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Bavinck's use of Wisdom Literature in Systematic Theology

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Bad ideas never die; they only put on new battle uniform. A good part of Herman Bavinck's continuing relevance as a Reformed theologian is that he not only wrestled down perennially recurring bad ideas in their classic garb—Gnosticism, Pelagianism, Arminianism—but was especially keenly aware of their modern dress. Among the bad ideas he repeatedly repudiated is one that goes back to Tertullian and is evident in varying degrees in a thread that takes us through Bernard of Clairvaux, Martin Luther, Pascal and Kierkegaard up to Adolf von Harnack, Karl Barth, and N.T. Wright: the repudiation of philosophy's legitimate role in systematic theology in the name of what Bavinck liked to refer to as 'so-called biblical theology.'[1] I will begin with a couple of recent critiques of Bavinck's own use of philosophy—both appealing to Cornelius Van Til—and briefly summarise his refusal to accept biblical theology's trumping of metaphysics and philosophy. Following this, as a test case challenge for those to claim to travel the high road of a pure and true biblical theology, I will consider the wisdom literature of Scripture, note the inadequate appropriation of wisdom *as wisdom* in a number of works of systematic theology, and finally by way of contrast, consider Herman Bavinck's use of wisdom in the *Reformed Dogmatics*.

I. CORNELIUS VAN TIL AND TWO CRITIQUES OF BAVINCK: THEOLOGY NOT BIBLICAL ENOUGH[2]

The two critiques under consideration share the charge that Bavinck's theology is insufficiently biblical. With differing degrees of intensity and severity, both use images of medical pathology to describe a duality in Bavinck. Baptist theologian Malcolm Yarnell contends that 'Bavinck's theological foundation is ostensibly Scripture, but his writings reflect a thoroughgoing rationalism that is prior to and formative for his treatment

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[1]   H. Bavinck, *Reformed Dogmatics*, ed. by J. Bolt, tr. by J. Vriend, 4 vols (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2003-2009), 1, p. 82 [hereafter cited as *RD*].

[2]   I am indebted to Calvin Seminary Ph. D. student Laurence O'Donnell for calling my attention to these two critiques and for the stimulation provided by our extended conversations about Cornelius Van Til.

of Scripture.'[3] Apparently without any sense of irony, Yarnell accuses Bav-
inck—and, by extension, the entire Reformed tradition!—of irrationality
and even mental illness: 'The contradictions in Bavinck with regard to the
priority of Scripture and reason form an almost schizophrenic picture.'[4]
The source of this schizophrenia—or 'two minds'[5] in Bavinck—is the con-
flict between a biblical-theological method and one that uses philosophy.
According to Yarnell, one must choose between the two—either Scripture
or philosophy; the combination is inherently unstable: 'The schizophrenic
nature of Bavinck's foundation—a schizophrenia caused by his inability
to choose between a philosophical or biblical foundation—makes for
interesting philosophy and unstable theology.'[6]

At this point Yarnell appeals to Cornelius Van Til's critique of Bav-
inck's 'scholasticism' as a species of natural theology. '[F]or all his effort
to the contrary, Bavinck seems to offer us a natural theology of a kind

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3   M. Yarnell, *The Formation of Christian Doctrine* (Nashville: B & H, 2007),
    p. 50.
4   Yarnell, *Formation of Christian Doctrine*, p. 51; cf., the comment on the
    Reformed tradition has to do with the doctrine of regeneration: 'The irra-
    tionality of the Reformed position is accepted without note' (p. 59).
5   Though I do not retract what I said in 'Grand Rapids Between Kampen and
    Amsterdam: Herman Bavinck's Reception and Influence in North America',
    Calvin Theological Journal 38 (2003), 263-80, I am not pleased by much of
    the appeal to 'two Bavincks' in recent literature. See my introduction to 'The
    David Van Drunen-Nelson Kloosterman debate on Natural Law and the
    Two-Kingdoms Doctrine in Herman Bavinck', on the Bavinck Society web
    page <http://j.mp/Bavinck01> [accessed 25 April 2011].
6   Yarnell, *Formation of Christian Doctrine*, pp. 64-5; Yarnell acknowledges
    Bavinck's 'sincere attempt to be biblical' and then cites with approval Bav-
    inck's statement that 'A theologian, after all, is not a philosopher'. (p. 64; from
    H. Bavinck, *RD*, 1, p. 503). Not content with this, however, Yarnell adds: 'But
    soon after that, theological epistemology is made "dependent on a philoso-
    phy."' This critique is simply wrong. In the very paragraph cited by Yarnell,
    Bavinck explicitly states: 'Theology has its own epistemology and, though
    dependent on philosophy, it is not dependent on any particular philosophical
    system.' Bavinck's point is that when a theologian asks questions about the
    relation of our knowledge of God to our knowledge in general he is asking
    epistemological questions that are philosophical in nature. To acknowledge
    the legitimacy of *using* philosophy is not the same as making theology *depend-
    ent* on philosophy. Cf. my essay *'Sola Scriptura* as an Evangelical Theological
    Method?' in *Transforming or Conforming: Post-Conservative Evangelicals and
    the Emerging Church*, ed. by G. Johnson and R. Gleason (Wheaton, Ill: Cross-
    way, 2008), pp. 62-92.

similar to that offered by the Church of Rome.'[7] Like Rome, so Yarnell believes, Bavinck has too exalted a view of human nature, especially of human reason, after the Fall. Yarnell takes Bavinck's core motif that 'grace restores and perfects nature' to imply a capacity for the perfection of human reason which yields for Protestants 'an unrealistic doctrine of the infallibility of the individual theologian'.[8]

I will not belabour Yarnell's numerous missteps but stress the matter of Yarnell's own set of presuppositions and agenda to make the point that the real question at issue between him and Bavinck is not a choice between Scripture *or* philosophy but a fundamental difference in biblical *interpretation*. Yarnell explicitly declares his intention to develop a foundation for theology that is based on a Believer's Church/Free-Church soteriology and ecclesiology; in other words, 'a believers' church theological method'.[9] It is this Believers' Church presupposition, built on 'the Anabaptist doctrine of the new creation',[10] that yields his critique of Bavinck. Here is the heart of that critique: Since, in the neo-Calvinist view, the gospel reforms not only human persons but also society, 'all aspects of human existence are subject to reformation. The world can be rescued as it is by Calvinism without the need for the introduction of a new cosmos.'[11] In this way, 'discipleship in the Christian life is replaced by rationalism. Where the Anabaptists encourage Christians to glorify God with the entirety of life in the carrying of the cross and witness, Bavinck focuses on being reasonable.'[12] In

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[7]   Yarnell, *Formation of Christian Doctrine*, p. 52; the reference is to Cornelius Van Til, 'Common Grace II', *Westminster Theological Journal* 24 (1961), 188, 192.

[8]   Yarnell, *Formation of Christian Doctrine*, p. 54; from Yarnell's footnote, the accusation apparently comes from Cardinal Ratzinger's *Principles of Catholic Theology*, p. 223; however Yarnell does not give us a direct quote but a paraphrase and it is clear the he approves the charge.

[9]   Yarnell, *Formation of Christian Doctrine*, p. 33.

[10]   Yarnell, *Formation of Christian Doctrine*, p. 53.

[11]   Yarnell, *Formation of Christian Doctrine*, p. 53.

[12]   Yarnell, *Formation of Christian Doctrine*, pp. 56-7. In a misreading of Bavinck, Yarnell concludes a thoroughgoing rationalism from Bavinck's statements that it is theology's task 'to take the thoughts of God laid down in Scripture into their consciousness and to understand them rationally' (*RD*, 1, p. 93). This assumes that for Bavinck every believer must be a theologian (something Bavinck explicitly rejects) and that being a theologian is all that there is to the Christian life. In fact, the imitation of Christ is at the heart of Bavinck's understanding of discipleship. See Dirk Van Keulen, 'Herman Bavinck's Reformed Ethics: Some Remarks about Unpublished Manuscripts in the Libraries of Amsterdam and Kampen', *The Bavinck Review* 1 (2010), 25-56.

addition, the unbiblical notion of a universal catholicity for the Christian church, based on the distinction between the visible and invisible church, 'allows Reformed theologians to take their eyes off the local church and focus them on the culture'.[13] The ultimate unbiblical move made by Calvinists is to set aside the importance of faith as 'voluntary reception of revelation' in favour of an abstract doctrine of grace and election leading to a detailed *ordo salutis* that 'defines salvation, often in opposition to the free-church movements, according to the divine decrees, calling, election, and even eternal justification . . .'.[14]

I am sensitive and even sympathetic to concerns about the misuse of neo-Calvinism's key themes as an excuse for 'worldliness'.[15] However, Yarnell's protest is really a quarrel about biblical *interpretation* and not a methodological objection that Bavinck does not use the Bible adequately. A couple of examples demonstrate this clearly. 1) Yarnell quarrels with the visible/invisible church distinction which turns on a disagreement with Bavinck's understanding of Acts 9:31 where Bavinck takes the singular Ἡ ἐκκλησία to be an indication that 'churches of Judea, Galilee, and Samaria considered themselves . . . unified'.[16] 2) Yarnell objects to Bavinck's anti-chiliast eschatology, ascribing it to a 'worldly Christianity'[17] without considering that those who object to millenarianism might do so for biblical grounds. The issue is not Scripture *or* philosophy but disagreement on the level of interpretation. By setting the problem as an either/or between philosophy and Scripture and positing the norm of 'theological method as disciplined response to divine revelation',[18] Yarnell begs the question and avoids—or evades—important questions about the nature of revelation. How does biblical revelation relate to other human knowledge? Does 'disciplined response' include reasoned reflection or would that be

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[13]   Yarnell, *Formation of Christian Doctrine*, p. 53.

[14]   Yarnell, *Formation of Christian Doctrine*, p. 59.

[15]   I share many of Klaas Schilder's objections to the *Reformed* (Gereformeerde) world of the Netherlands in the 1920s and 1930s. My own protest can be found in my book *Christian and Reformed Today* (Jordan Station, Ont. Paideia, 1984), especially chapter 7.

[16]   Yarnell, *Formation of Christian Doctrine*, p. 54; Bavinck citation is from 'The Catholicity of Christianity and the Church', trans. by J. Bolt, *Calvin Theological Journal* 27 (1992), 220-1. In fairness to Yarnell, he does then offer an argument against Bavinck from the larger context of the Book of Acts, but my point here is that we have here a disagreement about biblical interpretation and it is this disagreement that is then turned into a methodological argument.

[17]   Yarnell, *Formation of Christian Doctrine*, p. 56.

[18]   This is the title of Yarnell's first chapter.

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'rationalism'? In sum, Yarnell's accusation of rationalism and objection to the intrusion of philosophy into theology amounts to little more than a biblicist defence of ignoring and avoiding key important foundational-epistemological questions that require philosophical thinking.[19]

Oliphint addresses the important epistemological issues that Yarnell avoids. In his essay, 'The Prolegomena Principle: Frame and Bavinck',[20] Oliphint is quite clear in affirming that Bavinck's theological foundation rests finally and solely in Scripture[21] and that this is identical, he says, to the position of John Frame (and Cornelius Van Til),[22] though he adds that there is a 'viral bug' at loose that threatens the whole Bavinck enter-prise. Furthermore, as he goes on to explore this 'viral bug', he engages in an extensive analysis of Aristotle and Aquinas on epistemology and metaphysics including the vexing question of universals. Here, he praises Bavinck for going beyond Thomas: 'So Bavinck is explicit where Thomas, as far as I can tell, is not. Bavinck affirms that the connection between the universal and the particular is produced by the Logos.'[23]

What then is at issue between Bavinck and the Van Til-Frame-Oliphint position? What is, to use Oliphint's term, Bavinck's 'viral bug'? It seems that it is the attempt to explain human knowledge in general using categories that do not directly appeal to or are not derived directly from Scripture, as, for example, when Bavinck cites Aristotle: 'The mind does not know things apart from sense perception.'[24] Along with Frame, Oliphint objects to methodologically distinguishing prolegomena to the-ology from dogmatic theology itself and theology from other sciences:

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[19] Yarnell's treatment of Bavinck is evidence confirming my thesis in 'Sola Scriptura as an Evangelical Theological Method?' that whenever theologians intentionally eschew philosophical and metaphysical issues in the name of 'biblical theology' they fail to provide an adequate foundation for the truth claims of theology as a scientific endeavour.

[20] K. Oliphint, 'The Prolegomena Principle: Frame and Bavinck', in Speaking the Truth in Love: The Theology of John Frame, ed. by J. Hughes (Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R, 2009), pp. 201-32.

[21] 'As noted above, it seems clear that Bavinck allows for no other foundation than [scriptural] revelation when the context is dogmatic theology' ('The Prolegomena Principle', p. 209).

[22] After noting that it is 'the Logos who, externally and internally, grounds any and every attempt to know the world', Oliphint concludes: 'These affirma-tions are consistent with everything that Frame has himself wanted to assert' ('The Prolegomena Principle', p. 208).

[23] Oliphint, 'The Prolegomena Principle', p. 218.

[24] Oliphint, 'The Prolegomena Principle', p. 211; cf. Bavinck, RD, 1, p. 226; cf. Aristotle, De sensu, c.6.

'Where the foundations of method are concerned, what is true for one discipline should be true for them all.'[25] Building on Frame's contention that God 'performs all his acts by his speech', Oliphint concludes:

> (1) that God's revelation provides the foundation for *all* our knowing and living and that (2) because God's revelation is the *principium* for all knowledge, it cannot be the case that some other methodological process can be affirmed as a ground of knowledge. This latter affirmation seems to be a part of the epistemology and prolegomena in Herman Bavinck's thought.[26]

If 'revelation' in this passage included general as well as scriptural revelation, then Bavinck would be in full accord.[27] It seems however that Oliphint intends here to refer to Scripture alone, as the following cited passage from Frame—with Oliphint's own emphasis—indicates:

> *The idea that some radically different method is needed for 'introductory matters' is unwarranted and dangerous; dangerous because the only alternative to exegetical method is autonomous speculation.*[28]

The choice is: exegesis or speculation. Leaving aside whether 'radically different method' is a fair description of Bavinck's Prolegomena, what is telling is the reference to 'exegetical method' as the contrasting position. Oliphint confirms this when he posits as the 'cure' for the 'Bavinck bug' Frame's statement that 'we reach conclusions in these areas by studying Scripture just as we reach any other theological conclusions.'[29]

Oliphint's argument against Bavinck then takes a curious turn. Rather than engaging Bavinck's own text in a careful analysis, he turns to Geerhardus Vos's review of Bavinck's Prolegomena volume in its first edition and directs attention to Vos's contention that Bavinck's work 'is the same theory of knowledge that has been set forth in this country by the late Dr. McCosh'.[30] Oliphint then enters into a lengthy discussion about whether

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25 Oliphint, 'The Prolegomena Principle', p. 204; (cf. Bavinck, *RD*, 1, p. 209-10).
26 Oliphint, 'The Prolegomena Principle', p. 211.
27 H. Bavinck, *The Philosophy of Revelation* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1953 [1909]), p. 27.
28 J. Frame, 'Book Review' <http://www.frame-poythress.org/frame_articles/1983Corduan.htm> [accessed 25 April 2011].
29 Oliphint, 'The Prolegomena Principle', p. 204.
30 Oliphint, 'The Prolegomena Principle', p. 205; Vos's review appeared in *The Presbyterian and Reformed Review* 7 (1896), 356-363, and was reprinted in *Redemptive History and Biblical Interpretation: The Shorter Writings of Geerhardus Vos*, ed. by R. Gaffin Jr. (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1980), pp. 475-84.

it is biblical to say 'that all knowledge must begin from observation'. He apparently agrees with Van Til whom that this is evidence that Bavinck has not adequately purged himself from the scholastic pattern of 'commingling Aristotelianism with Christian principles... The net result...is a moderate realism [which]...is not a specifically Christian position based on the presupposition of the existence of the God of Scripture.'[31] After a lengthy discussion of Bavinck, Thomas Aquinas and their relation to Aristotle's metaphysics, Oliphint concludes that Bavinck follows Thomas in affirming that God is only the *cause* of human knowledge.[32] This, he judges, is an inadequate answer to the common sense philosophy of Thomas Reid and the Princeton divines (while Thomists, Reidians and the realism put forth by Bavinck do give appropriate credit to God as 'the *essendi*, the *causal* principle with respect to that epistemology' they do not deliver on the *content* of that knowledge).[33]

At several places in his discussion Oliphint raises points that seem intended as contrasts with Bavinck but in fact represent Bavinck's own views exactly. For example, in critique of Bavinck's 'Christian realist' epistemology, Oliphint raise two points from Romans 1 and 2. First, what people have is not just a *capacity* for knowing God but actual knowledge of God; and, second, that this is universal.[34] There is nothing in these two claims that Bavinck would dispute; the disjunction between 'actual knowledge' and 'capacity for knowledge' is Oliphint's creation, not Bavinck's.[35] To have actual knowledge assumes that one has the capacity for knowledge. Oliphint acknowledges, 'All of this, Bavinck seems to affirm in places.' He then claims that 'the affirmation of this surely carries implications that would destroy Bavinck's bug; it would disallow a

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[31] Oliphint, 'The Prolegomena Principle', p. 206.

[32] Oliphint, 'The Prolegomena Principle', p. 221.

[33] Oliphint, 'The Prolegomena Principle', p. 229. How far this is from Bavinck's understanding can be shown in a single reference to what he says about Christ as 'the mediator of union (*mediator unionis*) between God and his creation. He is not only the exemplary cause (*causa exemplaris*) but also the final cause (*causa finalis*) of creation. In the Son the world has its foundation and example, and therefore it has in him its goal as well. It is created through him and for him as well (Col. 1:16)' (*RD*, 4, p. 685).

[34] Oliphint, 'The Prolegomena Principle', p. 226.

[35] Cf., Oliphint, 'The Prolegomena Principle', p. 226, where he speaks more modestly and concessively: 'The confusion in Bavinck may be this: it seems that in the majority of cases, Bavinck attributes to the Logos not specifically the *principium cognoscendi*, but the *principium essendi*, in much the same way that Thomas Reid did.'

realistic epistemology.'[36] If I understand correctly the paragraph that follows, Oliphint believes that Bavinck understands the work of the Logos in giving knowledge to all people as something intellectual and abstract, enabling us 'to recognize the Logos in things'.[37]

In place of Bavinck's Christian realist epistemology Oliphint offers us John Frame's insistence that 'we begin with Scripture *alone* as our *principium cognoscendi* and measure all else by its truth. 'We need', he says, 'a universal principle of knowledge that has universal application regardless of circumstances, context or conditions. That principle...is the Word of God—as Logos and as written.'[38] In the end, however, Oliphint, avoids drawing out the implications of the Logos apart from Scripture and limits himself to Scripture. 'We are back, therefore, to the principle of *sola Scriptura* as the ground and foundation for our prolegomena and our epistemology. Thus, God's revelation alone and not a realistic epistemology is able to bring the gospel to bear on the church and on the world.'[39] My response to Oliphint is simple: Until I am shown how Van Til's 'improvement' of Bavinck's epistemology is anything more than a higher level of abstraction that makes no concrete difference in the actual content of theology, I am unconvinced that there is a viral bug.

II. BAVINCK'S REJOINDER: BIBLICAL THEOLOGY IS NOT ENOUGH

What could possibly be problematic about a theological system that simply reproduces the truth-content of Scripture and intentionally eschews all alien philosophic categories and concepts? Is this not exactly how Charles Hodge defined the task of Christian theology?[40] Bavinck raises both practical and theoretical objections. Practically it is impossible to shed oneself

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[36]   Oliphint, 'The Prolegomena Principle', p. 227.

[37]   Oliphint, 'The Prolegomena Principle', p. 227.

[38]   Oliphint, 'The Prolegomena Principle', p. 227.

[39]   Oliphint, 'The Prolegomena Principle', p. 230. Oliphint's critique puzzles me because he repeatedly affirms Bavinck's own views and seems to find fault only at a higher level of abstraction and not in the concrete content of any knowledge of God. The claim that all knowledge of everything must begin with the self-revealing God of Scripture in order to be true depends on elevating the most simple observation of nature—e.g., 'the sky is blue'—into a secondary metaphysical-theological abstraction: 'The sky is blue because the Triune God who created the heavens and the earth made it so.' Ironically, it is this impulse toward such abstraction that can be said to be truly 'rationalistic' while the Aristotelian impulse to begin with observation is a challenge to all rationalism.

[40]   '[T]he duty of the Christian theologian is to ascertain, collect, and combine all the facts which God has revealed concerning himself and our relation to

of all presuppositions and confessional commitments prior to coming to Scripture. Because

> every believer and every dogmatician first of all receives his religious con-
> victions from his or her church...theologians never come to Scripture from
> the outside, without any prior knowledge or preconceived opinion, but bring
> with them from their background a certain understanding of the content
> of revelation and so look at Scripture with the aid of the glasses that their
> churches have put on them.[41]

In an observation reminiscent of Schweitzer's judgment on the nine-teenth-century quests for the historical Jesus,[42] Bavinck says this about Albrecht Ritschl: 'The 'pure' gospel that Ritschl finds back in Luther and Jesus corresponds perfectly to the conception he himself formed of it.'[43]

Bavinck also judges that any conception of a 'pure biblical theology' is *theoretically* incorrect as well. The first reason he gives is rooted in the nature of Scripture itself. 'Scripture is not a legal document'; as a book it is 'a living whole', not abstract but 'organic' and the 'full doctrine of faith... has to be drawn from the entire organism of Scripture'.[44] Then follows the statement that Yarnell and others often use to accuse Bavinck of rational-ism: 'Scripture is not designed so that we should parrot it but that as free children of God we should think his thoughts after him.'[45] How far this is from individualistic rationalism should be clear from Bavinck's accom-panying insistence that 'So much study and reflection on the subject is bound up with it that no person can possibly do it alone. That takes cen-turies. To that end the church has been appointed and given the promise of the Spirit's guidance into all truth.'[46] In sum, Bavinck's first theoretical objection is this:

> *Scripture is not a legal document but a living, organic, unified whole to be*
> *understood with the church of all ages in the power of the Holy Spirit.*

Him. These facts are all in the Bible.' Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1888), 1, p. 11.

[41] *RD*, 1, p. 82.
[42] Albert Schweitzer, *The Quest of the Historical Jesus: A Critical Study of its Progress from Reimarus to Wrede*, trans. by W. Montgomery (London: A. & C. Black, 1910), pp. 10, 398.
[43] *RD*, 1, p. 82.
[44] *RD*, 1, p. 83.
[45] *RD*, 1, p. 83.
[46] *RD*, 1, p. 83.

The implication is that the search for a 'pure biblical theology' fails to do justice to the nature of Scripture itself as well as the importance of church tradition in reading and interpreting Scripture.

Bavinck's second theoretical objection amounts to this: Proponents of a pure biblical theology 'forget that the Christian faith is universal' and ignore the need for its translation, its contextualisation; that 'it can and must enter into all forms and conditions.' To reject this universal need for translation is 'to deny the incarnation . . . , to oppose grace to nature in a hostile fashion'. The truth of God and about God, given in Scripture in an organic, unified whole rather than as a set of aphorisms or propositions, must take on flesh and blood concreteness in human consciousness. 'Dogmatics is and ought to be divine thought totally entered into and absorbed in our human consciousness, freely and independently expressed in our language, in its essence the fruit of centuries, in its form contemporary.'[47] In other words, since translation can only take place when God's words and thoughts enter fully into human consciousness and are set forth in new forms, theoretically, an appeal to a pure biblical theology is an attempt to do the impossible: to resist translation; do its proponents really want to advocate this? In addition, two points to which I will return: theology must be contemporary and done in a spirit of freedom; both are at risk in a 'purely biblical theology'.

Thirdly, Bavinck considers this issue from a slightly different vantage point when he discusses Schleiermacher and others who see theology's task as only historical report of what is believed by the church at a given time. 'The case is different', he notes—though, I would add, not altogether different—'when it is said that the sole task of dogmatics is to furnish a historical report on the content of revelation. This, in a sense, is the position adopted by the "biblical theologians"[48] and ignores the *purpose* of scriptural revelation which 'is *designed* to generate faith in our hearts, to place us in a proper relation to God'.[49] This purpose assumes the reality of God and his revelation as objective givens; there is a God who desires a relation with us and he reveals himself for that reason. While it is important for a theologian to have a personal faith,[50] it is equally important to insist that the content of theology does not arise from personal religious self-consciousness (Schleiermacher). 'This denies that in nature or in Scrip-

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[47]   RD, 1, p. 83.

[48]   RD, 1, p. 89.

[49]   RD, 1, p. 91.

[50]   'Hence for dogmatic work personal faith is imperative. In that respect the statement that every dogmatics is a confession of one's own faith is perfectly true' (RD, 1, p. 91).

ture there is a revelation that provides knowledge of God. It thus severs theology, and particularly dogmatics, from all its objective connections, robs it of its own object, and then tries nevertheless to build up a kind of dogmatics from the material of one's own consciousness (mind, feelings, heart, conscience) without this being bound to anything objective.'[51] At stake is the very character of theology as a science.

> *If a given science has no object and no epistemic source of its own, then neither does it have any right to exist. So if there really is some religious knowledge among us—no matter what its scope and extent, and regardless of whether a system of such knowledge can be credited with the name 'science'—there has to be a source from which it is drawn.*[52]

What does this have to do with 'biblical theology'? Bavinck does not say and I am not suggesting that those who agitate for a 'pure biblical theology' are closet followers of Schleiermacher. However, there is a connection which brings me to Bavinck's fourth theoretical objection: 'biblical theology' has a chequered history in the church. He is aware that throughout the church's history there have been significant protests against the use of philosophy, protests accompanied by accusations of rationalism and intellectualism, and calling for a return to Scripture, to a proper biblical theology that would be practical and not speculative. He acknowledges the legitimacy of many of these protests,[53] even when he raises equally strong concerns about the protests themselves. Thus, he approves of the 'many movements...in the Middle Ages, and later, especially during the Reformation...that rose up in opposition to the devaluation and neglect of Scripture'; of Erasmus and other Renaissance men who sought stronger mooring in Scripture and 'advocated a simple, practical, biblical Christianity' in which they were followed by Socinians, Remonstrants, and numerous sects'; even of Johannes Cocceius and J. C. K. von Hoffman.[54] However, this list also serves as a flashing yellow light of caution; Bavinck is keenly aware that these protests involve a delicate dance in which the first step all too often became the start of an increasingly subjective journey through pietism to rationalism. As the Reformational 'back to the early church and the New Testament' symphony became the Anabaptist single-note 'back to Jesus only' chorus and eventually morphed into the numerous 'Song of myself' nineteenth-century 'lives of Jesus our example', the *object* of theology—the self-sufficient triune Creator and

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[51] *RD*, 1, p. 91.

[52] *RD*, 1, p. 91.

[53] *RD*, 1, p. 63.

[54] *RD*, 1, pp. 63-5, 103-4, 185; *RD*, 3, pp. 209-212.

Redeemer God whom we know through revelation—is replaced by an emphasis on human *subjec*tivity.

Again, without charging each and every 'pure biblical theology' advocate with such a lapse into subjectivity, one has to grant Bavinck this reading of church history. When Bavinck takes up the issue of theological developments in the early church,[55] he observes that the first 'theologians' of the church in the apostolic era were content with 'simple repetition and practical application of the truth of Scripture.'[56] 'However', he adds, 'theology could not stop [here].' Prompted by external opposition and attacks, Christian theologians became more methodical and scientific in their handling of revealed truth. This required knowledge of pagan philosophy; in fact, says Bavinck, 'theology originated with the help of and in alliance with philosophy.'[57] Harnack erred in trying to explain Christian theology '*in terms of* Greek philosophy, [but] it also did not come into being apart from it.' Christian theology was an attempt 'to think through the ideas of revelation, to link it with other knowledge and to defend it against various forms of attack. For this purpose people needed philosophy.' This was done, he notes, 'in the full awareness of and with clear insight into the dangers connected with that enterprise; they were conscious of the grounds on which they did it, and they did it with express recognition of the word of the apostles as the only rule of faith and conduct.'[58]

In that light we can see better the delicate dance I spoke of earlier. Let us grant, for the sake of argument, an occasion in which 'scholasticism' of an unhealthy sort— dry, arid, preoccupied with philosophical minutiae and devoid of any personal, biblical, evangelical soul—demands of us a clarion call to 'return to the Bible!' Well and good; understandable and appropriate! But, if we have even a rudimentary awareness of church history in general and the fate of such protests in particular, we will realise that the call to return to the Bible is not an innocent one; without the appropriate ecclesiastical and metaphysical cautions in place, the cure will be every bit as fateful as the disease. In Bavinck's view, not only should names such as Erasmus, the Remonstrants, the Socinians, Johannes Cocceius,[59] Von

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55   Eg., *RD*, 1, pp. 61ff., 116ff.

56   *RD*, 1, p. 121.

57   *RD*, 1, p. 123.

58   *RD*, 1, p. 607.

59   Bavinck's objection to the covenant theology of Cocceius is that it 'exchanged the theological for an anthropological viewpoint'. This objection is not to the use of covenant concept as such in theology, 'for that occurs already in Zwingli and Calvin and had been developed by Bullinger, Olevianus, and Cloppenburg. Cocceius's novelty lay rather in the fact that he was the first to divide all the material of dogmatics in terms of the covenant idea and planned

Hoffmann, Strauss, Ritschl, Hermann, Hans Küng, and Brian McLaren, raise warning flags, but, even more importantly, Bavinck makes the point that the doctrine of the Trinity itself has most frequently been repudiated *within* the church in the name of a biblical theology.

'The dogma of the Trinity', Bavinck noted, 'has at all times encountered serious opposition.' This opposition came, understandably, from Jews and Muslims and rationalists, but, Bavinck notes, 'also within the boundaries of Christendom' itself.[60] The Arian and Sabellian opposition to the doctrine, he observes, appealed extensively to Scripture, especially to such 'subordinationist' passages as John 17:3, 1 Cor. 8:6, Col. 1:15, and Phil. 2:9. He traces the opposition through church history highlighting the heretical views of people such as Joachim of Fiore in the Middle Ages, Servetus and the Anabaptists in the Reformation period, Socinianism, Pietism, and esoteric 19th century figures such as Swedenborg. He also takes note of the philosophic re-imaginings of the Trinity in Kant, Schleiermacher, Schelling, Hegel and Strauss. One of the common threads here is an appeal to the non-speculative teaching of Scripture and a protest against church teaching as having been corrupted in some way or another. Bavinck is quite aware that heretical voices love to appeal to Scripture, even to *sola Scriptura* as a theological method, but he refuses to concede:

> *True, the use of extrabiblical terms was condemned by the Arians as well as by the representatives of many schools of thought in later times, such as the Socinians, the Anabaptists, the Remonstrants, the [so-called] biblical theologians, and others. Christian theology, however, always defended it as proper and valuable. Scripture, after all, has not been given us simply, parrot-like, to repeat it, but to process it in our own minds and to reproduce it in our own words.*

That last point about the freedom of the theologian brings me to Bavinck's fifth theoretical objection:

> *The appeal for a 'pure biblical theology' threatens the freedom of the Christian theologian and the contemporaneity of his or her work.*

This final point serves as a summary of the previous four; it ties together convictions about the nature of Scripture, the work of the Holy Spirit in

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in this way to offer a more biblical-theological and antischolastic dogmatics.' 'By its historical movement his perspective erases the boundary between the history of revelation and dogmatics and thereby undermines the latter.' (*RD*, 1, p. 103-4; cf. *RD*, 3, p. 210)

[60]   *RD*, 2, p. 288.

the church as she goes out into the whole world, proclaims the gospel to the nations and guides the work of faithful theologians. In that task Bavinck defends the legitimacy of going beyond the strict language of the Bible because the church has 'always defended it as proper and valuable' and because 'Scripture, after all, has not been given us simply, parrot-like, to repeat it, but to process it in our own minds and to reproduce it in our own words.' Remarkably, Bavinck points here to the very example of Jesus and the apostles and notes the legitimacy of using 'reasoning . . . [to] draw inferences' from Scripture. It is impossible to do theology 'without the use of extra-biblical terminology' and this applies not only to the doctrine of the Trinity but 'in connection with every other dogma and throughout the entire discipline of theology.' Bavinck concludes: 'Involved in the use of these terms, therefore, is the Christian's right of independent reflection and theology's right to exist.'[61] It goes without saying that such independent reflection is an essential ingredient of the church's responsibility to translate the gospel of truth to all places and all ages. To proclaim to the world the Good News of what God is doing and how we must respond requires that we not 'parrot [Scripture] but...as free children of God... think his thoughts after him.'[62]

Conclusion: *Properly understood, theology is an exercise in understanding and articulating the truth about God; it is done in believing submission to God's Word revealed in Scripture as an integral part of our responsibility as free people in Christ to translate it for our times and places.*

III. WISDOM LITERATURE AS A TEST-CASE FOR 'BIBLICAL THEOLOGY'

Let us for the moment bracket out Bavinck's objections and consider what seems to me at least to be a key criterion for a theology that seeks to be purely biblical. In addition to *sola scriptura*, I judge that one would also

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[61] *RD*, 2, p. 296; the full passage reads: 'Jesus and the apostles used it in that way. They not only quoted Scripture verbatim but also by a process of reasoning drew inferences from it. Scripture is neither a book of statutes nor a dogmatic textbook but the foundational source of theology. As the Word of God, not only its exact words but also the inferences legitimately drawn from it have binding authority. Furthermore, reflection on the truth of Scripture and the theological activity related to it is in no way possible without the use of extra-biblical terminology. Not only are such extrabiblical terms and expressions used in the doctrine of the Trinity but also in connection with every other dogma and throughout the entire discipline of theology.'

[62] *RD*, 1, p. 83.

need to insist on *tota scriptura*.[63] We all know from the history of bibli-
cal interpretation how easy it is for theologians to operate with a limited
'canon within the canon.' Let me also propose here that a critical test for
a biblical theology is how it deals with the wisdom literature of Scripture.
There are two good reasons for this. (1) Without rehearsing the full story,
one of the reasons why the 'biblical theology movement' of the 20th century
ran into difficulties was its inability to incorporate wisdom literature into
its dominant soteriological and historical categories of covenant, promise
and *Heilsgeschichte*.[64] As such, this difficulty was part of the larger chal-
lenge of integrating the Old Testament's teaching about God as Creator
with the biblical theology movement's overwhelming emphasis on the
mighty acts of the Redeemer God in history.[65] (2) Since the wisdom litera-
ture of the Old Testament clearly borrows from and affirms the insights
of non-Israelite sages,[66] its content is a direct challenge to any 'pure' theol-
ogy that refuses to go beyond special, redemptive revelation to Abraham,

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[63] One of the few who has treated this question is H. Vander Goot, '*Tota Scrip-
ture*: The Old Testament in the Christian Faith and Tradition', in *Life is A reli-
gion: Essays in Honor of H. Evan Runner*, ed. by H. Vander Goot (St. Cather-
ines, Ont.: Paideia Press, 1981), pp. 97-118.

[64] See B. Waltke, 'The Book of Proverbs and Old Testament Theology', *Bibli-
otheca Sacra*, 136 (1979), 302-17. Of course, incorporating biblical wisdom
was not the only challenge faced by the soteriologically-oriented biblical the-
ology movement. Langdon Gilkey, among others, pointed out the problem-
atic character of language about 'the mighty acts of God' in the context of
modern cosmology; see his 'Cosmology, Ontology, and the Travail of Bibli-
cal Language', *Journal of Religion* 41, 194-205. Reprinted in O. Thomas, ed.,
God's Activity in the World: The Contemporary Problem AAR Studies in Reli-
gion, 31; (Chico, Cal.: Scholars Press, 1983), pp. 29-43. For a broad overview
of the biblical theology movement's main ideas and difficulties, see B. Childs,
Biblical Theology in Crisis (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1970).

[65] The classic expression of this angst is Gerhard von Rad's programmatic essay,
'The Theological Problem of the Old Testament Doctrine of Creation', in *The
Problem of the Hexateuch and Other Essays*, trans. by E. W. Trueman Dicken
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966), pp. 131-43. Von Rad's Barthian 'solution' was
to marginalise the doctrine of creation as a subset of soteriology and to con-
sider any 'independent' doctrine of creation as something 'borrowed' from
non-Israelite (i.e. Egyptian) wisdom sources. Of course, after completing
his two-volume *opus magnum, Old Testament Theology* (New York: Harper
& Row, 1962-1965; German original, 1960), von Rad came to a more posi-
tive affirmation of Old Testament wisdom in his last publication, *Wisdom in
Israel*, trans. by James D. Martin (Nashville and New York: Abingdon, 1972).

[66] B. Waltke, 'The Book of Proverbs and Ancient Wisdom Literature', *Bibli-
otheca Sacra*, 136 (1979), 226-28.

Moses, and the prophets.[67] Both of these reasons are neatly captured in a single quotation from Bruce Waltke:

> *In contrast to the scholarly success in showing the comparative similarity of Israel's wisdom with its pagan environment, Old Testament theologians proved unable to integrate the Book of Proverbs into the rest of the Old Testament which builds around Israel's covenants and its history of salvation.*[68]

Let us now take a quick look at how well some systematic theologians have handled the Bible's wisdom literature.[69]

I need to introduce an important qualification here. If one scans the Scripture index of Louis Berkhof's *Systematic Theology,* one will find Proverbs and Ecclesiastes (along with the Apocryphal book of Judith, incidentally) cited as *dicta probantia* in support of the divine attribute of wisdom or the doctrine of *sheol-hades,* but little if any use of Old Testament wisdom *as wisdom.*[70] Similarly, Charles Hodge appeals to wisdom in his discussions of the divine attribute of knowledge, God's providence, and original sin.[71] Herman Hoeksema has an extended discussion of wisdom as a divine attribute but also, in the anthropology locus, includes a wonderful paragraph-long meditation on the law of God that is based on phrases from Psalm 119 and, without citing biblical wisdom, nonetheless captures its essence as the delightful harmony and joy of living within the boundaries of God's created order.[72] A more contemporary Reformed theologian, Hendrikus Berkhof, goes beyond basic citation of texts. In *Christian Faith* he takes note of the influence of Barth on von Rad and others

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[67]   It was one of the distinguishing marks of the biblical theology movement to acknowledge Israel's 'borrowing' from her Ancient Near Eastern context but then immediately to insist that this appropriation was distinct and that Israel's religion was radically different and unique. See Childs, *Biblical Theology in Crisis,* pp. 48ff.

[68]   Waltke, 'The Book of Proverbs and Old Testament Theology', *Bibliotheca Sacra,* 136 (1979), 302 (emphasis added).

[69]   What follows is intended to be suggestive and illustrative and not in any way thorough or exhaustive. My thanks to CTS graduate student Gayle Doornbos for her indispensable assistance in scouring a variety of systematic theologies and locating key passages and themes in their use (and non-use) of biblical wisdom.

[70]   L. Berkhof, *Systematic Theology,* new combined edition (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), pp. 69, 683.

[71]   C. Hodge, *Systematic Theology,* abridged by E. Gross (Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R, 1988), pp. 144, 220, 301.

[72]   H. Hoeksema, *Reformed Dogmatics* (Grand Rapids: Reformed Free Publishing Association, 1966), pp. 100-3, 212.

as a 'problem' for the doctrine of creation.[73] He also honours wisdom *as wisdom* when he explores the pneumatological-ecclesiological significance of the world's wisdom for the church, appealing particularly to the personification of wisdom in Proverbs 8: 22-31.[74] Proverbs 8, along with other key wisdom passages, does figure in other recent systematic theologies as well, notably in discussions of God, Creation, Anthropology, Sin, Christology and Trinity (e.g., Braaten and Jenson,[75] Grenz,[76] Grudem,[77] Robert W. Jenson,[78] Spykman,[79] van Genderen and Velema[80]). Millard Erickson covers the usual attribute of divine wisdom but also does something curious in his discussion of revelation. Under 'modes of revelation' he considers 'history' and then 'divine speech' of which 'interpretation of event' is one form. It is here that he points out the problematic character of the biblical theology movement's attempt to fit all revelation into the category of 'mighty acts of God.' The major problem, as James Barr and others have pointed out, is that wisdom literature does not fit this pattern.[81] Now, in fairness to Erickson, because he accepts the doctrine of general revelation he is not at all hostile to a minor role for philosophy in theology as well as the significance of extra-biblical sources including the special sciences.[82] Yet, biblical wisdom *as wisdom* plays no role in his discussion of theological method nor in any of the loci of theology. While

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[73] H. Berkhof, *Christian Faith*, trans. by Sierd Woudstra (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans: 1979), pp. 151-2, 236.

[74] Berkhof, *Christian Faith*, pp. 420-21.

[75] C. Braaten and R. Jenson, eds., *Christian Dogmatics*, 2 volumes (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 1, pp. 282-4, 289, 306-7.

[76] S. Grenz, *Theology for the Community of God* (Nashville, Tenn.: Broadman and Holman, 1994), pp. 135ff., 393.

[77] W. Grudem, *Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine* (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994), pp. 229, 243-4.

[78] R. Jenson, *Systematic Theology*, 2 volumes (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, 1999), 2, pp. 157-9.

[79] G. Spykman, *Reformational Theology* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1992), p. 199.

[80] J. van Genderen and W. H. Velema, *Concise Reformed Dogmatics*, trans. by G. Bilkes and E. van der Maas (Phillipsburg, NJ: P & R Publishing, 2008), pp. 184-5, 391.

[81] M. Erickson, *Christian Theology*, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1988), pp. 214, 301-2.

[82] 'While philosophy, along other disciplines of knowledge, many also contribute something from general revelation to the understanding of theological conceptions, this contribution is minor compared to the special revelation we have in the Bible.' (Erickson, *Christian Theology*, p. 29; cf., ch. 2, 'Theology and Philosophy')

other authors include general discussions of biblical wisdom in their single-volume or multi-volume works,[83] the champion among contemporary theologians in using wisdom *as wisdom* in a clear and effective manner is, somewhat unsurprisingly, the other of the two greatest theologians in the 20th century, Wolfhart Pannenberg.[84] In addition to a thorough and penetrating analysis of biblical wisdom literature in general (2, pp. 68-76), Pannenberg makes use of wisdom *as wisdom* in his discussion of revelation (1, pp. 255-257); the Trinity (1, p. 306; 2, p. 25); the divine attribute of knowledge/wisdom (1, pp. 255, 265, 379, 392, 418, 432, 441, 444); the divine attribute of love (1, pp. 440ff.); creation (2, p. 188); the unity of body and soul; the place and role of human reason (2, pp. 190ff.); image of God (2, p. 206); human destiny (2, pp. 208-9; 216; 218-19); and, more marginally, the Holy Spirit and eschatology (3, pp. 10, 548, 632).

IV. BAVINCK'S USE OF WISDOM LITERATURE IN REFORMED DOGMATICS

I now turn, at last, to Bavinck.[85] He also calls attention to biblical wisdom in his discussion of the communicable divine attributes, but in a way that is quite different than those who simply cite passages such as Proverbs 8 as *dicta probantia*.[86] Wisdom, he notes, is distinct from 'knowledge', adding, 'Nearly all languages have different words for these two concepts.' (2, p. 203) While 'we acquire knowledge by study', we gain 'wisdom by insight. The former is achieved discursively; the latter, intuitively. Knowledge is theoretical; wisdom is practical and goal oriented... Knowledge is often totally unrelated to life, but wisdom is oriented to, and closely tied in with, life. It is ethical in nature; it is 'the art of living well.' (2, p. 203) Wisdom comes through experience and is a way of knowing that is tied to the heart, 'the radical centre of the personality.' (2, p. 203) That is also the way in which Israel gained wisdom, though Bavinck then adds that over time, wisdom 'became the handmaiden of revelation' and genuine wisdom was

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[83]   E.g., H. von Balthasar, *The Glory of the Lord: A theological Aesthetics*, 7 volumes (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1982-1989), VI. *Theology: The Old Covenant*, ed. by J. Riches, trans. by B. McNeil and E. Leiva-Merikakis, ch. 6, 'Job', esp. pp. 286-8, 290.

[84]   W. Pannenberg, *Systematic Theology*, trans. by G. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982-1989), 3 volumes; references will follow in the text, citing volume number and page; e.g., (1, p. 34).

[85]   For ease of reference I will simply cite Bavinck's *Reformed Dogmatics* by volume number and page in parentheses within the text; e.g., (1, p. 34).

[86]   It is worth highlighting here Bavinck's extended discussion of wisdom/logos in intertestamental Judaism (2, pp. 264ff.; 4, pp. 602-3).

seen to be rooted in 'the fear of the Lord.' It is for this reason that Philo and after him Christian theology, 'linked the doctrine of Scripture concerning the word and the wisdom of God with [Plato's] ideas.' (2, p. 204) It is also in keeping with the character of wisdom as intuitive insight gained from experience, I will suggest, that Bavinck takes up the notion of 'ideas', not as moderns do, namely as concepts obtained from pure thought, but as an artist working with a model or pattern.

> *Applied to God, the idea means that God has made all things with wisdom,*
> *that wisdom is 'the firstborn of his ways' (Prov. 8:22; Col. 1:15; Rev. 3:14). God*
> *is the supreme artist. Just as a human artist realizes his idea in a work of art,*
> *so God creates all things in accordance with the ideas he has formed. The world*
> *is God's work of art. He is the architect and builder of the entire universe. God*
> *does not work without thinking, but is guided in all his works by wisdom, by his*
> *ideas. (2, p. 206; emphasis added)*

I trust that this is sufficient to dispel the notion that when Bavinck calls us 'to think God's thoughts after him' he is a rationalist.

My favourite example of Bavinck's use of biblical wisdom *as wisdom* occurs in the opening chapter of his eschatology section in the *Reformed Dogmatics*, 'The Question of Immortality' (4, ch 12; esp. pp. 598-602). 'In revealing himself to Israel', says Bavinck, 'God accommodated himself to the historical circumstances under which it lived', and this is also true for 'popular belief in the afterlife.' (4, p. 598) Old Testament Israel follows its neighbours in their horror of death; the finality of Sheol as a place of utter deprivation, darkness, corruption, silence and forgetfulness: 'The dead do not praise God!' (Pss. 6:5; 115:17; 4, p. 600) Death is complete, total; 'there is no room for a view that permits only the body to die and comforts itself with the immortality of the soul. The whole person dies.' (4, p. 600) If so, how did God's people come to affirm that 'The God of Israel is not a God of the dead but of the living' (Matt. 22:32)?

Recall that wisdom is learned from experience, and over a period of time, says Bavinck, it became part of the received wisdom of humanity itself that death is 'not the way it's supposed to be' and that it is, in some sense, punishment for human conduct.

> *Just as the whole person was destined for life through obedience, so the whole*
> *person also by his transgression succumbs, body-and-soul to death (Gen. 2:17).*
> *This idea had to be deeply impressed upon the consciousness of humankind;*
> *and in antiquity it was also realized by all peoples that death is a punishment,*
> *that it is something unnatural, something inimical to the essence and destiny*
> *of human beings. The revelation God gave to Israel is therefore bound up with*
> *this revelation. In the same way that this revelation took over so many customs*

and ceremonies (sacrifice, priesthood, circumcision, and so forth) while purg-
ing them of impure accretions like self-mutilation (Lev. 19:28; 21:5; Deut. 14:1)
or consulting the dead (Lev. 19:31; 20:6, 27; Deut. 18:10-11), so the idea of the
unnaturalness of death was also allowed to continue and take over. (4, p. 600;
emphasis added)

However, 'revelation does something else and more as well.' Specifically, it
heightens the antithesis between life and death, weaves 'into the fabric of
the universally known natural antithesis between life and death...a moral
and spiritual contrast—that between a life in the service of sin and life in
the fear of the Lord. Death is bound up with evil; life is bound up with
good (Deut. 30:15). Godliness leads to life. It is true that for Old Testa-
ment saints this vision was tied to the future earthly hope of Israel as a
people and not to individual destiny; the latter development takes place
after the exile and return. Still, 'the basic elements for this development
were already present...in the revelation of the past', including that of the
canonical sayings of the wise (4, pp. 601-2).

What Bavinck has done here, I am suggesting, is bring together the
wisdom of the peoples and the *sharpened* wisdom of Israel living before
the face of God to provide a seamless portrait of a biblical vision of life
and death in a way that fully honours wisdom *as wisdom.* Life is good for
the Godly; to live apart from God is death.

In conclusion, I only want to add that my sketch of Bavinck and
wisdom is fully consistent with and fleshes out the claim I have made
elsewhere about Bavinck's repudiation of fideism and biblicism and his
insistence that the Christian theologian incorporate the wisdom from
universal human religious experience into the constructive task of Chris-
tian systematic theology.[87]

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[87]   J. Bolt, '*Sola Scriptura* as an Evangelical Theological Method?' (cf. note 6,
above); idem., 'Een Gemiste en een Nieuwe Kans: Herman Bavinck over
Openbaring en Religie', in *Ontmoetingen met Bavinck*, ed. by G. Harinck and
G. Neven (Barneveld, Neth.: De Vuurbank, 2006), pp. 143-64.