

ever plain the words are, they do not tell us the full truth unless we are of the right spirit to receive it. Very often people make up their minds first what they want to believe, and then pick out words from the Bible that seem to back them up. So they have often quarrelled about the truth, and thrown texts at each other. That is not at all the way to learn the truth. Jesus said that it was the spirit in ourselves that we needed, and then the spirit in His words would speak to us.

That is what many of us have found, and what we want you boys and girls to find. If you keep asking God to make you want what He wants, and to see things more as He sees them, you will find that some of Jesus' words will speak to you so that you are quite sure of them in your heart, and as you go on trying to trust Him and do as He says,

other sayings, that had not meant much to you before, will be just alive with meaning. In a way, you believe them now, because He said them. I dare say you would believe me if I told you that the three angles of a triangle were equal to two of the angles of a square, just because you know that I have learnt more than you. I expect that some of you have seen that to be true for yourselves already, while the rest of you just listen politely. It is like that with the truth that Jesus wants to teach us. Many people listen politely to Him, but they do not really receive the truth, because they have not yet enough of His spirit to understand it. When they have, it comes home to them. But so long as we are selfish, we cannot receive it.

'Not of the letter, but of the spirit: for the letter killeth, but the spirit giveth life.'

In Praise of Faith.

A STUDY OF HEBREWS XI. 1, 6, XII. 1, 2.

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II.

(1) THE reason for Enoch's translation, according to the writer of the Epistle, was that he had been 'well-pleasing unto God' ('*he had satisfied God,*' Moffatt); and what satisfied God in him was his faith. The writer justifies the inference by the general proposition that 'without faith it is impossible to be well-pleasing unto him' ('*to satisfy him,*' Moffatt). What gives faith its *value* is that it is just what God wants from man; and God's requirement is not unreasonable or arbitrary because of the nature of faith itself: 'he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that seek after him' ('*the man who draws near to God must believe that he exists, and that he does reward those who seek him,*' Moffatt). This account of the content of faith in v.⁶ corresponds with the description of the function of faith in the first verse.

'The unseen must be treated as sufficiently demonstrated, and the hoped-for reward must be considered substantial' (*The Expositor's Greek Testament*, iv. p. 354). The relation between God and man is mutual, on man's side there must be

an approach to God in worship (*τὸν προσερχόμενον*, cf. 7²⁶), and a strenuous endeavour (*τοῖς ἐκζητοῦσιν*) in service. But both worship and service of God imply faith, not only belief in God's existence, although that there must be, but belief that God responds to man's approach as a rewarder (*μισθαποδόρης*). Faith treats the invisible God as real, and the future good as certain.

(2) At first sight we seem here to be moving in the region of legalism, and not of the gospel. But we must, in the *first place*, remember that in this chapter the writer is dealing with the heroes of faith under the old covenant, and that it would be an anachronism for him in this context to present to us the distinctive faith under the new covenant. *Secondly*, in the instances of faith which he gives it is generally trust in the fulfilment of God's promises which is commanded. It is not righteousness of works, but 'the righteousness which is according to faith' (v.⁷), that is characteristic of these heroes of faith. When, *thirdly*, we go beyond the bounds of this chapter even the appearance of legalism vanishes. In 7²⁶, where

the same word is used for the approach to God in worship (τοὺς προσερχομένους), Christ is the way. 'Wherefore also he is able to save to the uttermost them that draw near unto God through him, seeing he ever liveth to make intercession for them.' And in 12⁷ God is represented not as lawgiver, judge, or ruler, but as Father who in the chastening even deals with men as sons, and makes that chastening even a proof of His fatherly care. In view of these considerations, we are warranted in our study of the value of faith, under the guidance of this estimate of it, to go in our thought beyond what the words of the writer taken literally suggest, as he himself is here appropriately to the context giving us only a partial representation, the inadequacy of which is elsewhere corrected.

(3) It is evident that in the relation between God and man it rests with God to determine the attitude which He assumes to man, and the attitude He requires of man. When we speak of man as drawing near, or as seeking God, and of God only as the rewarder, we are in danger of at least appearing to assign the initiative to man. I have heard a responsible theologian say that in all other religions man has been seeking God without finding Him; and that in Christianity alone has God sought man as to be found of him. But I prefer to hold with my revered teacher, Dr. Fairbairn, that religion implies revelation, and that man seeks God, because he is being sought by God, that he comes to God as God draws him. While the desire and the effort of man after God are from God, yet what man is conscious of is his own seeking and striving, and not God's drawing. How variously men have striven and sought after God! As in the previous section we turned to animism for an illustration of the universal and permanent function of faith, so may we now turn to Hinduism for an illustration of the ways in which men have tried to worship and serve the divine. Hindu piety recognizes three kinds of approach, the *jnana marga*, the *karma marga*, and the *bhakti marga*. By knowledge, sacrifice, and devotion has the Hindu saint sought the divine. He turned to the last of the three ways because he could not find his soul's satisfaction by either of the other two. And the Hindu *bhakti* has a resemblance, though remote, to Christian faith.

(4) In the Hebrew nation the popular religion sought to please or to appease Yahveh by the

multitude and value of its sacrifices. 'Wherewith shall I come before the Lord, and bow myself before the high God? Shall I come before him with burnt-offerings, with calves of a year old? Will the Lord be pleased with thousands of rams, as with ten thousands of rivers of oil? Shall I give my firstborn for my transgression, the fruit of my body for the sin of my soul?' The prophet's answer to this question is: 'He hath shewed thee, O man, what is good; and what doth the Lord require of thee, but to do justly, and to love mercy, and to walk humbly with thy God?' (Mic 6⁶⁻⁸). And there can be no doubt that the *doing justly* and the *loving mercy*, in the prophet's view, would follow on the *walking humbly with God*; and that the walking humbly with God would involve contrition and confidence of heart, penitence from sin, and faith in God. Hosea declares God's will for man in the words, 'I desire mercy, and not sacrifice; and the knowledge of God more than burnt-offerings' (6⁶). The Hebrew word חֶסֶד, *chesedh*, means 'dutiful love,' whether to God or man; while the parallelism requires the first reference, the context would suggest the second; but the two senses are not mutually exclusive, but organically related. He who is devoted to God will be kind to man. Jesus on two distinct occasions quotes the first clause against His critics (Mt 9¹³ and 12⁷).

(5) While Pharisaic Judaism sought justification by the deeds of the law, Paul preached the gospel of justification by faith, for he had himself discovered to his own despair the impossibility of the former, and to his own salvation the reality of the latter. And he had the warrant of Jesus' teaching as well as his own experience. Jesus did call men to penitence and faith; and the first was possible only when the second was actual. Faith in God's grace, as in the sinful woman, moved to repentance of sin. As we shall see in the next section, Jesus Himself is the supreme instance of the life of faith which is well-pleasing unto God.

(6) For this pre-eminence of faith in religion there are two reasons, one subjective as regards man, and one objective as regards God. (i.) The way of *Knowledge* can be attempted only by the few. 'Canst thou by searching find out God? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection?' (Job 11⁷). This is a challenge which the majority of mankind cannot take up. And those who attempt the quest end either in despair of it,

or in a 'vaulting ambition that o'erleaps itself.' What could be more cheerless than the Hindu sage's attempt to lose his own consciousness in Brahma? What more pathetic, if not ridiculous, than the pretension of the Hegelian philosophy that the Absolute Idea has reached its highest stage of development in philosophy? It is not then by the *jnana marga* that mankind can hope to reach the relation to God for which it is fit, and which it needs.

Neither can the *karma marga* assure man of God's favour. What offering can be costly enough, what number of gifts can be sufficient, if God be thought of as needing to be thus propitiated? Man cannot command the resources to make sure of God's favour by satisfying Him with gifts. Again, can any man be good enough to claim as a right God's approval and reward? The more earnest a man is about the moral task, the more hopeless will any such attempt appear to him. If it be objected that a man may bring even his small offering with confidence, because he believes that God of His grace will accept it, or he may make his feeble endeavours after goodness, because he believes that God, knowing man's weakness, will of His grace not expect too much from him, already the ground of offerings and works has been abandoned, and it is faith that is the reason for any assurance of God's favour which may thus be gained. Belief, and trust in God, and consequent believing and trustful surrender to God is possible, if difficult to the wise and prudent, if they will humble themselves as children; and it is the only way open to 'the babes,' the poor, the weak, the unworthy. On man's side, then, faith is the sole possibility for man's universal approach and appeal to God.

(ii.) But it is also the only appropriate response of man to God as He has revealed Himself. Even as Creator, God claims man's dependence on Himself, and in prayer and sacrifice, where offered in a recognition of such dependence, there is implicit faith that God can and will protect and provide. Still more, if we think of God as Jesus did, and has taught us to do, must faith appear the one activity of man which can be well-pleasing to God. The Father desires above all the trust of His children, their dependence on Him, confidence in Him, and submission to Him. How inadequate the relation of knowledge in comparison with the relation of faith, which exercises the whole per-

sonality. How presumptuous the relation of knowledge as though man could so know God as to know Him fully as He is! How hopeless the enterprise of worship or works which does not find its motive in the conviction that God is gracious and wants to save and bless! How sufficient, appropriate, and satisfying on the contrary is the relation of faith between the perfect God and men as His dependent creatures and beloved children through His goodness and His grace. Faith gives God, and not man, the initiative in the relation. It is receptivity for and responsiveness to God's activity to do good and to show mercy. It recognizes man's insufficiency and God's sufficiency. It magnifies the difference between God and man, and so emphasizes the condescension of God to man. It both humbles and exalts man, and the humility is not craven, and the exaltation is not proud. It claims nothing for man except as God gives it; and it yields to God as of God all that is good in man. Man for it is great only as God makes him great by the generosity of His grace.

(7) Having shown reason why faith is the only appropriate attitude of man to God, as alone corresponding to God's attitude to man, we may glance at the writer's description of the content of faith. There is belief in God's existence, and in God's rewarding those who seek Him. (i.) Although we sometimes use the word belief to indicate the intellectual activity in faith, yet, as the whole context shows, no such restricted meaning can be here assigned, for the heroes of faith here mentioned gave practical effect to this belief. They trusted in God's promises, and fulfilled God's commands. To take only one instance. 'By faith Abraham, when he was called, obeyed to go out unto a place which he was to receive for an inheritance; and he went out, not knowing whither he went' (v.⁸). There is here confidence in and committal unto God, as well as conviction about God. Emotion and action were correspondent with and consequent on the conception about God. These believers felt and did as they believed; and faith is complete only as it inspires trust and constrains obedience. (ii.) But even belief as one aspect of faith is not an intellectual activity alone. Belief is both less and more than knowledge. (a) Belief is a knowledge which cannot be fully verified. When I have sensible evidence of an object, or logical demonstration of a thesis, I know it, and do not simply believe it, even if the

knowledge does involve a belief in the trustworthiness of my senses and my understanding. Of God's existence and of His relation to men either in justice or in grace, I have neither sensible evidence nor logical demonstration. In the experience and character which result from belief, there may be reached such a verification of it as raises the object of it from probability to certainty, and we may claim that for moral insight and spiritual discernment belief in has become knowledge of God. But this is a personal conquest, and not a general possession. (b) Belief is also more than knowledge. 'We cannot refer belief,' says Croom Robertson, 'to any one phase of mind. It is an essentially complex mental state, describable in every one of the three phases—a mode of representative intellection, tinged with feeling, having relation to the native tendency, to act' (*Elements of General Philosophy*, p. 90). In belief in God the sentiment of dependence and reverence, the sense of worth which accompanies the belief, moves to the choice of the will, its decision that the belief is true, that it does correspond to reality. To believe in God, that there is a wise mind, a loving heart, and a holy will in all, through all, over all, as ultimate cause, essential reality, and final purpose in the Universe, is not the result of sensible evidence or logical demonstration; it is a decision of the whole personality as to the supreme value of truth, love, holiness. Accordingly, even the belief in God's existence is not a mere intellectual process; it exhibits because it results from the personal qualities in man, through which, as like God's, he can have personal fellowship with God, and accordingly in itself it

has moral and religious value. It is in these respects more than knowledge.

(8) While the belief in God's existence even has this moral and religious value, still more has the belief in God as the rewarder of them that seek after Him. It need not be taken at all in a legalistic, Pharisaic interpretation. All the instances of faith which follow even exclude such an interpretation. It is no immediate temporal good that is gained by faith, but one that the selfish and the worldly would not desire or expect. The writer sees even in the reward believed in something more heavenly and less earthly than a strictly historical view would allow (vv. 10, 13-16), and insists that none did actually obtain the reward. For all God's promise remained unfulfilled, 'These all, having had witness borne to them through their faith, received not the promise; God having provided some better thing concerning us, that apart from us they should not be made perfect' (v. 40). He thus himself points us to the ultimate object of faith, of which all proximate objects, which never did or could give final satisfaction, were but the promise. It is the revelation of God and the redemption of man that is the substance of all that which the heroes of faith under the old covenant looked, suffered, and sought for was but the shadow. Faith attains its moral and spiritual maturity only in relation to the object in which culminates God's relation to and dealing with man: and the value of the faith corresponds with the value of its object, the finality of the truth, the sufficiency of the grace, and the certainty of the good, which is received by man in Jesus Christ.

Contributions and Comments.

Where did Paul speak at Athens?

WHEN two rival and violently divergent views hold the field on a subject so central in the public eye as St. Paul's speech at Athens, it would seem to be a piece of gratuitous impertinence to suggest a third interpretation. I should neither care nor dare to do so, did not an ancient tradition, which has not, so far as I know, come to the notice of Protestant writers, give support to the theory here unfolded.

The question rages, of course, round the question, 'Where did Paul speak?' The normal view of English writers, expounded and defended with great clarity by the Rev. A. Findlay (*Annual of the British School at Athens, 1894-1895*), is that he spoke on the hilltop whither he was led (from the agora, the market-place) by those who wished to hear him in quiet. Curtius, however, followed with vigour by so great an authority as Sir William Ramsay (*St. Paul, the Traveller and Roman Citizen*, pp. 243-249), maintains that he made the speech

where he had already been disputing, *i.e.* in the agora itself, possibly going to the Stoa Basileios (the royal arcade), which stood at the north end of the market, to be heard by the members of the court of the Areopagus, though not in their judicial capacity, and by the philosophers, with the general public standing round. Sir William Ramsay suggests that the court had power to admit 'university lecturers' and, in this capacity, was giving Paul a tentative hearing.

The ground for discussion arises principally through the double meaning of the word Areopagus, which is used twice in the account given in Ac 17. Does 'Areopagus' mean the hill (as translated in the Authorized Version, v.²²), or the body of men who constituted the court? It is certain that the word was commonly used to signify either; but in which sense does Luke use it?

He tells us that Paul was led to the Areopagus (v.¹⁹) and that Paul stood in the midst of the Areopagus (v.²²). Mr. Findlay (as the ablest exponent of the hill theory) says that this means that the philosophers—being inquisitive and scenting a novel philosophy, and perhaps (we may add) with an anticipation of doing some heckling—took Paul by the hand and led him to the actual session-place of the Areopagus on the top of the hill itself. It was not a formal trial at all, but a break in the routine of discussing their thread-worn philosophic themes.

Curtius and Sir William Ramsay object that the hilltop, exposed and wind-swept, is a most unsuitable place for a speech, to which Mr. Findlay retorts that the wind does not always blow, and, in any case, the hill was used regularly by the court of the Areopagus for its sittings, and could not therefore be so unsuitable.

Reading the controversy in Athens, and walking over and round the rocky hill itself, I was reduced to despair. For the objections on both sides seemed so well founded that neither view seemed to be possible. Standing on the hilltop and trying to put oneself in the position of an Athenian of the first century, it appeared to me perfectly incredible that they would bring Paul to that spot. They had just called him a 'Smatterer' (the word used by Luke was an Athenian slang expression indicating a loafer who picked up odd bits). They led him in a spirit of inquisitive expectancy, critical and tinged with disdain. Yet this hilltop was simply saturated with the profoundest religious

and civic awe. Not only was it the seat of the court, but within twenty feet was the cleft of the Semnai (the goddesses of the under-world), round which a thousand associations of worship and reverence hung. And this same cleft was the burial-place of Œdipus himself, the great king whose very bones were said to make the side of the Acropolis before which they lay impregnable. To take Paul there would be (from the Athenian point of view) like some Oxford dons taking a more than usually clever and arresting street orator off his box under the Martyrs' Memorial and leading him into the Sheldonian Theatre to speak.

Yet it seems just as difficult to accept the other view that they stayed in the market-place, where the chaffering of commerce and the perpetual movement would be so continuous that—although an argument might be carried on quite easily—a set speech would seem impossible. And the strength of Luke's Greek is all in the direction of a more definite move to a quieter spot than the conjectured Stoa Basileios. Whither, then?

I was prowling round and over the hill and came down, by a set of ancient rock-hewn steps, to an artificially cut place on the north side of the hill. It is a sloping plateau, facing on to the site of the Greek agora, seventy-two paces from end to end and forty-seven in depth. The whole back of it is one artificially cut wall in the native rock some twelve to fourteen feet high. In the centre of this wall is cut a rough deep cross as tall as a man. A Greek boy, who was playing in this sheltered spot, saw me looking at the cross, and, pointing to it, he uttered the one word 'Paolos.'

The Greek Church has an immemorial tradition—which has apparently escaped the notice of our British writers on St. Paul—that he was led from the agora to this sheltered plateau, which is both in and on the Areopagus rock.¹ This is, of course, tradition. It is nothing more, but it is nothing less. Those who know most of research in the Eastern Mediterranean coasts know how extraordinarily tenacious the unwritten traditions of the Greek Church are, and how often they give the clue that leads to the discovery of lost sites.

¹ For this information I am indebted to Dr. (Miss) Kalopathakes, who combines the intimate local knowledge of a native Athenian with the trained, detached mind of a Harvard graduate, and who possesses all the archaeological instincts and learning of one who has followed the whole development of research—German, American, and British—in personal contact with the great excavators.

Tradition is here reinforced by topography, that element which the class-room expositor may so easily and perilously neglect. The plateau is the nearest point on the hill to the practically certain site of the Greek agora. Acoustically it is ideal for open-air speaking—having a formation similar to that of the Pnyx, Demosthenes' great open-air platform. Incidentally one may mention that the sun goes off the plateau very early, which is not so trivial as it may seem, in view of the fact that Paul was in Athens about August, and possibly in September, when the city literally broils. 'The shadow of a rock' would be found there.

Such a place might well be a kind of antechamber of the Areopagus court, being situated on the side of the Areopagus hill itself, and, indeed, lying directly between the Greek agora and the sacred height. The rock-hewn steps, mentioned already, lead up from this plateau to the high official session-place, which is about a hundred and thirty paces south-east of the plateau and from thirty to forty feet higher. It would, therefore, be a singularly suitable spot for an unofficial meeting of the Areopagites at which non-Areopagite philosophers were present, and where cultivated and uncultivated loungers formed the background—a background which quite clearly had a large place in Paul's consciousness. To place the meeting in this spot retains that air of free public discussion which belongs to the story and yet is lost on the hilltop; while it is without the difficulties which the agora theory presents. Further, it allows the word 'Areopagus' to have that double meaning, of the hill and the body of men, which properly belonged to it in the everyday speech of Athens. An interpretation which is thus supported by tradition and topography, and is consistent with the text, is submitted for examination by competent expositors and archæologists. But the examination, to be adequate, should be made on the spot.

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Devendranath Tagore.

I WISH to say something about the note in the January number on the *Autobiography of Devendranath Tagore*. From the chapter quoted it appears unquestionable that Tagore found God, or was found by Him; and as we read we are

ready to exclaim with St. Peter, 'Of a truth I perceive that God is no respecter of persons, but in every nation he that feareth him, and worketh righteousness, is acceptable to him.' But no sooner have we reached this conclusion than we are invited to turn the page, and to see in this man a bitter enemy of Christian missions, and are reminded of the solemn words of Christ Himself: 'No man cometh unto the Father, but by me.' And the question is asked, What can we make of it? May I try to answer?

(1) Of Tagore's hostility to missions, and his desire to check their progress, let two things be said. In the first place, this no doubt marks the incompleteness of the revelation he has received. He is still where Cornelius was before St. Peter's visit—*on the way to the Son through the Father*. And in the second place, the tone in which some missionary writers have been known to speak of Roman missions in India, and propound plans to frustrate their success, ought to remind us that the argument from Tagore's feeling about missions cannot bear much weight.

(2) 'No man cometh unto the Father, but by me.' Here the ground is more difficult, and I venture to express my view with some hesitation. If 'me' here denotes Jesus of Nazareth, the Divine historical Person who revealed the Father by His life, death, and resurrection, then it seems at first sight as if we were driven to the conclusion that Tagore cannot have 'come to the Father.'

But are we bound to restrict the denotation of 'me' in this way? Does it not denote not only the historical manifestation of the Divine Word, but also the Divine Word Himself, by whom all things were made, who 'is' before Abraham? Are we required to believe that since the Incarnation God no more utters His Word 'in divers manners'? Is it possible to deny the fact of His operation in any particular person on the ground that such person has not yet comprehended His historical manifestation? Surely it was by the Word that Cornelius was led, and Saul prepared for his vision, that Plato, in his highest moments, saw and spoke, and Marcus Aurelius hungered. And by that same Word, though not yet recognized in His manifestation as Jesus of Nazareth, may we not believe that Devendranath Tagore was enlightened, because He is 'the true Light, which lighteth every man'?

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The Elberfeld Horses.

WITH reference to the review of Maeterlinck's article on the Elberfeld horses, Mr. Rawson in *Life Understood* has dealt with the dog 'Rolf,' and the instances of the answers this dog gave by an alphabet composed of taps of his foot to even theological questions, put the Elberfeld horses in the shade. It is worth while repeating one portion of what Mr. Rawson says, as it is very amusing and confirms what the article in THE EXPOSITORY TIMES says:—

'Some of the stories told about this dog are very amusing. In Mr. Del Re's letter Rolf's aptitude for figures was mentioned. It is related of the dog by Dr. Mackenzie that Madame Moekel, having cause to suspect one of her children of getting help from someone in doing his sums, and not being able to get a satisfactory answer from the child himself, determined to watch the children while doing their lessons. The result was quite unexpected. The two youngest children were seated with the dog, and hardly had they heard their mother draw near than they pushed him violently

away, exclaiming, "Be off, Rolf, here's Mamma!" All three, said Madame Moekel, had the air of guilty persons taken in the act. The admission of the culprits confirmed the suspicions of the lady: the children made Rolf do their sums for them!'

Mr. Rawson in *Life Understood* clears up the scientific reason for all forms of occult phenomena, and shows to what this apparent intelligence of horses and dogs is due.

His book shows that Maeterlinck's suggestion that the intelligence of animals 'is not conscious intelligence, but only subconscious or subliminal,' is perfectly correct; and, what is of more importance, he shows how every man by true prayer can obtain the advantage of the knowledge possessed by the subconscious mind. He shows the two methods by which this knowledge can be obtained: one harmful to the worker, namely, by deadening the conscious mind, as is done by hypnotism, spiritualism, use of drugs, etc.; the other, conscious right thinking in the way that Jesus Christ taught and demonstrated.

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Entre Nous.

THE offer is made of a complete set (20 vols.) of *The Great Texts of the Bible* (or the equivalent in other books chosen from T. & T. Clark's Catalogue) for the best series of illustrations from the War, suitable for pulpit or platform. The illustrations should be sent in February.

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Quite above the ordinary day-book in pith and point is the Rev. W. J. Pearce's book *Old Gems Reset* (Bennett; 2s. 6d. net). Mr. Pearce quotes a text of Scripture, and a sentence of Thomas à Kempis agreeing with it, and then he gives his illuminating exposition. Here is an example.

The Inner Ear.

'The ears of them that hear shall hearken.'
Is. xxxii. 3.

'Mind these things, O my soul, and shut the door of thy senses, that thou mayst hear what the Lord thy God speaks within thee.'

Thomas à Kempis, Book III. ch. i.

We can hear with the heart what we cannot hear with the ear, but we cannot hear with the heart what we *refuse* to hear with the ear. The ear that declines the information, counsel, and correction of the Word and Will of God cannot receive the knowledge of salvation, of remission of sins, and of eternal life. 'The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, they are foolishness unto him, and he cannot know them, because they are spiritually discerned.' The well is deep, and he has nothing to draw with: Heaven is high, he cannot attain unto it, he has no ladder; an acceptance of the Truth there must be, before there can be an experience of the Way. As long as the ears are 'dull of hearing,' and man is deaf to the calls and appeals of God, so long his heart remains *gross*, unimpressed by that which is spiritual and Divine. Man must open 'the door of the soul'