually move, to conform our notions of righteousness to facts thus ascertained? None of our *a priori* judgments can be more positive than our conviction that God is righteous—that the Judge of all the earth will do

right. To question this would be to contemplate moral suicide, so that we must start with assuming this.

There are four facts so manifest under the divine administration in this world as not to be questioned. 1. The good in this world suffer in consequence of the sins of the bad. 2. The bad are benefited by the good acts and lives of the good. 3. The bad are saved from some of the natural consequences of their sins through what the good do or suffer on their account. 4. Some of the bad are led to repentance and reformation through what the good do or suffer on their account.

These facts are constantly brought to view in the family and other relations, so that all are familiar with them. They are not mere accidents of rare occurrence, nor mere incidental results in the working of a social system which God for other reasons saw fit to institute, but are of such frequent and regular occurrence as to indicate that God planned his government over men in this life with a view to just these results. Charles Kingsley says: "I believe that if we could behold all hearts, as the Lord Jesus does, we should find there never was a good man but that the whole of Christendom, perhaps all mankind, was, sooner or later, better for him; and that there never was a bad man but that all Christendom was the worse for him; so fully and really true is it that we are members one of another."

It is manifest that the divine government in this world does not contemplate the individual as the only unit. The family, the circle of kindred, the tribe or the community, the nation and the race, are each units with which God deals as really as with each of the individuals composing them, so that there are certain liabilities under which each member comes in consequence of his relations to others. No member of the human family can escape race liabilities.

The beneficence of this system would be manifest in a world of sinless beings, where every one would thus contrib-

ute to, and share in, the blessedness of every other one, and we might say that God could not have made us social beings, having natural affections, without such a result. But this constitution of the race so well adapted to a sinless world, brings pain and sorrow to the innocent as well as the guilty in a sinful world, and if we say (what we cannot certainly know) that God could have constituted the race so that we should have shared in each other's blessedness without the liability of suffering for each other's sins, then the manifest fact that he has not so constituted it is presumptive proof that he judged the present constitution to be better.

It is not safe to content ourselves with a superficial view of this feature of the divine administration. That we may be sure that we rightly apprehend it, let us study it in a particular case. The most simple one is found in the first recorded sin after the original transgression—*Cain's murder of his brother Abel*. All the results of that sin came in the order of sequence established by the Creator. What were they? and on whom did they fall?

1. Abel, the innocent victim, suffered physical pain, and loss of life, together with the grief which the hatred of his brother and his great sin caused him. This last element—grief on account of his brother's sin—must have been very grievous to the pure and loving heart of Abel.

2. The parents of the brothers suffered in the loss of Abel, their son, in the alienation and banishment of Cain, in their anguish of heart over the sufferings of the innocent Abel, and still more over the unnatural sin of Cain.

3. The posterity of Cain suffered in the inheritance of disgrace which the sin of Cain, their ancestor, brought upon them, in the murderous disposition, which, by the laws of heredity, they received from him, and in their alienation from the rest of the human family, as well as in the virtuous grief they must have felt over their father's sin.

4. The subsequently born sons and daughters of

Adam and Eve suffered in consequence of the corruption and wickedness entailed on his posterity by Cain.

5. Whether the guilty man felt pain and grief for his crime or not, in view of its sinfulness, and in view of the pain and suffering he had caused others, there were consequences to him wholly unlike those just mentioned as coming upon others—consequences sure to come upon the transgressor, and upon him only. These were self-condemnation, remorse, sense of divine displeasure, fear of deserved punishment, injury to his moral nature in the blunting of his moral sensibilities and the strengthening of evil disposition, and finally whatever retribution came upon him as penalty for his crime, of which his vagabondism was a part and a type. Three things are here to be specially noted: (1) That no member of the family of Adam and Eve is exempt from the evil consequences of the sin of Cain, and, if Charles Kingsley's idea is correct, all the human family are still experiencing the consequences of the first murder. (2) That a set of consequences came to the guilty man in which no other had any part. (3) That the suffering Cain's crime caused the innocent made possible certain good results: (a) Abel, being dead, yet speaketh as he could not have spoken but for his martyrdom. Cain's fratricidal act lifted Abel's *faith* into view of all the generations, and gave it a wider scope of influence than it could otherwise have had. (b) The wanton murder of a righteous brother because of his righteousness made sin appear exceedingly sinful, and so warned all men against the indulgence of envy and malice. (c) The manifest consequences of his sin, not only to himself but to others, were fitted to restrain men from sin. (d) The grief of Adam and Eve over the crime of their first-born would make them more careful in the training of their subsequent offspring, so that Seth may have been a better man than Cain, in consequence of his parents' grief over the sin of Cain. (e) Cain ought to have been moved to repentance at

witnessing the pain and grief his sin brought upon his parents, and perhaps in the final end he was. (✓) The pain and grief which the crime caused the innocent would array them on the side of justice in approving the sentence pronounced upon the guilty man, while their sorrow of heart would bring them into such sympathy with the sorrowing that they would be ready to forgive the offender if he should ever manifest genuine sorrow for his sin.

Thus far we have considered the effects of Cain's sin upon Adam and his descendants. Has it a still wider range? If the wickedness of the antediluvian world grieved God at his heart, the sin of Cain must so have grieved him. The Almighty Father's heart must have been grieved over the suffering of Abel, and of Adam and Eve, and his holy nature must have been pained at the sin of Cain. God's holiness does not make him impassible; no more does his infinity. Rather, the greater and more holy he is, the more will he be grieved by the sin and suffering of his creatures.

These facts being manifest under the divine government, we are not to search for arguments to justify the ways of God, but, assuming the essential righteousness of the divine administration, the wise thing for us to do is to inquire, what purpose of God this feature of his administration is designed to subserve.

In prosecuting this inquiry, let us, thinking of God anthropomorphically, conceive of him as pondering the question, whether or not to create man. All the possibilities are before the divine mind. Bishop Butler remarks, that "we make very free with the divine goodness in assuming what God will or will not do because he is good." Do we not make as free with the divine power in assuming what God can or cannot do because he is almighty? Do we not make too free with the divine power, if we assume that God could have created a race of moral beings incapable of sinning, or that he could have kept them from sin without doing vio-

lence to their freedom? Speaking anthropomorphically, we might say (1) that God might have determined to keep the universe free from sin by refraining from creating moral beings. Doubtless God was sufficient unto himself for his own eternal blessedness. Or God could have created beings sentient, and capable of endless progress in knowledge, but destitute of a moral faculty, and so incapable of sin. No doubt the infinite Creator takes pleasure in the orderly movement of suns and planets, and in the grandeur of mountains and plain and ocean, and even in the beauty of the flower that seems born to blush unseen, but he did not stay his creating hand at the inanimate creation. Though he knew that a sentient being must be capable of suffering, he has filled the world with innumerable forms of sentient life. If God finds pleasure in crawling worms and singing birds and roaming wild beasts and toiling oxen, though they are capable of suffering pain, will he not find a higher delight in the sons of men, who are capable of knowing and obeying and loving him; and will the possibility that beings endowed with reason and conscience and free will may fall into sin through wrong choice, deter him from their creation? (2) He may place the race under a system of strict law, making instant extinction of being the penalty of sin, thus allowing sin, even if it enter into the universe, no chance to extend or propagate itself. If he be simply a just Being, having supreme delight in moral rectitude, he may create man under such conditions. Or (3) foreseeing that, if man be created with free moral agency, he may transgress and fall, God may, in the very constitution of the race, provide for the possibility of recovery, so that, if sin enter the world, man shall not be beyond the reach of rescue. To say that God *could* not do this is to assume that we know the limits of the divine omnipotence and wisdom; to say that he *would* not do this seems to deny to God the attribute of mercy. No ship-

owner commits his ship with its precious cargo of human life to the winds and waves without every possible provision for saving the lives of passengers and crew in case of wreck. We cannot believe that a wise Creator would fail to make similar provision for the human race. Let us see whether we do not find such provision in that feature of the divine government which we have been considering.

When a company of men cross the Atlantic in one of the great ocean steamers, each man knows that he puts his life in the keeping of those who sail with him. It is possible for any of the passengers or crew, through ignorance or carelessness or malice, to put the lives of all on board in peril. And yet no wise man prefers crossing the Atlantic in an open boat alone. Not only will the great ship buffet the billows more successfully than the little yacht, but if one fall overboard there are many to pick him up, and even if, through carelessness or malice, he set the ship on fire, there are many ready in a moment to quench the fire and save him and themselves from the consequences of his careless or wicked act. The advantage in this case far exceeds the disadvantage.

God has evidently constituted the human race on this principle. He has set the solitary in families, and grouped families into communities and tribes, and organized communities into nations, and the nations of the earth are all of one blood and constitute one race. No member of the race is robbed of his individuality or released from personal responsibility, but each is to some extent his brother's keeper, and shares the lot of the race, of which he is a part. As each log in a raft floats or sinks or moves with the current or is stranded on a shoal, with the raft, so we are, to a certain extent, subject to the force inherent in the race; but, not being inert logs, but living persons, we have power to resist that force, or change or modify its direction, within certain limits, though we cannot place ourselves wholly be-

yond its power. Now though this constitution of the race would have served a beneficent purpose had sin not come into the world, yet since sin did not take God by surprise, we may be sure that it is suited also to a sinful race, and it may appear that the whole system of moral government was planned with special reference to the possibility of sin. An administration under which all the legitimate consequences of sin fall upon the transgressor alone would be strictly just, but if some of them fall upon the innocent, either the administration is faulty to this extent, or some worthy end, not inconsistent with justice, but additional thereto, must be had in view.

We have seen that often the blow that justice strikes, wounds the innocent as well as the guilty, in order that thereby the guilty may be led to repentance, and we conclude that a perfect moral government must provide for something more than equal and exact justice to all its subjects—that a righteous government is one that makes for righteousness in all its subjects, upholding those that are righteous, and making possible the restoration to righteousness of those that fall. The Supreme Ruler is not trammelled by any abstract principles. His own eternal righteousness is a law unto him. This insures that he will wrong no one. If it be found that under his administration the innocent suffer in consequence of others' sins, and thereby transgressors are brought to repentance, and receive pardon, and are restored to righteousness, no *a priori* judgment of ours is competent to pronounce sentence of condemnation on such a system of government. The only question deserving consideration is, whether in such a case the innocent sufferer is wronged.

1. He is not wronged by being denied the pleasure of seeing the guilty suffer. Such enjoyment would be in itself sinful, and no one is wronged in being denied a wicked gratification.

2. No one is wronged by having offered him opportunities to obtain good the neglect or rejection of which will result in loss or damage to himself. It is not the prerogative of the finite creature, but of the infinite Creator, to arrange the conditions best suited to the well-being of the creature. The Creator has not made man with a hermit nature, to find his highest well-being and most perfect development in seeking his own gratification, but with a social nature whereby his development and happiness are dependent in large measure on his treatment of others. The opportunity to share in the joys of others involves the liability also to share in their sufferings.

3. Moral character is the thing of supreme importance in God's sight. To place within my reach the means whereby my character may be improved and perfected is supreme kindness, and cannot be unjust. What means of moral development and culture God may have for sinless beings we may not know, but in this world it certainly seems that character cannot be perfectly developed without suffering. Sin being in the world, the suffering caused by it is as necessary for the discipline of the righteous as for the restraint or punishment of the wicked. The attempt to escape in cells and cloisters from contact with the evil in the world is an attempt to dispense with the means appointed by God for the development and perfecting of character. If the block of marble felt the sculptor's chisel as keenly as the patient feels the surgeon's knife, it would not shrink from it if only it knew that it was being transformed into a thing of beauty. An angel would gladly share with Christ in his sufferings for the sins of men, if thereby he could be made more like Christ.

4. If it be asked, What becomes of law and justice, if, in consequence of the sufferings of the innocent, the guilty be pardoned? it may be asked in reply, whether man was made for the law, or the law for man? What is

law but the method by which God accomplishes his righteous purposes? If his purpose be to provide for free moral agents all possible helps towards the maintenance and cultivation or restoration of righteous character, all means that promote this end must be consistent with righteousness.

The plausibility of the objection to the doctrine of vicarious atonement depends mainly on ignoring the fact that the atonement avails only for those who repent of sin. Let it be distinctly understood that no suffering of another can save from deserved penalty any who remain impenitent, and this objection falls to the ground: and there is left the alternative, either to treat as a transgressor and a rebel one who, though once guilty of transgression and rebellion, is now a loyal and obedient subject, or to stop the further infliction of penalty by pardon. The instinct of mercy pleads for the latter. Justice is no more an attribute of the divine nature than mercy, and infinite wisdom is competent to guide the exercise of both in mutual harmony. That the suffering of the innocent from the sins of others is *adapted* to restrain the wrong-doer, and to bring him to repentance, all can see. As a transgressor can be brought to repentance only by means of motives addressed to his moral nature, we can conceive of no motives so powerful as those drawn from the fact that others are made to suffer in consequence of his sin. A vicious father may have lost every other virtue except love for his child, but while this love survives, the fact, perceived by him, that his child is enduring untold anguish on account of his own evil conduct may bring him to repentance. The faith that the Son of God suffered for his sins was the constraining force in Paul's life.

Granted that we have not instruments of sufficient power to enable us to map out the orbits in which divine justice and divine mercy move, so as to prove that they will never collide; no telescope or microscope is needed to en-

able us to see that wrong-doers are wooed to repentance through a realization of the grief and suffering their wrongdoing has caused others who love them.

We find ourselves, then, under a system of government of which social and race liability constitutes an essential element, and we see enough of the working of this system to warrant the faith that, in the final outcome, no injustice or wrong will be done to any innocent sufferer, while on the other hand many transgressors will thereby be brought to repentance and restored to righteousness, and the righteous ends of government be secured. The suffering which falls upon the heads of the righteous is not vindictive, but vicarious; the blow prompted by justice is directed by mercy, and wounds for the purpose of healing.

We are now prepared to inquire, what place Christ holds in such a scheme of moral government. The church has its doctrine of the Trinity. It believes that God is revealed in the Scriptures as existing in the three persons of the Father, and the Son, or *Logos*, and the Holy Spirit, though it does not claim to be able to give an exact definition of the word *person* as thus used. For the present discussion it is sufficient that the Scriptures affirm the essential deity of the *Logos* (John i. 1). The *Logos* was with God, and the *Logos* was God.

Let us now go to the Scriptures, and learn from them what place in this system of government they assign to Christ.

In Gen. i. 26 we read: "God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness;" and "God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him." In John i. 1-3 we read: "In the beginning was the *Logos*, and the *Logos* was with God, and the *Logos* was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him." In Col. i. 16 we read: "By him [Christ] were all things created, that are in the heaven, and that are in the

earth," etc. Interpreting the Genesis of Moses by the Gospel of John and the epistles of Paul, we understand that it was the Logos, or the Christ, that in the beginning created man in his own image. A statuette is a miniature image or copy of a statue. So man was a finite copy of the divine Logos. Having seen a statuette, and being told that it is a miniature copy of a statue, we have some definite ideas of the statue which we have not seen. We are sure that it has the same features as the statuette, though probably far more perfect and on a larger scale. So we infer that the Logos, in whose image man was created, has certain attributes of which man's are a finite copy. We may say that the divine Logos has such a nature as he gave to man in finite measure. Thus the relation between the Logos and man is a relation of kinship. Paul did not hesitate to say to the Athenians, who believed that the gods had human offspring, "We are the offspring of God, who made the world, and all things therein." The writer of the Epistle to the Hebrews (chap. ii. 11) says: "Both he that sanctifieth and they who are sanctified, are all of one: for which cause he is not ashamed to call them brethren, saying, I will declare thy name unto my brethren;" and again, "Behold, I and the children which God hath given me." The writer makes these quotations from the Old Testament to show, that, before his birth in Bethlehem, the Christ, or Logos, called men his brethren, because, as the writer has just said, he and they were all of one nature. Then he goes on to say, that, "since the children are sharers in flesh and blood, he also himself in like manner partook of the same; that through death he might bring to naught him that had the power of death," and this he sets forth still more fully and clearly by saying, "Verily, not of the angels doth he take hold, but he taketh hold of the seed of Abraham. Wherefore it behooved him in all things to be made like unto his brethren." This harmonizes with Ps. xl. 6, if we take the Septuagint

rendering, which the writer to the Hebrews accepts. "Sacrifice and offering thou wouldst not, but a body hast thou prepared me." "Lo, I come to do thy will, O God." It harmonizes too with what Paul says (Phil. ii. 6): "Being in the form of God, he counted it not a prize to be on an equality with God, but emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men."

These Scriptures plainly teach that the Logos, who was God, and who made the world and all things therein, and who created man in his own image, and being in the world was not received by them who were his own, in the fulness of time became flesh by being born in Bethlehem. He is called the man Christ Jesus. He was really and truly man, not because at his incarnation he united our human nature with his divine nature, but because we were made in his likeness. He was not made in our image, but we were made in his. He did not assume man's nature when he was born in Bethlehem, because man was made with his nature when he was created in Eden. He did not first become of one nature with us when he was made of a woman, because he made us of one nature with him at our original creation. Christ is then at the head of the human race, and he and we are all of one. He has not come into the race since its fall by sin, but he has been in the race, and of the race, even its head, from the beginning, and is still in it, and of it, to lift it up, and to give it life from himself. Adam, *created* in the image of God, fell through the abuse of the freedom with which God had endowed him, and all his posterity feel the consequences of his fall. But Christ, the *uncreated* head of the race, has not fallen, nor lost his relationship to the fallen race. Each of us sustains a vital relation to him, whereby our recovery from the fall is made possible. The vicarious element, which, as we have seen, characterizes the divine government, has its seat in Christ and comes to view

constantly, because he is head over all things. The solidarity of the race is a solidarity in him, its head.

Here, then, we find the provision made, when man was created and endowed with freedom of will, for his recovery in case of fall by sin. The divine Logos, making man in his own image, constituted the race one in himself, its head, and thus made himself the great sin-bearer for the race. He began to bear sin when sin began in Eden. The disobedience of the first-created pair grieved him. He grieved over their fall from purity and over the suffering their sin brought upon them. Cain's unnatural crime grieved him. The multiplying wickedness of men as they increased on the earth grieved him at his heart, so that it is said, anthropomorphically, that he repented that he had made man; and the sins of the whole human family have been a continual grief to him. These sinners are of his own race—his brethren. Their sins are as if they were his own. The grief and pain felt by the best of fathers over a wicked and profligate son, or by the best of brothers over a fallen brother, fall far below in intensity what Christ the Holy One feels over every sinner. Each member of the human family is as near to his heart as any son or brother can be to father or brother. His own perfect purity and love make him susceptible to grief over the sins of those he loves, such as no one less pure or loving is capable of. He may be said even to feel the shame of their sins because they are his own brethren.

And, as one of the human race, even its head, he was subject to all the liabilities of the race. All the consequences of sin, which could fall upon one who was himself without personal sin, actually came upon him. As these consequences come upon the body as well as the soul, it was necessary that, as the children were sharers in flesh and blood, he also himself should take part in the same; and so, in the fulness of time, he "emptied himself," and took on him the form of a servant, being found in fashion as a

man. In his life in the flesh he bore the utmost that sin could cause one who knew no sin. Himself holy, harmless, and undefiled, the embodiment of God's love to men, he became at once the special object of Satanic and human malignity. He was tempted by the devil in the wilderness. His bitterest enemies were the very ones who should have been the first to recognize his mission of love and his divine character. They were the students and expounders of the divine oracles, and the religious teachers and guides of the people. Instead of welcoming him and commending him to the people, they pursued him with unrelenting hatred till they procured his condemnation to the cross, and then made sport of his dying agonies. While human sinfulness manifested itself on the one hand in the malignity of his enemies, on the other it exhibited itself in the weakness, fickleness, and unfaithfulness of his friends. One of the chosen twelve betrayed him, another who seemed boldest and bravest, denied him, and finally, in his extremity, all forsook him. The utmost that Satan could do he did, and the utmost consequences of sin came upon him, and he shrank from nothing. He had subjected himself to all the liabilities of the race of which he was the head, and they all came upon him. He was tempted by Satan at all points, and he was despised and rejected of men, and men esteemed him stricken and smitten of God. But he was wounded for our transgressions; he was bruised for our iniquities; the chastisement of our peace was upon him, that by his stripes we might be healed.

Is the method pursued in this discussion scientific? Instead of starting with *a priori* judgments as to the method of righteous government, the endeavor has been to take the obvious facts of universal experience, and interpret them in the light which the Scriptures shed on them; and we seem to have found, as the explanation of that large class of facts which come under the head of race liability, a merciful purpose of the Creator to provide for the recovery of the race

in case of a lapse through sin. But if the lapse be universal, so that all are sinners, however much the consequences of sin may be distributed and so equalized, there cannot be the possibility of recovery for all the race. Either the whole race must sink, like a ship, by reason of its too great specific gravity, or at best some must perish that others may be saved, as a part of a cargo is cast into the sea that a remnant may be saved. Adequate provision requires that there shall be one who, while he is one of the race, and so subject to race liabilities, shall not be personally a sharer in the sin of the race. Where shall such a one be found? And if he be found, to ingraft him upon the race in order to make him a part of it, seems like an afterthought, or a clumsy expedient to provide for an unlooked-for emergency. But that the infinite head of a finite and fallible race should be the surety for the whole race, and share in full measure the liabilities of the race, seems natural. That he who created man a finite image of himself should identify himself with the race, and provide thus for the rescue of the fallen, without interference with personal freedom or individual responsibility, accords with our conception of a wise and merciful Creator.

The Scriptures lay great emphasis on the death of Christ as the procuring cause of pardon for sinners. This emphasis does not exclude from his redeeming work, his pre-incarnate suffering, any more than it excludes what he suffered at the hands of the Jews and from Satan before he was nailed to the cross. His redeeming work could not have been done without his death. He must die, because sin had brought the race of which he was the head under the power of death. Death is the wages of sin, and he was, before the foundation of the world, surety for the race. He must die, too, because Satanic malice and human sinfulness found in him, the Holy One of God, the object of its supreme hatred, and in his crucifixion manifested their exceed-

ing sinfulness. Sin reached its culmination of daring wickedness when it put to death the Prince of life, and divine love reached its complete manifestation when the Prince of life suffered himself to be taken and by wicked hands crucified and slain. Too much emphasis cannot be put upon the death of Christ, for without it his work would have been incomplete, like a bridge that reached only part way across a chasm. He, the infinite head of a finite race, and the sinless head of a fallen race, must experience, in his own person, the utmost that sin could do, and must share to the full all the grief and pain that a being of infinite holiness and love could feel in consequence of the wickedness of those whom he loved as brethren. But all this exhibition of human sinfulness, and of patient endurance on the part of Christ, was only the culmination and visible exhibition of what had been going on since the first transgression. All through the ages preceding the incarnation, the sinful race had been trampling on his righteous law and abusing his goodness, while he had as constantly been bearing their iniquities and striving to win them to repentance. For a little time now the veil is drawn aside, and, in his life among men and his death on the cross, men and angels are permitted to see the exhibition of human wickedness and divine long-suffering in closest contact and sharpest contrast.

The human race was constituted a unity, in which the innocent suffer with the guilty, in order that the divine Logos, himself the head of the race, might bear the sins of men, and win them, by this manifestation of his love, from sin to holiness. By his long-suffering grief over the sins of his own brethren, by his subjection to the malice of sinful beings, by his patient endurance of this malice, by his resistance of the temptations of Satan and his victory over him, and at last by receiving in himself the utmost that sin could do when it procured his death on the cross, he redeemed the race he had created in his own image. Not

alone on Calvary, but before his incarnation and birth in Bethlehem, in the temptation in the wilderness, in patient endurance of the contradiction of sinners, in every deed of kindness and patient submission to wrong, he was bearing our sins and working out our redemption. The doctrine of an angry God demanding a victim on whom to pour out his wrath, and finding it in his own son, substituted for the guilty, and laying on him the stripes due to sinners, finds no warrant in Scripture. Sin is exceeding sinful, and Christ's mission is to destroy it, and deliver men from its power. For this purpose he makes common cause with men. He shares their nature, not by uniting it with his own, but by creating them with his own, and thus making them his kinsmen; and in the fulness of time, limiting himself to human conditions in a human body, he endures, in his own person, the malice of Satan and of sinful men, and all that it is possible for them to inflict on him. He appeals to the best there is in man,—not to his fears alone, but to his love. It is from sin that he seeks to deliver men, and this he can do only by bringing them to love him.

The sufferings of Christ, then, were vicarious, not on Calvary alone, but before his incarnation and during his life on earth; and the agony in Gethsemane and on Calvary was but the consummation and culmination of the suffering involved in the relation which he constituted between himself and the human race when he made man in his own image. Thus he who knew no sin was made sin for us, that we might be made the righteousness of God in him.