

While the Lucan tradition concentrated on the paradoxical praise of need, we may feel tolerably confident that Jesus' blessings included alike those who needed help and those who were fitted to help others. This supreme Son of God knew no painful friction between religion and morality, between faith and 'works.' Yet no one can suppose that Christ leaves the smallest loophole to self-righteousness! The goodness He praises is that which

needs mercy from God and accepts mercy as a supreme boon.

We may also infer from these sayings what is, in Jesus' mind, the central spiritual significance of the Kingdom of God. Comfort—satisfaction—Divine mercy—the unclouded sight of God—to be the true child of such a Father. Blessed, indeed, are they whom the King thus welcomes into God's Kingdom!

Recent Foreign Theology.

Know Thyself.¹

STUDENTS of philosophy, who are unable to read Italian, can now read in their mother tongue some of the works of contemporary Italian thinkers, and can form some estimate of the philosophic activity of Italy. Some of the works of Croce have already been translated, one of the works of Alliotta we noticed lately, and now the work of Varisco has been made accessible to the English reader in the volume before us. The translation of Varisco's *Great Problems* has already been published in the 'Library of Philosophy.' In the same library has also been published Professor Villa's *Contemporary Psychology*. We mention these works in order that the reader may be aware of the philosophical activity of Italy, and of the place she is taking in the great endeavour to understand ourselves and the world in which we live. We have mentioned only a few of the contributions of Italy to contemporary thought which have been rendered into English; but these are only a part of her work, and represent writers whose eminence is great enough to have transcended the Alps. Students of philosophy ought to keep their eye on Italy. Croce, Alliotta, and Varisco have not the same point of view. Nay, they have criticized the works of each other. But the notable thing about them all is that they take up the universal tradition, and labour at the problems

of philosophy as these are determined, not by the tradition of any one country, but by the interaction of all the countries that have striven with the great questions of philosophy in all the ages of the past. In the works of these writers we have mentioned, reference is constantly made to authors who have written in English, in French, in German, and even in Russian. That is one of the notable things in contemporary Italian philosophy. It grasps the problem as it has been set to former ages, and to other nations than the Italian.

Professor Varisco deals in this volume with what may be called the fundamental problem of philosophy, and deals with it in a most suggestive way. The reader must, however, bring patience and interest to the study of the volume. There are many things in the argument which give him pause, for the connexion or the inference is not at once apparent. This arises partly from the character of the argument, and partly from the style. While the translation is on due scrutiny intelligible, it is not always couched in the forms which an Englishman is wont to use. The style adds a little to the difficulty of mastering the author's argument. Yet with diligence the book can be understood.

We think that we must begin with a characteristic quotation, which illustrates the style and also the method of reasoning of the author. It is from the introduction, and the paragraph is called 'Consciousness and Subconsciousness.' It is as follows: 'No doubt, to admit this conclusion, indeed to understand it, we must admit that the constitutive consciousness is not equally clear in every subject: over and above the clear or actual consciousness, there is another, and much larger,

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sphere of subconsciousness. And that such a subconsciousness exists, is an undeniable implication of consciousness. I remember: that, which I now remember, would not be that element of my consciousness which in fact it is, if it had not been already an element of my subconsciousness. Our being clearly conscious is in every case the result of a process which implies subconscious elements, and partly takes place in subconsciousness. Moreover, subconsciousness is not a *Deus ex machina* introduced with the object of eliminating difficulties: this would be an elusive contrivance. Consciousness is nothing but subconsciousness organised.' It will be well, however, to state the course of the author's exposition and argument. Almost the whole argument is given in broad outline in the introduction, the doctrine of the phenomenal universe forms the opening paragraph. Then follow sections dealing with reality and cognition—the Subject, Existence of other Subjects, Existence of External Bodies, Mutual Interference of Subjects, Consciousness and Subconsciousness, Unity and Multiplicity, Distinction between Existence and Knowledge, and Distinction between Truth and Error. It will be well that the reader should linger over the introduction, and ponder it somewhat deeply. He will find difficulties in fully understanding the meaning, but he will at least see that there is a meaning. He will need some agility in taking the leaps needed to keep up with the author. At all events he ought to look at the theses in the introduction as statements to be made good in the body of the work. They are problems to be solved, but it will be well to see what the problems are.

Then in the work itself, the chapters are the Subject, First Principle, the Subject, Reality, Fact, and Cognition, Thought, Unity and Multiplicity, and the Absolute. There are appendices, one on Experience, Religion, Philosophy; a second on Human Knowledge; and a third replies to criticisms of his former work on Great Problems.

It is not possible to set forth in detail the long and intricate argument of the author, though it deserves the closest attention in every step of it. But some conception of the gist of it may be given. Beginning with a brief statement of what he calls objective cognition, he immediately shows that objective cognition, valuable though it is, is not exhaustive. It is abstract, and therefore unequal to the description of the fulness of life or

of experience. There remains the whole question of the reference to a subject of knowledge. 'The process of knowing, that is to say an activity which manifests itself in a great number of acts of cognition; that is to say the totality of objective cognitions which result from these acts: the subject, that is to say the centre of irradiation, without which the acts would not be manifestations of one and the same activity: the object, that is to say what in each case opposes itself to the subject as knowing: experience, that is to say the totality of facts which form the matter of the single cognitions,—are elements of one unity, elements which we must distinguish, but not hypostatise' (p. 6). These then are elements in one unity, any one of them taken by itself is an abstraction. The real is the unity of them all. What then is this unity? It is the unity of the subject, which is the centre of its own universe, and each of the elements mentioned above is an element of the subject. But a further inquiry has to be undertaken. What is the subject? The answer is not simple or obvious. 'I only exist in relation to the whole, and the whole exists only in relation to me' (p. 35). Such, in brief, is the conclusion reached by the author at the conclusion of the section called The First Principle. It is a conclusion sufficiently impressive, and the steps of the argument by which the author seeks to establish it deserve attention. Some of these steps are valid, some of them are not so cogent. He postulates a subjective unity to start with, but the postulated unity is not the consciousness of self, but the unity which develops through activity and organization towards explicit self-consciousness. 'The development of self-consciousness necessarily presupposes a primitive unity of consciousness,—a unity which exists in so far as it is not alien, but present to itself, or, in other words, in so far as it is, in an embryonic form, self-conscious.' In this regard the author occasionally indulges in what may be called the natural history of the individual. He describes in quite felicitous terms the evolution of the chicken from the egg, and happily describes the evolution of the primitive unity of consciousness into self-consciousness. It is quite interesting, but it is attended with difficulties. One of these is that the natural history implies that the subject has a beginning and a history; on the other hand the subject is eternal, is the subject of all experience, and as necessary to the whole as

the whole is to it. The author is well aware of the difficulty and seeks to face it, without success. Another difficulty is the relation of the conscious to the subconscious. We are told by the author that 'Consciousness is nothing but subconsciousness organised.' Apparently the original and directive unity is subconsciousness, by it the work is done, and to it the organized consciousness is wholly indebted. The author is aware of the risk involved in the argument. For he warns us that, 'Subconsciousness is not a *Deus ex machina* introduced with the object of eliminating difficulties: that would be an illusive contrivance.' But this is precisely what occurs in many parts of the author's argument. On the whole the larger rôle is played by the subconscious. Nor is it ever shown what benefit arises out of consciousness when it has appeared on the scene. Nor is the reference to memory convincing. For when we strive to recollect any name, and search for it in the domain of the subconscious, the essence of the matter is that when we recognize what we have searched for, we recognize it as something which has been in consciousness before. The subconscious is a warehouse in which is stored what has been already in consciousness.

In the chapter on the Subject the author seeks to show how the primitive unity is developed until it becomes the subject properly so called. Even when we hesitate to follow the author in all his deductions, yet the endeavour to do so is always stimulating and instructive. Quite clear and cogent is the distinction between the relation subject-object, and between (say) Peter and Paul. 'That a developed subject is a constituent of another developed subject is evidently not true. The two consciousnesses are distinct, are two, not as constitutive parts of one and the same consciousness, but as consciousnesses. Therefore, the same reasons, for which the duality subject-object must be resolved into a primitive unity, require that the duality Peter-Paul should be recognised as primitive' (p. 48). Relations between Subjects is the next theme, and it is one to be closely studied. While one consciousness cannot be a part of another, yet the subjects form a system essential to each. It is a system of many centres, each of which is a centre of its own world, yet all of them are bound together into one system. 'One single unity, in course of development, accounts fully for the duality subject-object,

since the consciousness of that duality is still one consciousness. But it does not account for the duality Peter-Paul, for though Peter and Paul are inseparable it remains true that Peter's consciousness is different from that of Paul. Peter and Paul may see the same things, but the seeing of Peter is not the seeing of Paul. They both think according to the same laws: but the thinking of the one is not the thinking of the other' (pp. 51-52). It is well to have this distinction made plain, for it is usually disregarded by many thinkers, particularly by those of the idealistic persuasion. The concrete universal is sometimes lacking in concreteness, and the difficulty with all such schemes is that they do not adequately recognize the individual in his individuality. Our author, however, strives for unity, and that unity he finds in a system in which all subjects are, through which they become themselves, and to the building up of which they each contribute. We have found this line of thought to be fruitful.

We should have liked to dwell on the subsequent chapters, more especially on the chapters dealing with Thought, Unity and Multiplicity, and on the Absolute. Let us quote a paragraph from the summary: 'Every subject is a centre of the phenomenal universe, in the unity of all phenomena,—a secondary, that is to say, a particular, unity: *i.e.*, not unique, but one among many ordered among themselves, but still a unity of the whole phenomenal world. This latter is a system of more or less developed subjects. And phenomena are interconnected variations of the single subjects. Every subject varies in so far as its spontaneous variations interfere with those of all the rest, the course of events implies both as logical factors, which are the spontaneities of the single subjects, and a logical factor, on which the interfering of the single spontaneities according to necessary laws depends. The logical factor, on which the necessity of thought is founded, is the supreme unity of the universe—a unity which, while it connects the subjects, is constitutive of each, so that each subject exists only as belonging to the system' pp. (262-263). One remark we make as we close. We are pleased with the fact that the author makes room for a doctrine of the value of the individual, and for a rational doctrine of freedom. For freedom has been attacked from many sides, and the latest has been from the new doctrine of

heredity. The new development of Mendelism leaves no room for freedom or spontaneity. And the doctrine of development, or of nurture versus nature, as set forth in these subtile pages forms a splendid vindication of the possibility of freedom,

and of the worth of the individual. It at once provides for the unity of the universe, for the worth of the individual, and for the reality of ideals.

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The Archaeology of the Book of Genesis.

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Chapter viii.

18-22. The corresponding passage in the Babylonian story (where the account of the descent of Utu-napistim himself from the ship has dropped out of the text) is:

I sent (them) forth to the four winds; I offered sacrifice;
I built an altar upon the peak of the mountain;
seven by seven I placed the libation vases;
below them I spread reeds, cedar-wood, and myrtle.
The gods smelled the savour,
the gods smelled the sweet savour,
the gods gathered like flies over the sacrifice.

The literal translation of the line, 'the gods smelled the sweet (*literally* 'the good') savour,' leaves no doubt that the Hebrew translator had the same cuneiform text that we have before him; but, as elsewhere, the polytheism of the Babylonian story becomes monotheistic. As in the Babylonian version, moreover, so in the Hebrew account we have first the animal sacrifice, and then the burnt-offering, which in Babylonia consisted of sweet-smelling woods placed under the sacrificed animal, but here, in accordance with the Mosaic ritual, becomes the *'ôlâh*, or 'burnt (animal) offering.' In accordance also with the Mosaic ritual, 'clean' animals and fowl are selected for the sacrifice, which explains why the clean animals were introduced into the ark (7²). As they take the place of the libation vases in the Babylonian narrative, we have further an explanation of the statement that these clean animals were taken 'by sevens.'

In the Babylonian poem the gathering of the gods round the sacrifice is followed by Istar's denunciation of Ellil for having caused the deluge, and of the gods who had acted as his ministers; by the anger of Ellil at finding that Utu-napistim had escaped destruction; and by his acceptance of

the 'wise' words of Ea that henceforward the individual alone should be responsible for his own sins: 'Lay on the sinner (alone) his sin; lay on the transgressor his transgression; be merciful that he be not cut off, be long-suffering that he be not [destroyed].' All this is necessarily omitted by the Hebrew monotheist, who passes on to the acceptance by Ellil of the counsel of Ea, which was, on the one hand, that the individual, and not 'every thing living,' should suffer for the individual's sins; and, on the other hand, that the punishment inflicted on man for his sins should be confined to man—lions, hyænas, famine, or plague—and not extended, as in the case of the deluge, to the ground. Accordingly, in v.²¹, 'Yahweh says to his heart' that the curse inflicted on 'the ground' by the disobedience of Adam and the murder of Cain is finally removed from it, and that He 'will not again smite any more every thing living.' For the meaning of this last passage—that the individual should henceforth bear his own sin—we have to turn to the Babylonian story, the Hebrew writer not having explained it. The Hebrew code which admitted the principle of blood-revenge, and the participation of the community in the guilt of its members, differed from the code of Khammu-rabi, which assumed that the individual was responsible to the law for his actions.

In the Babylonian story there is nothing corresponding with v.²². *ṣṣ*, *'ôdh*, is the Ass. *adû*, 'the time of all the days of the earth,' and is used as in *adû Nannari*, 'the time of the Moon,' i.e. as long as the moon exists. *Yishbôthû* is the Ass. *sabâtu*, 'to keep Sabbath'; a phrase quoted from an early bilingual poem is *sabâtu sa abubi*, 'the keeping sabbath' or 'cessation of the deluge'; see note on