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THE TRINITARIAN ONTOLOGY OF JOHN ZIZIOULAS

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Orthodoxy concerning the being of God is not a luxury for the Church and man: it is an essential necessity.[1]

I. INTRODUCTION

1 The Irrelevance of the Trinity

It is becoming fashionable to describe the revival of interest in the Trinity as a 'renaissance'. However, it is a sad indictment of the Christian church that a return had been desperately needed for some considerable time. 'Many people view the theological doctrine of the Trinity as a speculation for theological specialists, which has nothing to do with real life.'[2] And yet the doctrine of Trinity would seem to be both part of the bedrock of our faith and something characteristically and distinctively Christian.[3] No doubt the concentration on abstract metaphysics has been largely to blame for this: is the Trinity really nothing more than an attempt to explain impossible mathematics?

The question of God's internal nature is not a puzzle needing to be solved but rather a doctrine in need of re-application to every culture and age of Christianity. Such is the preoccupation of contemporary Trinitarian writers, of whom Zizioulas is only one.[4] His is a particular re-application, and a vital one, for what distinguishes his work is its rigorous application of the doctrine of the Trinity into the contemporary problem of the dissolution of personhood in Western society.

2. 'Being as Communion'

Ontology is not the central tenet of Zizioulas' writings; rather, it is personhood that forms the centre and primary concern. He works through the implications of understanding the Trinity as 'Being as Communion', that is, as being-in-relation. 'Only *in communion* can God be what God is, and only *as communion* can God be at all.'[5] In contrast to the Western idea that personhood can be defined in reference to the individual in isolation,[6] Zizioulas sees that it is only 'in relation' that true identity can be found. 'Being a person is basically different from being an individual or "personality" in that the person cannot be conceived in itself as a static entity, but only as it *relates to*.'[7] A further

contrast to the Western approach is typified in the statement that 'particularity [individuality] is to be understood as causative and not derivative in ontology'.[8] The nature of God's being is communion, and therefore the nature of our being is communion.

But what is the basis, the ground, for communion? Zizioulas finds this not in the substance, but in the person of the Father.[9] He is the 'cause' of communion.[10] This concept of communion finds expression in the term *ekstasis*: a derivative word used as a contrast to the idea of *hypostasis*.[11] '*Stasis* (being "as it stands", as it is "in itself") is realised both as *ek-stasis* (communion, relatedness) and as [with]in personhood (particularly, uniqueness).'[12] Thus *ekstasis* refers to the *hypo-stasis* (particularly, uniqueness).'[12] Thus *ekstasis* refers to the *hypo-stasis*, that aspect that is directed towards outward motion in personhood, that aspect that is directed towards others. Being is not restricted but 'in its *ekstasis* breaks through boundaries in a movement of communion'.[13] Communion finds expression in love:

> Love is not an emanation or 'property' of the substance of God . . . but is *constitutive* of his substance, i.e. it is that which makes God what he is, the one God. Thus love ceases to be a qualifying property of being and becomes the *supreme ontological predicate*. Love as God's mode of existence 'hypostasizes' God, *constitutes* his being.[14]

Through love, persons exist in *ekstatic* relationship. Elsewhere he states: 'we must speak an ontology of love as replacing the ontology of *ousia*, i.e. we must attribute to love the role attributed to substance in classical ontology.'[15] Love not only constitutes God's being, it also constitutes our being.

Freedom and necessity are other elements of vital importance to Zizioulas' thesis. Human beings have no choice in their existence: born of our parents we have no freedom in our 'biological *hypostasis*', our bodily physical existence.[16] Such ontological restriction and necessity, however, is overcome in the 'ecclesial *hypostasis*'.[17] It is baptism that brings about the ontological change into this new *hypostasis*, this new being-in-relation, that allows us to exist in freedom and *ekstatic* expression towards other persons. Thus, it is only in the church, in incorporation into Christ, that human beings can find their true expression as persons restored to the *imago Dei*.

3. Aim and Structure of this Essay

This sketch of Zizioulas' wider concerns cannot hope to do justice to him. The aim of this essay is to evaluate the presuppositions that underlie his ontology. At a few points in his writings he claims Patristic support for his ideas, in particular from the Cappadocian Fathers, but also with references to Athanasius and Maximus the Confessor. Yet it

soon becomes clear that there are significant differences between ancient and modern Greek thought.

The major differences focus around the question of the basis of unity in the divinity, to which there are two aspects. First, what meaning is to be attached to *ousia*—how did the Cappadocian Fathers use it? What precisely were they trying to say through it? As Hanson emphasises in the title of his book, *The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God*, the early centuries are characterised by an investigation of the most satisfactory way to describe what can and what cannot be known of God.[18] Second, what role did they find for the *hypostasis* of the Father—is he the cause of the Trinity, or only one among equals? Is there economic or ontological subordination, or neither? But as these differences are considered, a further question will need to be addressed: To what extent must contemporary re-applications of the Trinity adhere to the teachings of the past centuries if they are to be valid?

The essay falls into two main sections. §II will look at the Cappadocian Fathers, aiming to present the ontology they formulated through two central questions: Are the *ousia* and the *hypostases* understood as abstract ideas or as concrete entities? and What are the relationships between the *hypostases*? In §III attention is directed at Zizioulas. The Patristic support he claims for his teaching will be considered through the central question: What does it mean to say that God is being-in-relation? §IV will evaluate Zizioulas' presentation.

II. THE ONTOLOGY OF THE CAPPADOCIAN FATHERS

1. The Situation they Inherited

The situation directly prior to the work of the Cappadocian Fathers was one of extreme confusion due mainly to the lack of agreement on the understanding of various terms. Both orthodox and heterodox authors were using the same terms, but with different meanings, resulting in everyone being suspected of heresy![19] Confusion centred especially on the meaning of the word *hypostasis*: should it be used to refer to the 'oneness' or the 'threeness' of God? It was with the intention of resolving this problem that the Council of Alexandria was convened in AD 362. The letter sent by Athanasius and the other bishops present at this Council illustrates exactly the situation that the Cappadocians took up and makes, therefore, a convenient starting point for this survey.[20]

Initially, *hypostasis* had been synonymous with *ousia*, and therefore referred to the oneness of God (the three classic examples of this being Hebrews 1:3,[21] the Nicaean Creed anathema,[22] and a letter from Athanasius[23]). But, because of the use of the phrase 'three *hypostases*' (originated by Origen), there was confusion and counter-accusation: *hypostasis* could now be used to express either the oneness or the threeness of God.

The Council failed to establish the permitted usage of *hypostasis*. Despite the acknowledgment by those present that neither of these opposing usages had heretical intentions, they did not clarify what meaning it was now to have. Even the statement that 'all agree together that the faith confessed by the Fathers at Nicaea is better than the said phrases, and that for the future they would prefer to be content to use its language',[24] still left the issue unresolved. Whilst the Nicaean Creed had acknowledged that there was One and Three, it had neglected the formulation of the relationship between them. The implication behind the quotation, however, is that the synonymous usage from the anathema should set the standard: one *hypostasis* (even though this meant that there was still no accepted word to express the threeness).

The issues concerning which word to use were still far from resolved, despite Gregory of Nazianzen's assertions to the contrary.[25] It was actually Basil of Caesarea who achieved the fixing of terminology and meaning that Gregory ascribed to the Council. Coming from his Origenistic background it was not surprising that Basil should have chosen Origen's formula for the Trinity as his starting point: one *ousia*, three *hypostases*. However, it is not enough simply to identify what terms were in use, and how they were enumerated, it is vital that the underlying meanings are also identified.

2. The Problem of Terminology

An underlying problem with Trinitarian terminology is whether it is abstract or concrete entities that are being dealt with. If God is described as 'one *ousia*' does this term indicate an abstract concept lacking any sort of physical reality, or is it something concrete? If at the same time God is described as 'three *hypostases*', and that all are agreed (bar the heterodox) that these are concrete realities, how then does this relate to the *ousia* if that is also concrete? And if the *ousia* is only abstract, then in what sense are the three unified?

These questions have been posed as stark alternatives simply in order to heighten the issues that confronted the Cappadocian Fathers on the problem of the Trinity. As they sought to develop the meaning of their chosen terms, these questions hindered their progress. The next two sub-sections consider the implications of their progress and how they achieved it. First, what elements did they draw from Greek philosophy? Second, what did they hope to gain from the use of analogies?

3. Greek Philosophy

Aristotelian understanding of ousia
Aristotle believed in an objectively real concept that was present *in* concrete objects. He named this 'secondary *ousia*' which, along with 'substratum', composed 'individual substance' (primary *ousia*)—the

material of physical reality.[26] Such a system, where physical reality was deemed to be composed of a variety of different materials (both abstract and concrete) was a clear possibility for Trinitarian explanations.

Modern authors used to assume that this had been applied to the Trinity to produce the following equation:[27]

> *hypostasis* = primary substance, and
> *ousia* = secondary substance,

and that this, therefore, represented the ideal explanation of the early Church Fathers' view of the Trinity.[28] However, more recent authors have rejected the idea that this equation had ever been used by the Cappadocian Fathers (although Hanson notes that Gregory's *Epistle*, 38 could be the sole exception).[29] Stead goes further and questions the influence of Aristotle on *any* theologian at all.[30]

It appears, therefore, that any attempt to use Aristotle's theory of primary and secondary *ousia* as an explanation of the Trinity must be treated with extreme caution.

Stoic concepts
Stoic ideas contrast with those of Aristotle. They taught that there was a common underlying substance that composed the material of *all* things, including the world and God. This substance they called *ousia* which, whilst capable of change in appearance, was not capable of change in quantity.[31] This concept can be characterised by the word 'substratum'.[32] Such a system leads inevitably to pantheism, and needed much modification before it could be of use for Christian ideas. However, the idea of an underlying concrete substance of which physical reality is composed has obvious use for the doctrine of the Trinity.

A different element of Stoic thought used by Christian authors was the system of four 'categories': substratum, quality, disposition, and relative disposition.[33] This system enabled the Stoics to make a distinction between what an object is in itself (substratum and quality) and what it is by contrast to other objects (disposition and relative disposition). LaCugna notes the importance of this distinction for the Cappadocians: definition by relatives does not inform us about the nature/substance of an object but only its existence in definition to another object.[34] Thus, the *hypostases* could be discussed without actually explaining God's *ousia*: in this way it was possible to maintain the inaccessibility of the *ousia* to human knowledge.

Another aspect of Stoic terminology to note is their distinction between what is common (*koinon*) and what is individual (*idios*). This contrast between properties belonging to a group or to specific examples is an important part of Basil's vocabulary, and will be discussed further below.

Summary
Greek philosophy taught a variety of ideas around the general area of concrete and abstract properties that provided theologians with inspiration for means of describing the Trinity. Hanson draws a contrast between Basil and Gregory of Nyssa, the former being Stoic influenced, the latter Aristotelian.[35] This ascription may be over-dependent on his assessment of *Epistle*, 38 (especially given the uncertainties surrounding the authorship of this letter), but indicates the variety of sources the Cappadocians allowed to enter their thinking. However, as will be seen later, it must also be affirmed that they *transformed what they received*.

4. The Aristotelian Degrees of Unity and Analogies

Introduction
Aristotle identified a hierarchy of five different ways by which the degree or extent of unity between any two objects can be defined. Of these the latter three are the most important, since they were extensively used by many different Patristic authors for inspiration when discussing the unity of the Trinity. These three are unity by substratum, genus and species.[36]

Unity by substratum
Oil and wine are related because each contains water as a constituent part.[37] This is the favoured analogy of Augustine rather than the Cappadocians.[38]

Unity by genus
A dog, a horse, and a man are all related because they are animals. A clear example of this analogy in use is provided by Basil. 'The distinction between *ousia* and *hypostasis* is the same as that between the general and the particular; as, for instance, between the animal and the particular man.'[39] Just as three animals may be related because they are all mammals, so the three *hypostases* are related. This was a very common analogy and one that has occasioned much debate.

Unity by species
Peter and James and John are all related because they are all members of a single species: man. This analogy is clearly used by Gregory of Nyssa: Peter and James are both men who share a common substance —humanity. If John is added to them then the humanity is not increased, there is still only one humanity.[40] Likewise, no matter how many *hypostases* are 'present', the common property—divinity—is not increased if another *hypostasis* is added.

Cappadocian attitude to the analogies
The Cappadocians put only limited trust in analogies: they often were

the first to point out the inadequacies of such methods.[41] This is not surprising, because any analogy can go only so far as an explanation before a particular aspect of it becomes entirely inappropriate. A good example of this problem is that of the analogy of three men sharing the one substance, referred to earlier. The problem with it is this logic:

Since Peter + James + John = three men, then
Father + Son + Spirit = three Gods.

Gregory discusses this problem extensively, arguing (correctly) that the word 'man' has a double meaning, being able to refer to both the individual and the common.[42] However, no amount of arguing that only the second understanding should be used with this analogy will convince us, for the first will always intrude. The analogy has encountered a limitation.

It was exactly this problem that persuaded Augustine in favour of the analogy of substratum.[43] Basil, however, in his correspondence with Apollinaris, rejects both the 'unity by substratum' and the 'unity by genus' as open to misunderstanding.[44] This is because genus could have a Platonic (and thereby undesirable) understanding, and substratum could imply a (Stoic) pre-existent *ousia* independent of the *hypostases*.

What is easily overlooked is the fact that the Cappadocian Fathers used many different analogies, not all of them drawn from philosophy,[45] and never felt themselves restricted to any one in particular. The importance of these analogies is that they provide further evidence of the way the Cappadocians conceived the relative abstract/concrete relationship between *ousia* and *hypostasis*, besides providing an invaluable means of illustrating the relationship between the two.

5. The Meaning of the Cappadocian Terminology

Ousia: concrete being
The material surveyed can be formulated into two different approaches. The first, often described as Neo-Nicaean, makes a distinction between the *ousia* as abstract-being (Aristotelian view) and *hypostasis* as concrete-being; whilst the second approach treats both *ousia* and *hypostasis* as concrete-being.[46] The Cappadocians adhered to the second: *ousia* was viewed as concrete being, a 'single undifferentiated substance, identically expressed in each of the Three Persons'.[47] The analogies were then used to demonstrate how two concrete substances could be related together in some way.[48]

But this is not to say that they were somehow limited by the ideas in Greek Philosophy for, as was previously stated, the Cappadocians changed and developed what they received. They moved beyond the controversy that raged over the correct understanding of the Nicaean Creed—that if the term *ousia* was interpreted in Aristotelian terms of

primary *ousia* it led to modalism/Sabellianism; and if via either second-ary *ousia* or Stoic *ousia* then both implied tetratheism.[49] The *ousia* is so totally bound up with the *hypostases* that it is only by relating the two that the Cappadocian understanding of them can be perceived. Their attitude can be summed up this way:

> As applied to the being and persons of the deity . . . *prosōpon*, *hypostasis* and *ousia* all equally denote single concrete entities. To the Greeks, God is one objective Being, though He is also three objects.[50]

The relationship between ousia *and* hypostasis

The heart of Cappadocian Trinitarian theology is now reached. By concentrating on the possible derivations and meanings of the termino-logy there has been the dangerous implication that the *ousia* and the *hypostases* are effectively unrelated to one another. Nothing could be further from the truth, for it is not possible to discuss God's nature using only the one or the other. It is only together that these two terms can inform us of anything meaningful about God.

Gregory of Nazianzus was well aware of the inseparability of the *hypostases* and the *ousia*: 'No sooner do I conceive of the One than I am illumined by the Splendour of the Three; no sooner do I distinguish them than I am carried back to the One.'[51] But nor should we conceive of any rift between *hypostasis* and *ousia*:

> Beholding the glory in Father, Son and Holy Ghost, [a reflective student's] mind all the while recognises no void interval wherein it may travel between Father, Son and Holy Ghost, for there is nothing inserted between them.[52]

Or again,

> For it is in no wise possible to entertain the idea of severance or division . . . but the communion and the distinction apprehended in them are, in a certain sense, ineffable and inconceivable, the continuity of nature being never rent asunder by the distinction of the *hypostases*, nor the notes of proper distinction confounded in the community of *ousia*.[53]

An oft-quoted passage from Prestige summarises how it is only together that the three *hypostases* constitute one *ousia*:

> The whole unvaried substance [*ousia*], being incomposite, is identical with the whole unvaried being of each person . . . the individuality is only the manner in which the identical substance is objectively presented in each several person.[54]

The Cappadocian Fathers, however, never confounded or confused the *ousia* and the *hypostases*: *ousia* cannot exist without the *hypostases* but represents what is common, whilst *hypostasis* represents what is proper and distinct. This is clearly seen in two quotations from Basil, where he draws on the Degrees of Unity:

> The distinction between *ousia* and *hypostasis* is the same as that between the general and the particular; as, for instance, between the animal and the particular man. Wherefore, in the case of the Godhead, we confess one *ousia* or substance so as not to give a variant definition of existence, but we confess a particular *hypostasis*, in order that our conception of Father, Son and Holy Spirit may be without confusion and clear.[55]

And elsewhere, '*ousia* has the same relation to *hypostasis* as the common has to the particular.'[56] The distinction between *ousia* and *hypostasis* was defined as their 'mode of being' (*tropos tēs hyparxeos*): the Son is begotten, the Spirit is the one who proceeds, and therefore the Father becomes the unbegotten.[57] This idea can be explained through a quotation from Gregory of Nyssa:

> If one were to ask a husbandman about a tree, whether it were planted or had grown of itself . . . would he by that answer declare the nature of the tree? Surely not; but while saying how it exists he would leave the question of its nature obscure and unexplained.[58]

Discerning the difference between a planted tree and one that sprang up from a seed blown by the wind does not enable us to identify whether the tree is an oak or ash.

The similarity to the Stoic (and Aristotelian) concept of relation is apparent here. When the differences between the *hypostases* in terms of their 'modes of being' are enumerated no comment is made about the substance. Nor is the *how* by which this occurs explained; that remains a mystery inaccessible to us. God's very substance cannot be known, it is only the *hypostasis* that is known.

Summary

The large number of quotations in this section is deliberate: it is better to let the Cappadocian Fathers speak for themselves and to reduce commentary to the minimum. They were unafraid to express the differences between each *hypostasis* but sought a balanced concept of God as 'divided indivisibly and united in division. The Godhead is One in Three and the Three are One'.[59] The basis of unity is the *ousia*, whilst the *hypostases* are real distinctions expressed in their 'modes of being', or relations one to another. Prestige sums this up as: 'God is one object *in* Himself, and three objects *to* Himself.'[60]

6. The Father as the Cause of the Trinity

The preceding discussion has presupposed that the standard Trinitarian formula used by the Cappadocian Fathers was 'one *ousia*, three *hypostases*'. The assumption has also been that there was an absolute equality of the different *hypostases*. But, whilst the Cappadocian Fathers did insist on an absolute ontological equality of the *hypostases*, they had to, and did, also acknowledge a sense in which the *hypostases* were *not* equal functionally. The economy of salvation reveals a certain 'order' (*taxis*) of the *hypostases*, but the theology affirms that only a full equality of substance between each Person will safeguard against slipping into ontological subordinationism. Several statements can be found, however, that imply a more significant role for the *hypostasis* of the Father in contrast to the other *hypostases*, and it is to these statements that we now turn.

It was the teaching of Eunomius that raised the issue of cause (the question of how the Son and the Spirit came to be).[61] His understanding of the word 'Ungenerate' (as applied to the Father) was that 'God is from no one' and that it was the property of the *ousia*.[62] 'God is himself uncaused, but the cause of everything else which has come into being.'[63] Hence, since the Son has been generated from the Father he must be of a different *ousia*, and therefore the Son and Spirit ontologically subordinate to the Father.[64]

The Cappadocians rejected this notion by stating that it was the Father who was the cause of the Son and the Spirit: cause must be located in the *hypostasis*, and particularly in the *hypostasis of the Father*.[65] For example, Gregory declares:

> God, who is over all, alone has, as one special mark of his own *hypostasis*, his being Father, and his deriving his *hypostasis* from no cause; and through this mark he is peculiarly known.[66]

Or again,

> The same principle applies to the Holy Spirit affecting only a difference in order (*taxis*). For as the Son is attached to the Father and the fact that he derives his being from him does not diminish his status (*hyparxis*) so the Holy Spirit holds to the Son who can be regarded as prior to the *hypostasis* of the Spirit in theory on the score of origin. So if the matter of origin is removed the Holy Trinity is in no way unsymmetrical with itself.[67]

Lossky, however, sounds a warning note.[68] At times, Gregory of Nazianzus' stress on the Father as the source and Monarch is so great that he runs close to compounding the person of the Father and the Godhead. This is especially seen in the following quotation:

> The Three have one Nature (*physis*)—God. And the union is the

Father, from whom and to whom the order of Persons runs its course, not so as to be confounded, but so as to be possessed, without distinction of time, of will, or of place.[69]

But running close is different to overstepping the mark. Any mention of cause is carefully circumscribed by the surrounding discussion. For instance, Gregory also states:

> I should like to call the Father the greater, because from him flows the Equality and the Being of Equals, but I am afraid to use the word Origin, lest I should make him the Origin of Inferiors, and thus insult him by precedencies of honour.[70]

He goes on to affirm that any ideas about cause that produce subordination of any sort are inadmissible because of the *homoousios*. It was within this context that any statements of cause were acceptable.

Whilst the Cappadocian Fathers varied the starting point of Trinitarian discussion, they were careful not to imply any supremacy of *ousia* over *hypostasis* or vice versa:[71] 'order does not affect the *ousia*.'[72] They also avoided emphasis: to speak of the one necessitated discussion of the other.[73] As stated above, they were careful to balance the relationship between *hypostasis* and *ousia*. It is within this context that the statements about cause must be understood.

7. Summary

Basil's teaching on the Trinity is conveniently summarised by Hanson:

> Basil produced a doctrine of God as a single *ousia* with three distinct sets of recognizable properties or peculiarities, each set forming an authentically existing *hypostasis*, the whole bound together inseparably in a common *ousia* or nature, no *hypostasis* being subordinate to or less than the others, but the Second and Third deriving from the First as their source or ultimate principle.[74]

There is a careful distinction here. The cause of the *Logos* and the Spirit is the *hypostasis* of the Father, but the basis of unity is the *ousia*. It is to this distinction that we will return when considering Zizioulas' ontology.

III. ZIZIOULAS' METAPHYSIC

1. Introduction: Being in Relation

Turning to Zizioulas requires a leap through sixteen hundred years of history. Yet this does not mean that he is totally divorced from the Cappadocian Fathers. Quite the opposite, for he stands in their wake as a Greek and Orthodox thinker. As an Orthodox theologian it is

incumbent upon him to validate his own thoughts by demonstrating their continuity with the thought of the Fathers.[75] It is at this point that problems occur for the contemporary Orthodox community—does he always correctly present the case as put by the Fathers?

Whilst claiming Patristic support, Zizioulas provides only minimal citations from the Greek Fathers: there are insufficient specific references to them that would enable us to evaluate the evidence for ourselves. It is essential, therefore, that close attention be paid to whatever support is given. Fortunately, Lossky appears to share similar ideas, and (whilst also not replete with references) he will allow a greater survey of the Greek Fathers than would otherwise have been possible.

As discussed in §I, the focus of Zizioulas' thesis is personhood. He identifies the non-relational definition of 'person' prevalent in the West, a definition that has its origins in the emphasis on substance in Western Trinitarian theology.[76] This emphasis had developed the idea that divine personhood is demonstrated in those who possess divine substance —Father, Son and Holy Spirit. By extension, the human person is defined as one who possesses human substance.[77] To be a person is simply to be, to exist.

Zizioulas challenges this notion of divine personhood. For him, to be in relation is not only an extra element in personhood, it is the dominant element. A person is defined primarily by his or her relations to other persons.

The focus of this section is personhood as 'being in relation'. There will be a presentation of Zizioulas' understanding of what the Cappadocian Fathers taught about 'being in relation', but of vital importance is an understanding of the meaning and use of the word person/*prosōpon* itself, which will be considered first of all.

2. *Prosōpon*

History
Zizioulas does not identify who took 'the momentous step of the identification of *hypostasis* with the term *prosōpon*'.[78] If *prosōpon* was 'foreign' to the Eastern concept of ontology why should it have ever been incorporated? It is perhaps surprising to discover, given its importance to Zizioulas' thesis, that it was actually the Western Latin Fathers who must take ultimate responsibility!

Webb identifies three stages in the process of accepting *prosōpon*.[79] The first was the use of *persona* by Tertullian.[80] The second the translation problems illustrated in the following diagram:

Greek	Latin
ousia	essentia
	substantia
hypostasis	
	persona
prosōpon	

Substantia should have been used for *hypostasis* but was used instead for *ousia* (it being only later that the better translation *essentia* for *ousia* was adopted). In such a situation what word was to be used to translate *hypostasis*? This is the third stage: the idea in the West was to use Tertullian's term, *persona*. However, the nearly literal translation for this was *prosōpon*.[81]

This confusing state of affairs was, of course, exacerbated by the fact that *ousia* and *hypostasis* were originally synonyms (as discussed in §II.1) and therefore were often *both* translated by *substantia*. This is the reason why the Eastern Trinitarian formula, 'one *ousia*, three *hypostases*', sounded to Western ears like 'one substance, three substances' and therefore implied Arianism or tritheism. On the other hand, the Western formula, 'one *substantia*, three *persona*', was totally wrong since *prosōpon* was the favoured term of Sabellianism, a major problem for the East.[82]

The Cappadocian Fathers display a variety of reactions to *prosōpon*. In the space of only two years (AD 375–376) three different attitudes can be distinguished in Basil's writings.[83] Firstly, he demonstrates hostility to it;[84] secondly, he can be careful to distinguish between the correct use and Sabellius' use of *hypostasis* and *prosōpon* (though *hypostasis* is still Basil's preferred term);[85] thirdly, he can use it favourably without also having to use *hypostasis* in the same sentence.[86] Gregory Nazianzus maintains a more positive attitude, though occasionally being highly condescending towards the Western need for the word.[87] Official recognition of the new synonymous meanings came at the Council of Constantinople (AD 382):

... believing also that the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit have a single Godhead and power and substance ... in three most perfect *hypostases*, or three perfect persons.[88]

Thus, *prosōpon* entered Trinitarian vocabulary and became the accepted term for the three.

Zizioulas' use of prosōpon

Zizioulas' concern is not on the history but on the effect this word had, asserting that *prosōpon* radically altered the basic ideas of Trinitarian reality.[89] Whereas there had previously not been a relational term for use with the Trinity one was now introduced. The *hypostases* are not simply concrete realities but realities in personal relationship to one another.

Zizioulas devotes considerable attention to the background of *prosōpon* in both Greek and Latin thought.[90] He delves into its origins as a Greek theatrical term and finds there significance in the general theme of tragedy: Man is doomed to failure in his struggle for 'identity', in the face of the maltreatment by the Gods. 'Identity' and 'personhood' are therefore unattainable, and Greek thought does not ultimately acknowledge the value of the person. The Latin use of *persona* was similar, but applied to the context of legal situations: one standing in the stead of another. This self-evidently relates to the Greek concept of one individual portraying another.

In sum, *prosōpon* meant a mask, a role, something additional to the substance of a human being that allowed 'the same man to enact more than one *prosōpa*' at a time.[91] It is not surprising to find that Sabellius brought exactly this pre-Trinitarian meaning of *prosōpon* into his Trinitarian thought, nor that the East should reject *prosōpon* for this reason (as Zizioulas accepts).[92]

So far all this seems to be going against Zizioulas. His contribution is to demonstrate the concept of relation that underlies the use of the word: personhood was *not* seen as a function of substance. The linking of *hypostasis* and *prosōpon* in Trinitarian thought altered the meanings of both words so that personhood became the distinctive mark of beings that exist in relationship. By introducing a relational term the notion of communion/*koinōnia* appears at the heart of Trinitarian doctrine.[93]

Summary

Through his study of the origins and the use of the word *prosōpon*, Zizioulas has prepared the ground for an evaluation of his main thesis, 'being in relation'. With the coming together of a word from ontology (*hypostasis*) and another from 'sociology' (*prosōpon*) there was a revolution in ontological thought. The notion of personhood as something more than merely an individual entered and altered ontological definitions. Simply to possess divine (or human) substance was not proof of personhood: something totally different to the substance also needs to be recognised. This is the ability to be in relation.

3. Zizioulas' Presentation of the Cappadocians

In §II, the aim was to present the Cappadocian Fathers as they thought of themselves. The aim here is to see the Cappadocians through the eyes of sixteen hundred years of subsequent theological thinking, as they are presented by Zizioulas. His understanding of their teaching is at once distinctive and yet typically Greek, and focuses especially around the re-emphasising of different elements in their system, and especially the implications of the teaching that the Father is the cause of the Trinity.

Father as cause

In §II.6, cause was seen as a (minor) part of the Cappadocian scheme, integrated but without undue emphasis. Zizioulas, however, presents it as a much more central part, almost the lynchpin of their system! Frustratingly, neither he nor LaCugna provide Patristic support for this, and attention must turn to Lossky instead.[94] What appears from his citations is a gradually increasing importance of the doctrine. The two Gregorys maintain cause alongside the emphasised *ousia*.[95] With John Damascus, however, the situation has shifted even to the position of reversal: whilst the *ousia* is still retained, it is cause that is emphasised.

> We do not speak of three Gods . . . but rather of one God, the holy Trinity, the Son and Spirit being referred to one cause.[96]

Father as basis of unity

The significance Zizioulas attaches to this increased emphasis on cause is apparent in this central statement around which he establishes his ontology.

> Among the Greek Fathers the unity of God, the one God, and the ontological 'principle' or 'cause' of the being and life of God does not consist in the one substance of God but in the *hypostasis*, that is, *the person of the Father*.[97]

This makes a stark contrast to Hanson's conclusion quoted in §II.7. The idea of the Father as cause has been extended to incorporate the idea of the Father as the basis of unity. The *ousia* as the unity is specifically rejected.

Although Zizioulas makes no mention of it, he may be supporting this position with the 'generic' view of *ousia*.[98] This emphasises an Aristotelian 'second *ousia*' understanding to a *homoiousios* interpretation of the Nicaean Creed (i.e. that the Father and the Son are not of identical substance but of similar substance). The principle of unity, therefore, is not the *ousia* but the monarchy of the Father.

> The Father becomes the source, ultimate principle and cause of the Godhead, so that unity rests in him and not in the consubstantiality of the Three.[99]

It must be conceded here that Basil did indeed come from a 'homo-iousian' background,[100] and that the Cappadocian emphasis on the triplicity of God meant that they did not deal fully with the *ousia*,[101] but full appraisal of the generic view is delayed until §IV.2.

Several other comments on the *ousia* should also be noted. There is the observation that even the substance became a relational category by virtue of the *homoousios*.[102] To say that the Father and the Son are of identical substance is itself a definition of relation. It seems strange that Zizioulas does not here recognise the Cappadocian attitude that the *ousia* is seen in and is defined by the *hypostases*. This leads Zizioulas into an observation on the notion of communion, noting that Basil 'prefers to speak of it in terms of the *communion of persons*: communion is for Basil an ontological category'.[103]

Can the *ousia* be discarded? 'No', comes the unexpected answer.[104] *Ousia* is retained *as the element of communion*. The definition of *ousia* that Zizioulas accepts is relational (as noted in §I.2), but is only a very minor part of his ontology.

4. Conclusion

The focus of the difference between the Cappadocian Fathers and the modern Greek authors is clear: the basis of unity in the Godhead. In the face of the evidence surveyed in §II, which indicates that the Cappadocians believed that this lay in the *ousia*, the modern authors maintain that the Cappadocians believed it lay in the *hypostasis*, or Person, of the Father. This, it is claimed, establishes communion and relationship as the ultimate ontological category in God. 'Being is traced back not to substance but to a person.'[105]

IV ASSESSMENT

It is not our purpose here to assess some of the larger implications of Zizioulas' method (though see §V below). The aim, rather, is to discuss specific issues of emphasis and ideas. The main element of assessment is to evaluate the ramifications of such a radical alteration in the role of the *ousia*.

1. The Pre-eminence of the Father

There are too many problems associated with the role being ascribed to the *hypostasis* of the Father as cause of the Trinity for it to be uncritically accepted. Whilst it is valid to recognise a significant shift in position from Basil to John Damascus, it is too sweeping to state that 'the Greek Fathers *always* maintained that the principle of unity in the Trinity is the person of the Father'.[106] To do so is to ignore statements

about the *ousia* and its relationship to the *hypostases*, present even in John Damascus.[107]

The primary danger is that the emphasis upon the Father will become so great that ontological subordination will result, despite several voices sounding a warning.

> One would doubt, however, whether Augustine or any of those predecessors of his who stress equality, say Basil, would admit that a mere causal relation between the Father and the other persons does by itself constitute any kind of inequality between them.[108]

> There is no longer any suggestion that God is one simply by reason of the fact that the Second and Third Persons may in the last resort be resolved back into the First Person, since they derive their origin from him. The fact that now comes to be emphasised is that the Father is manifested in the Son and in the Holy Spirit wholly and without detraction. The Three Persons no longer lead back to a unity that is primarily found in one Person: they are in a real sense one in themselves.[109]

To these must be added Gregory Nazianzus' reticence, as indicated in §II.7, 'to call the Father the greater'.[110] Whilst Lossky cautioned against the idea of confounding the Godhead and the Father,[111] neither he nor Zizioulas have adequately guarded against slipping into ontological subordinationism.

Gunton's comments are especially perceptive. He questions the basis of ascribing pre-eminence to the Father on the basis of cause since these relations are *mutual*. Communion is not based solely on the Father, but is a constituent part of the nature of the Son and the Spirit.[112] A more balanced picture of cause must take account of the economy of salvation. Scripture reveals an 'order' (*taxis*) of the Persons, but this does *not* imply the loss of ontological equality.[113]

In sum, then, Zizioulas' stress on the Father as source and Monarch is so great that he has compounded the person of the Father and the Godhead. The Church Fathers successfully avoid both confounding the Godhead with the Person of the Father *and* subordination; Lossky and Zizioulas do not.

2. Attitudes to the *Ousia*

Zizioulas has a highly negative attitude to the possibility of any role for the *ousia* in the Trinity. He notes with disdain the tendency of Western thought to start any discussion of the Trinity with the *ousia* and never to achieve a true separation of the Three. This, he believes, gives pre-eminence to the *ousia* as the 'ontological principle of God'.[114] Gunton's work on Augustine would largely agree with this.[115] Augustine worked with an essentially abstract Trinity, a God who is first and foremost One

and to whom the Three are somehow to be added. Yet Mascall has argued that Augustine is not as anti-relational as he has been presented.[116] Augustine worked extensively from the Stoic/Aristotelian concept of relation; far from being concerned simply with the question of being and substance he was highly concerned with the interactions of being and substance he was highly concerned with the interactions between the three. The infamous quotations—'[the Greeks] intend to put a difference, I know not what, between *ousia* and *hypostasis*' and 'when the question is asked "what three?" . . . the answer is given "three persons" not that it might be [completely] spoken, but that it might not be left [wholly] unspoken'—have been overstressed and distorted from their context.[117]

There is also much against Harnack's theory of generic *ousia*. The rejection of Aristotelian influence (§II.3) and the doubts expressed on the analogies, and especially on the generic analogy (§II.4), have already been expressed and indicate the shaky foundation for this line of thinking. And whilst Zizioulas agrees with Harnack's conclusions, he does not give any indication of supporting a generic view of *ousia*.

There are also problems with the idea that Basil prefers to speak of communion rather than of the *ousia*. It is too contentious to state that the passages referred to support this conclusion, for the context of Basil's comments is that of the illogic of attempting to number the Godhead:[118]

> For the Son is in the Father and the Father in the Son . . . so that according to the distinction of the Persons both are one and one, and, according to the community of the Nature, one.[119]

The *ousia* is about more than the communion together of the *hypostases*. And to claim on the basis of four references (one of which cannot be traced) that Basil prefers communion to *ousia* is to ignore the evidence to the contrary. The following quotation should also be borne in mind when evaluating Cappadocian attitudes to communion:

> The continuity of nature never being rent asunder by the distinction of the *hypostases*, nor the notes of proper distinction confounded in the community of essence.[120]

It is certainly a matter of deep regret that the basis of Eastern thought on the Trinity was lost to the West. But there is still much that can be gained from the Western line of the tradition. Zizioulas' attempt to remove *ousia* seems unnecessary.

3. Tritheism?

Kelly observes that the Cappadocian Fathers were often accused of tritheism.[121] Such an accusation, however, overlooks their attitude to the *ousia*, which they stress is one, indivisible and concrete. They prefer

not to number the Godhead at all,[122] and resist the idea of adding the *hypostases* together.[123] This, however, is exactly the way in which Zizioulas lays himself open to the same charge of tritheism: he does not have the same attitude to *ousia*. Even Gunton, who elsewhere is far from reticent in castigating the evils of stressing substance, questions whether Zizioulas should reassert the *homoousion* to avert this charge of tritheism.[124]

4. *De Deo Uno*

The idea that 'the substance never exists in a "naked" state, that is, without *hypostasis*, without a "mode of existence" ', is a common enough notion in Trinitarian studies.[125] It is designed to say that the *ousia* did not precede the *hypostases*: there was no temporal lapse between the existence of the Godhead and the individual Persons, and that the Persons are independent of the economy of salvation. Zizioulas, however, reaches a quite different conclusion from this: that God exists primarily in relationship. The three modes of being are said to owe 'not to the substance but to one person, the Father'.[126] In support of this he cites Prestige, who observes that the mode of being 'may, at least in the case of the Second and Third persons, originally have contained a covert reference not merely to their existence, but to the derivation of their existence from the Parental *archē*'.[127]

Yet it is also possible to affirm the opposite: that God has always existed in his unity. Both singleness and relationship have always been a vital factor in God's existence. With Rahner we would agree that the classic separation of the doctrine of God into two treatises was not only incorrect but also implied that the Persons were 'added' to the *ousia*.[128] It is also quite probably the case that later theologians made this mistake, but that does not mean that the *ousia* must be jettisoned.

5. *Prosōpon?*

The claim that the word *prosōpon* had such a devastating effect upon Trinitarian ontology as is claimed for it, is far from convincing. The Greek Fathers always seem to have had a strong sense of the relations between the Three. This came from their full incorporation of the economy: the Three were obviously in relation to each other simply by virtue of the biblical material. The Greek Fathers did not need a mere word, and one 'foreign' to their ontology at that, to teach them about relation.

6. Summary

These criticisms force us to ask with Williams, 'who on earth says that the divine *ousia* has a *causal* relation to the persons of the Trinity?'[129]

Zizioulas has simply overstated the case in his desire to downplay the *ousia*. Zizioulas states that there are two elements to a definition of personhood: 'to be' and 'to be in relation'.[130] Whilst agreeing whole-heartedly with this (admittedly without discussion of it as such), some of the evidence adduced in its support is not above suspicion.

Firstly, *prosōpon* does not seem to have been the relational term he claims it to have been. The Greek Fathers seem to have (grudgingly) accepted it as quibbling over syllables (whilst also carefully guarding against Sabellianism). Secondly, he has not proved that the basis of. unity of the three, for the Cappadocian Fathers, was the *hypostasis* of the Father. Certainly the Father is the cause of the Son and the Spirit; of course the *ousia* was never without the *hypostases*. But his conclusion that the *hypostases* are ontologically pre-eminent to the *ousia* is impermissible. His entire attitude to the *ousia* is so negative that it is . difficult to see that he can actually support the one *ousia*, three *prosōpa* statement he quotes.

V CONCLUSION

1. Are the Cappadocians Normative?

The above survey has demonstrated the differences between Zizioulas and the Patristic Fathers, whom he claims to be in support of his thesis. Zizioulas is incorrect to state that the Cappadocians believed the basis of unity lay in the *hypostasis* of the Father, as the cause of the Trinity. Whilst acknowledging the Father's role as cause, the Cappadocians taught that the basis of unity was the *ousia*. Zizioulas may feel that the *ousia* has received too much emphasis in Western discussions of the Trinity, but he is incorrect to assert its lack of role for the Cappadocian Fathers; it had a major and central role for them.

This brings us to the point where the important question of §I.3 can be addressed: to what extent must contemporary re-applications of the Trinity adhere to the teachings of the past if they are to be valid? Even though the Cappadocian Fathers did not teach a unity based on the *hypostasis* of the Father, is it acceptable for Zizioulas to do so?

Hanson makes an apt observation on this issue:

> [The Cappadocian Fathers] elaborated a new vocabulary for expressing a Trinitarian doctrine of God and insisted that this was the only sound way, *in their circumstances and within the limits of their culture*, of expressing the ultimate burden of the witness of the Bible to his nature and character.[131]

If the work of any previous theologian is to be of value to us, its culturally specific elements must be recognised, and adjustments made accordingly. Thus, to a large extent, it is valid and acceptable to say that whilst the Cappadocians were correct for their age and time, they are

not binding upon us. They were reacting to their situation, especially that of refuting Eunomius and of establishing a secure Trinitarian vocabulary—a situation that no longer exists. In this sense, then, it is not incumbent upon *any* theologian to adhere to their teaching. Rather, it *is* incumbent upon every generation and situation to seek to contextualise dogma by a more thorough dependence upon the biblical material. Yet there are few who would wish to disregard totally the work of previous generations of theologians, especially those of the stature of the Cappadocian Fathers. Even so, their formulations can be no more lifted up and unthinkingly applied into our own situation than the Bible can be used to provide proof-texts directly for dogmatics.

Zizioulas' stance on the matter is evident in his desire to be seen as a mainstream theologian working from and with the teachings of the past and applying them to contemporary problems. The material surveyed demonstrates that his re-working of the Cappadocians is only partial in degree and possibly only a slight extension of their ideas. He does, however, tend to overstate his case and to claim definite Patristic support for ideas that they only hinted at, or which were a minor theme in their overall scheme.

2. What Role for the *Ousia?*

What must be recognised are the huge difficulties for contemporary Christians in attempting to understand the *ousia*. Ordinary church members cannot be expected to wade through complex Greek philosophy before they can have an understanding of the Trinity. What is required is a re-expression of the Trinity to capture the aim of Cappadocian teaching about the *ousia*—the equality of the *prosōpa* —whilst avoiding the Greek context and terminology that gave rise to these valuable ideas.

Certainly what is encouraging about recent Western studies is the move to reincorporate the economic Trinity as the central element of a doctrine of Trinity. With Rahner we must recognise the reality of a genuine Trinity in which things happened to the *Logos* that did *not* happen to the Father.[132] There is a desperate need to reassert the distinctions between the persons of the Trinity, to work from the economic Trinity to demonstrate the personhood of God as communion. The emphasis on *ousia* has so skewed the understanding of the Trinity in the West that there has been great damage over many centuries.

There is, however, a danger with the idea of returning to the economic Trinity: that of equating it so completely with the immanent Trinity that the latter could be regarded as superfluous. In the face of today's problems we are in greater, not lesser, need of a secure ontology; as the opening quotation demonstrates, Zizioulas also agrees

with this. But a contemporary ontology need not be formulated with the vocabulary of previous centuries and theologians. Zizioulas' aim is to establish a secure contemporary ontology by recognising the reality of the distinctions between the persons, its basis in communion and its foundation in the Scriptures. By doing this he has demonstrated a way out of the existential despair concerning the nature of personhood, that the early part of this century has saddled Western society with.

3. Conclusion

Zizioulas stands with other theologians who are re-assessing the doctrine of the Trinity and who are seeking to find new ways of making this meaningful to today's society. Instead of being restricted by the formulations of the past, these theologians are attempting to return to the economy of salvation as the bedrock, and then formulating a presentation of the Trinity for today's circumstances and culture. Whilst reservations have been expressed concerning the way Zizioulas reports the work of previous theologians, his work has much to say to contemporary Western theologians.

Endnotes

1 J.D. Zizioulas, *Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1985), 15.
2 J. Moltmann, *The Trinity and the Kingdom of God: The Doctrine of God*, trans. M. Kohl (London: SCM, 1981), 1.
3 C.B. Kaiser, 'The Ontological Trinity in the Context of the Historical Religions', *SJT* 29 (1976), 301–310. His survey of 'threes' in other religions concludes that only parallels can be found: 'the economic relations . . . are not analogous or even comparable to cosmic hierarchies' (309).
4 An extensive listing can be found in *The Forgotten Trinity* (London: British Council of Churches, 1989), 45–47.
5 C.M. LaCugna,*God For Us: The Trinity and Christian Life* (San Francisco: Harper-Collins, 1991), 260, her italics.
6 C.E. Gunton, *The Promise of Trinitarian Theology* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 86–90.
7 J.D. Zizioulas, 'Human Capacity and Human Incapacity: A Theological Exploration of Personhood', *SJT* 28 (1975), 407–408.
8 J.D. Zizioulas, 'On Being a Person: Towards an Ontology of Personhood', in C. Schwöbel and C.E. Gunton (eds.), *Persons, Divine and Human* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 38.
9 Zizioulas, 'On Being a Person', 40.
10 Zizioulas, *Being*, 17.
11 Zizioulas (*Being*, 44, n. 40; 'Human Capacity', 408, n. 2) indicates that the idea comes from some of the mystical Greek writers but also appears in the writings of Heidegger.
12 Zizioulas, 'Human Capacity', 425.
13 Zizioulas, 'Human Capacity', 409.
14 Zizioulas, *Being*, 46, his italics.
15 Zizioulas, 'On Being a Person', 42.
16 Zizioulas, *Being*, 49–53.
17 Zizioulas, *Being*, 53–59.
18 R.P.C. Hanson, *The Search for the Christian Doctrine of God: The Arian Controversy, 318–381* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988).
19 H.A. Wolfson, *The Philosophy of the Church Fathers: Faith, Trinity, Incarnation* (London: Harvard University Press, 1970 3rd edn.), 334.
20 Athanasius, *Tomus ad Antiochenos*, trans. H. Ellershaw, in P. Schaff (ed.), *The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, 2nd series, Vol. IV (first published 1894; reprint Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, n.d.), 481–86.
21 χαρακτης της ὑποστασεως αὐτου: 'exact representation of his being' (NIV).
22 τους δε λεγοντας . . . ἐξ ἑτερας ὑποστασεως ἠ οὐσιας . . . 'And those who say . . . [that he was] from another *hypostasis* or *ousia* . . .', N.P. Tanner and G. Alberigo (eds.), *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils*, Vol. 1 (London: Sheed & Ward, 1990), 5.
23 Athanasius, *Synodal letter ad afros epistola synodica*, 4—ἡ δε ὑποστασις οὐσια ἐστι, και οὐδεν ἀλλο σημαινομενον ἐχει ἡ αὐτο το ὁν: '*hypostasis* is *ousia* and has no meaning apart from being in itself' (though this actually dates from seven years after the Council). Greek text from G.W.H. Lampe, *Patristic Greek Lexicon* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1961), 1454; translation from *The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*.
24 Athanasius, *Tomus*, 6.
25 Gregory of Nazianzen, *Theological Orations*, 31.35, trans. C.S. Browne and J.E. Swallow, in P. Schaff (ed.), *The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, 2nd series, Vol. VII (first published 1872; reprint Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1961), 279.
26 J.N.D. Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines* (London: A&C Black, 1977 5th edn.), 17.
27 Examples of this can be found in Wolfson, *Philosophy*, 318–22, and G.L. Prestige, *God in Patristic Thought* (London: SPCK, 1956 2nd edn.), 190–95.
28 See e.g. Wolfson, *Philosophy*, 337, on Origen.
29 Hanson, *Search*, 864, and Zizioulas, *Being*, 38. With LaCugna, *God*, 67, and Hanson, *Search*, 723, I am assuming that Gregory of Nyssa was the author of *Ep.*, 38, not Basil.
30 G.C. Stead, *Divine Substance* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), 113–18.
31 Stead, *Substance*, 120–22.
32 Wolfson, *Philosophy*, 335.
33 Stead, *Substance*, 122.
34 LaCugna, *God*, 58–59.
35 Hanson, *Search*, 724. See also D.L. Balas, 'The Unity of Human Nature in Basil's and Gregory of Nyssa's Polemics against Eunomius', in E.A. Livingstone (ed.), *Studia Patristica*, Vol. XIV (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1976), 279–80, where he uses this distinction to explain Gregory Nyssa's alteration to Basil's *Adv. Eun.* II.4.
36 Wolfson, *Philosophy*, 314.
37 It is disappointing that no modern author has pointed out that this is totally incorrect from a chemical point of view: there is no H_2O (water) in oil.
38 Wolfson's bizarre treatment of the Nicaean creed anathema (*Philosophy*, 335) should be noted in passing. Here he identifies the meaning of *ousia* to be Stoic substratum and *hypostasis* to be Aristotelian unity by substratum. In so doing, he treats them as virtually identical whereas they are to be carefully distinguished, especially given the Stoic understanding of *ousia* as an all-pervasive substance.
39 Basil of Caesarea, *Epistles*, 236.6, trans. B. Jackson, in P. Schaff (ed.), *The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, 2nd series Vol. V (first published 1892; reprint Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, n.d.), 278.
40 Greg. Nyssa, *Ep.* 38.2, in Basil, *Epistles*.
41 Greg. Naz., *Or.* 31.11.
42 Gregory of Nyssa, *Tres dei*, trans. W. Moore and H.A. Wilson, in P. Schaff (ed.), *The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, 2nd series, Vol. V (fist published 1892; reprint Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, n.d.), 332.
43 Augustine, *De Trinitate*, trans. A.W. Haddon, in P. Schaff (ed.), *The Nicene and*

     Post-Nicene Fathers, 1st series, Vol. III (first published 1887; reprint Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978), 6.
44 Wolfson, *Philosophy*, 342–46.
45 Greg. Nyssa, *Ep*. 38.5, in Basil, *Epistles*.
46 LaCugna, *God*, 67.
47 Prestige, *Patristic*, 265.
48 Basil, *Ep*. 236.6, 125.1, and 214.4.
49 Wolfson, *Philosophy*, 336.
50 Prestige, *Patristic*, 235.
51 Greg. Naz., *Or*. 40.41.
52 Greg. Nyssa, *Ep*. 38.4, in Basil, *Epistles*.
53 Greg. Nyssa, *Ep*. 38.4, in Basil, *Epistles*.
54 Prestige, *Patristic*, 244.
55 Basil, *Ep*. 236.6.
56 Basil, *Ep*. 214.4.
57 Basil, *Ep*. 214.4; 236.6; Greg. Naz., *Or*. 29.2.
58 Greg. Nyssa, *Tres dei*, 336.
59 Greg. Naz., *Or*. 34.11.
60 Prestige, *Patristic*, 249.
61 Hanson, *Search*, 611–36; LaCugna, *God*, 55–66.
62 LaCugna, *God*, 62
63 G.A. Keith, 'Our Knowledge of God: the Relevance of the Debate Between Eunomius and the Cappadocians', *TynBull* 41.1 (1990), 68.
64 Keith, 'Our Knowledge of God', 72.
65 Zizioulas, *Being*, 40; LaCugna, *God*, 245.
66 Greg. Nyssa, *Ep*. 38.4, in Basil, *Epistles*.
67 Greg. Nyssa, *Con. Eunom*. I. 690, 691, cited by Hanson, *Search*, 729.
68 V. Lossky, *The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church*, trans. the Fellowship of St. Alban and St. Sergius (London: James Clarke, 1957), 59.
69 Greg. Naz., *Or*. 42.15.
70 Greg. Naz., *Or*. 40.43.
71 Prestige, *Patristic*, 249.
72 Hanson, *Search*, 729, n. 207.
73 Lossky, *Mystical*, 56.
74 Hanson, *Search*, 699.
75 J. Pelikan, *The Christian Tradition*, Vol. 2: The Spirit of Eastern Christendom (600–1700) (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974), 8–10.
76 Zizioulas, *Being*, 40; Gunton, *Promise*, 86–90.
77 Zizioulas, 'Human Capacity', 405–406.
78 Zizioulas, *Being*, 38; 'Human Capacity', 409.
79 C.C.J. Webb, *God and Personality* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1920), 36–52.
80 Tertullian, *Ad. Prax*., 11, as cited by Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines*, 113.
81 This table does not present all the areas of confusion. W.G.T. Sheed comments, in his notes to the *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers* edition of Augustine's *Trinitate*, 92, n. 7, that *substantia* was later identified with *essentia*. This rendered Augustine's formula, 'one *essentia*, three *substantia*', meaningless, and led to the creation in the Middle Ages of the Latin term *subsistantia*, which K. Barth notes, in *Church Dogmatics*, Vol. I.1: The Doctrine of the Word of God, trans. G.T. Thomson (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1936), 413, relates to the Eastern understanding of *hypostasis* as mode of being.
82 Lossky, *Mystical*, 52.
83 These are not necessarily chronological.
84 Basil, *Ep*. 210.5. See also *Ep*. 236.6.
85 Basil, *Ep*. 214.1–4.
86 Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto*, 45.

87 Greg. Naz., *Or*. 21.35 and 36.11.
88 . . .δηλαδη θεοτητος και δυναμευς και ουσιας μιας του πατρος και του υιου και του αγιου πνευματος πιστευομενης . . . εν τρισι τελειοταταιας υποστασεσιν, ηγουν τρισι τελειος προσωποις. Synodical letter of the Synod of Constantinople (Theodoret, *Historica Ecclesiastica*, V.9), trans. R. Bubberworth, in Tanner and Alberigo (eds.), *Decrees*, 28.
89 Zizioulas, *Being*, 36–39.
90 Zizioulas, *Being*, 31–35.
91 Zizioulas, *Being*, 34.
92 Zizioulas, *Being*, 37.
93 Zizioulas, 'Human Capacity', 409; *Being*, 39.
94 LaCugna, *God*, 243–50; Lossky, *Mystical*, 58–63.
95 Greg. Naz., *Or*. 20.7 and 31.14 can be added to the passages discussed previously.
96 John of Damascus, *Of the Orthodox Faith*, I.8, trans. S.D.F. Salmond, in P. Schaff (ed.), *The Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, 2nd series, Vol. IX (first published 1898; reprint Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1963), 11. Zizioulas' and Lossky's certainty on this issue may be taken to imply that this becomes an even stronger aspect of Orthodox Trinitarian theories.
97 Zizioulas, *Being*, 40, his italics. Note also *Being*, 41, n. 37; 'Human Capacity', 410, n. 2; 'On Being a Person', 40, n. 13.
98 Supported especially by A. Harnack, *History of Dogma*, Vol. 4, trans. N. Buchanan (New York: Russell & Russell, 1958), 85–87.
99 Hanson, *Search*, 696.
100 Hanson, *Search*, 696.
101 Prestige's observation (*Patristic*, 244), drawn particularly from Greg. Nyssa, *Ep*. 38.
102 Zizioulas, *Being*, 84.
103 Zizioulas, *Being*, 134, his italics. The reference is to Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto*, 18, but note the problems with this, discussed below in §IV.2 and n. 118.
104 Zizioulas, *Being*, 89.
105 Zizioulas, *Being*, 42, n. 37.
106 Lossky, *Mystical*, 58.
107 For example: 'in the sense of the word *agenētos* the three absolutely divine subsistenses of the Holy Godhead agree: for they exist as one in essence' (*De Fide Orth*. I.8).
108 Wolfson, *Philosophy*, 357–58.
109 Prestige, *Patristic*, 233.
110 Greg. Naz., *Or*. 40.43.
111 Lossky, *Mystical*, 59.
112 Gunton, *Promise*, 165.
113 Gunton, *Promise*, 166–67.
114 Zizioulas, *Being*, 40. See also Rahner, *The Trinity*, trans. J. Donceel (Tunbridge Wells: Burns & Oates, 1970), 15–21; Lossky, *Mystical*, 56.
115 Gunton, *Promise*, *passim*, esp. ch. 5.
116 E.L. Mascall, *The Triune God: An Ecumenical Study* (Worthing: Churchman Publishing, 1986), 11–23. See also B.L. Horne, 'Person as Confession: Augustine of Hippo', in Schwöbel and Gunton (eds.), *Persons*, 71, n. 15 for further comments concerning Augustine's attitude to the *ousia*.
117 Augustine, *Trinitate*, V.10 (*Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers*, 1st series, III.92). The Latin for the second quotation, cited in Gunton, *Promise*, 40, is *dictum est tamen tres personae non ut illud diceretur sed ne taceretur*.
118 Zizioulas refers to Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto*, 18 and 68, as well as *Ep*. 52.3 and *Con. Eun*. II.12. The *De Spiritu Sancto* references are, however, not consistent with the *Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers* edition. §45 yielded the passage Zizioulas quotes in n. 23 (cited as §18), but the other reference could not be traced. Also, it is far from clear what support he finds in *Ep*. 52.3.

119 Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto*, 45.
120 Greg. Nyssa, *Ep.* 38.4, in Basil, *Epistles*.
121 Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines*, 268–69.
122 Greg. Naz., *Or.* 23.10, as cited by Hanson, *Search*, 710.
123 Basil, *De Spiritu Sancto*, 44.
124 Gunton, *Promise*, 167.
125 Zizioulas, *Being*, 41; see also 88.
126 Zizioulas, *Being*, 41.
127 Prestige, *Patristic*, 245.
128 Rahner, *Trinity*, 15–21.
129 R. Williams, Review of J.D. Zizioulas, *Being as Communion*, *SJT* 42.1 (1989), 104.
130 Zizioulas, *Being*, 88.
131 Hanson, *Search*, 731, my italics.
132 Rahner, *Trinity*, 11–15.